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This dissertation examines the United States’s elite news media’s hegemony in a 
global media landscape, and how it can come to stand for the entire American nation in 
the imagination of outsiders. In this transnational, instantaneous digital media arena, what 
is created for an American audience can fairly easily be accessed, interpreted and relayed 
to another. How, then, is U.S. international news, which is traditionally ethnocentric and 
security-focused, absorbed in Afghanistan and Pakistan, two countries where the United 
States has acute foreign policy interests? 
This study draws from two bodies of scholarship that are analogous, yet rarely 
linked together. The first is on hegemony and the U.S. news media’s relationship with 
American society and the government. This includes scholarship on indexing and 
cascading; agenda building and agenda setting; framing; and reporting during conflict. 
The second is on the American news media’s relationship with the world, and 
nationalism as a fixed phenomenon in international news. This includes examining the 
different kinds of press systems that exist globally, and how they interact with each other. 
Afghanistan and Pakistan’s media systems have expanded dramatically since being freed 
in 2002 and they struggle daily with making sense of the volatility that comes with the 
U.S.-led Afghanistan war. Through 64 qualitative, in-depth interviews with Afghan, 
	  
	  
American and Pakistani journalists, this study explores the sociology of news inside 
Afghanistan and Pakistan and how the American news narrative is received there.   
There is a widespread, long-standing perception in Afghanistan and Pakistan that 
American journalists stain the reputation of their nations as failed states. Just as the U.S. 
exercises global hegemony in a material sense, the U.S. media is powerful in shaping 
how American and international publics see the world. Yet, while American foreign 
correspondents are U.S.-centric in their reportage on the Afghan, American and Pakistani 
entanglement, so too are Afghan journalists Afghan-centric and Pakistani journalists 
Pakistani-centric. Nationalism is how journalists organize chaos and complexity. While 
their news stories can represent an entire nation, they are more likely to harden national 
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PREFACE: Washington and Kabul  
 
 
 I write this from Kabul, Afghanistan, in July 2012. Almost nine years have passed 
since Thanksgiving Day 2003, when I first arrived here on a C-140 at Bagram Air Force 
Base as a public affairs aide at the U.S. embassy. I didn’t realize at the time that it would 
be the first of many flights into Afghanistan, long after my yearlong State Department 
tour was over. The chaos and complexity of this place has driven many Americans and 
Westerners from here, mad and frustrated. But some of us over the past decade have 
found reasons to come back: Trying to understand Afghanistan and the region can be 
addicting. For me, too, being, thinking, writing from here has always given me a sense of 
clarity that’s elusive elsewhere. Unwinding and making sense of Afghanistan, and its 
neighbor, Pakistan, takes years of living in both countries. I haven’t. I’ve therefore done 
my best to unpack small parts of these countries in the following pages. The clarity I seek 
and find here, therefore, is not as much about Afghanistan and Pakistan, as it is how 
America looks from here. And that’s the real focus of this dissertation.    
It was in Afghanistan in 2003 that I realized that Americans aren’t the only ones 
paying attention to U.S. news about the world; those affected by U.S. foreign policy 
rarely live within American borders. The people who often care the most about U.S. 
foreign policy agendas and news aren’t Americans, but the policymakers, journalists and 
publics directly affected by policies created at-a-distance in Washington. To most of 
these people – if not to most Americans – Washington is an intangible place. But they 
can turn to U.S. news — normally, elite agencies — to make their own meaning of U.S. 
intentions toward their country or region, and to see how America is projecting their 
country’s image across a global media landscape. My idea of looking at a national news 
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narrative as a sort of national representation, and at journalists as diplomats, first took 
shape here.  
To the reader and the critic of this work, I must be forthcoming about my 
professional, or administrative, experiences in U.S. press-state relations and global 
communications that contributed to this dissertation’s framework. While the cadre of 
American reporters and officials who define and communicate what the United States’s 
role in the world is, and should be, has always fascinated me, two professional 
experiences inspired me to investigate this phenomenon further at Columbia University 
and provided the conceptual foundation for this work.  
The first experience was in Washington.  
The National Security Council at the White House is a collection of academics; 
Foreign Service Officers; intelligence and military officers; and various other government 
officials who advise the president on foreign policy issues. Their job is to amass 
information from the various U.S. government agencies and then streamline it for 
presidential decision-making. It’s where foreign policy wonks want to work not only 
because of the NSC’s proximity to the Oval Office, but because of the intimate and 
flexible nature of the institution.  
My first job there was as a 21-year-old intern in May 2000. Serendipitously, I had 
met the Deputy NSC Spokesman, Mike Hammer, on an airplane flying from Reykjavik, 
Iceland to Washington, D.C. in October 1999. We were traveling back from a State 
Department conference I had been dispatched to work at. Blame it on the exhaustion, or 
the typical panic and insistence of a college senior to plan his/her entire life, but I 
admitted to Mike that, because of a less-than-satisfying experience at the department as 
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an intern, I was thinking of shunning public service and pursuing a career in the private 
sector. Luckily, he had a different idea: It wouldn’t be right, he later called to tell me, for 
one so young to give up on public service so soon. Mike hired me to intern at the NSC 
Press Office during the final year of the Clinton administration and I started working 
there a week before my graduation from The George Washington University with a 
bachelor’s degree in international affairs.   
North Korea and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict took up much of our time that 
year, but so did reconciliation within Northern Ireland and the Balkans. From the purview 
of the White House in 2000, the world seemed to be at peace – thanks, we thought, in 
part to Clinton. He traveled a great deal, making sort of global victory laps, as his second 
term came to a close. I remember, distinctively, receiving just one phone call from a 
reporter asking about Iraq the summer of 2000; it struck my colleagues and I as so odd at 
the time that anyone would think Iraq merited White House-level attention. Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, too, were on the underside of the agenda; neither country mattered much to 
Clinton’s foreign policy legacy. 
The closeness between the officials who worked at the NSC and the reporters who 
covered the White House was palpable. They were part of an elite club and I, as the 
gatekeeper to the spokespeople, was a sort of facilitator of the relationship. Journalists 
called me to find out the general stress level of the office, fish for gossip, receive advice 
on what restaurants to take my bosses to for lunch, and get tips on what issues they 
should research in advance to supplement their reporting.  
I loved it: I felt like an insider, and cherished the opportunity. This was a 
thoroughly satisfying and inspiring time to be young and working at the White House. I 
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was grateful that Mike had redirected my ambitions. But, the vagaries of American 
politics cut my time short. I left in January 2001, discouraged that Al Gore had conceded 
the 2000 presidential election to George W. Bush, but encouraged by America’s 
seemingly positive place in the world and the prospect of returning to the White House in 
2005.  
Eighteen months later, however, I was back. In April 2002, as I was traveling in 
China with Operation Smile, the charity I worked for at the time, the NSC’s personnel 
officer contacted me to see if I would interview to be an aide to President Bush’s 
National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, and his Deputy National Security Advisor, 
Stephen Hadley. Her rationale was that I knew how the NSC operated and, more 
importantly, I was young enough to not mind the long hours and humble work. I hadn’t 
voted for President George W. Bush. But, for me, September 11, 2001 made me redefine 
what public service meant. Ten years ago, playing politics with foreign policy was 
shunned; national security was a bipartisan effort and I wanted to again make a 
contribution. It didn’t matter that I hadn’t voted for the administration in power, I told 
myself, we were at war—and I had a chance to serve again. I took the position after Rice 
officially offered it to me.  
I quickly learned that my mindset would put me in good company with my fellow 
officials, and with the reporters who sat just a few feet away in the White House 
pressroom.   
In August 2002 I took my seat in the National Security Advisor’s suite in the 
West Wing as the public sell for a second post-9/11 war in Iraq began. I saw up close the 
profound media agenda-setting power of the White House, beyond what I had ever 
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witnessed during the Clinton administration. How President Bush and my new bosses 
defined global threats had changed, they argued, and the concept of preemptive action 
became operational doctrine with the October 2002 National Security Strategy.1 
Over the next six months, the rollout for the war in Iraq to the American public 
and international community dominated our workdays. Interviews between Rice and 
journalists were a daily ritual. The White House Office of Global Communications 
compiled long but slapdash reports with titles like “Apparatus of Lies” about the threat of 
Saddam Hussein for the public. Perhaps because of the lack of evidence to dispute the 
content – there were no U.S. news agency bureaus in Baghdad at the time – they were not 
publicly contested.2  
The language in the 2003 State of the Union speech clearly communicated that 
Iraq was the top presidential priority for the year, making the preparation for the war a 
fixture in the Washington-based press. The NSC and White House press offices had 
worked to ensure that this news coverage was favorable to their agenda. Officials led 
conference calls with academics, think tank analysts, and pundits, creating a sense of 
intimacy within and between them that possibly led them to believe that they were part of 
the same team. The experts had, essentially, become the administration’s third party 
spokespeople and White House talking points cascaded through the mainstream press, 
leaving few skeptics to balance the case for war.  
Once the Iraq War began on March 19, 2003, the communications strategy shifted 
from Washington to Iraq. My office monitored the effects of the military embeds, 
engineered by Pentagon public affairs officials. News correspondents, a majority of 
whom had no experience inside Iraq, were deployed alongside American troops 
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purposely to give them a narrow, U.S.-centric view of the war. For the first month, the 
U.S. news from Iraq was considered a success for the White House and the Pentagon and 
on May 1, 2003, the carefully crafted “Mission Accomplished” media event celebrated 
this veneer as solid truth. 
At this stage, my comfort level of working at the National Security Council 
plunged. I respected my co-workers’ intellect and dedication to public service. But I 
wondered if my view from the West Wing of U.S. foreign policy effects was too removed 
from reality. This was not just about Iraq, but also Afghanistan, which had also been 
informally labeled a success within the first few months of the war and now received 
episodic attention from reporters and officials alike.  
One July afternoon in 2003, while crossing the street from the White House to the 
nearby parking garage, I ran into Zalmay Khalilzad, the senior director for the Middle 
East at the NSC, whom I frequently interacted with. Khalilzad was an Afghan by birth, 
and an American by choice. After receiving his doctorate in political science at the 
University of Chicago, he became an associate professor at Columbia University; then a 
young aide in the Reagan administration as the U.S. fueled the mujahedden’s insurgency 
against the Soviets; and, ultimately, a Bush administration official. On September 11, 
2001, there was no Afghanistan office in the White House – but there was Khalilzad. He 
shaped U.S. policy toward the country from that point on. And, while he had 
simultaneously been working intensely on Iraq issues, he would soon be announced as 
the new U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan.  
I walked with Zal across 17th street and congratulated him on his new role. When 
we got to the parking garage, he turned and asked, Why don’t you come?  
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Yes. I thought instantly. I should. 
Then began the second defining experience, in South Asia.  
When I first arrived in Kabul in November 2003, the U.S. mission was severely 
out of balance. There was a dearth of resources dedicated to U.S. efforts – less than $1 
billion – but a plethora of optimism that a mission on a budget would produce sustainable 
change in a country with no infrastructure, military, health care system, civil service, or 
recent history of open governance. It was an ill-informed premise, which we’d realize--
and pay for years later. In 2004, the U.S. mission in Afghanistan was suspended between 
the excitement of the post-9/11 liberation, and the chaos that was to inevitably return as 
long as we dedicated a fraction of the money, troops, attention -- and sobriety -- 
necessary.   
From the outset, the mission in Afghanistan was troubled: With the exception of 
Khalilzad, we didn’t seem to know anything about the place. Debates about what to do 
oscillated between what should be a light footprint and a full-blown nation-building 
project. What was realistic for a country that had no human or physical infrastructure to 
effectively run a democratic government, civil society and economy beyond Kabul and 
into the parts of the country where extremism thrived?   
Afghanistan’s cruel realities clashed with Washington’s confidence. I was a 
staffer in the public affairs office at the U.S. Embassy, grappling with how to even define 
what our purpose there was. We now had a $2 billion for aid funding and a staff of 
approximately 80 diplomats and aid workers. The constant riddle was how to celebrate 
small successes and build the Afghan people’s confidence that their lives were improving, 
while simultaneously convincing Washington that Afghanistan’s progress was superficial 
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and needed continued investment. We were trying to make Afghanistan matter to U.S. 
policymakers and the press before it became a crisis. 
As embassy officials, we weren’t the only ones trying to get our Washington 
bosses’ attention. Afghanistan’s second-priority status affected the reporters assigned to 
cover the war for U.S. news agencies. Representing the U.S. press corps full-time in 
Afghanistan were six reporters working for the Associated Press, the New York Times, 
and the Washington Post. Journalists from CBS, Los Angeles Times, National Public 
Radio, Chicago Tribune and Wall Street Journal would visit frequently, but also covered 
the entire South Asia region that included the complicated, dynamic nuclear-power rivals 
of India and Pakistan. Exacerbating the exhaustion of reporting on countries with little 
physical or government infrastructure was the fact that their U.S.-based editors often 
deemed journalists’ stories obsolete. 
I empathized with the reporters. My job was to plan and implement media events 
around the country to celebrate various reconstruction projects. I spent much time with 
the U.S. security detail assigned to protect President Hamid Karzai, who was employed 
by DynCorp USA under a contract with the Diplomatic Security Bureau of the State 
Department. But the majority of them were a callous, unprofessional and dangerous lot 
with appallingly high salaries and zero code of conduct. Worst of all, they didn’t seem to 
care that every time they ventured outside the presidential palace they managed to 
humiliate Afghans. While protecting Karzai, they also directly undermined any sense of 
goodwill the American mission was trying to promote. When I tried to reason with the 
American contractors about respecting our diplomatic and aid mission, they would often 
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respond, Do you want him to die? Implying that we should never question their tactics if 
we wanted to stay alive. Most of the time, it was an unfair and condescending response.    
When I contacted Washington to complain, I was told to focus on public affairs 
and not concern myself with security, as if domineering and humiliating security acts in 
didn’t affect public perceptions of America. My colleagues and I urged the Kabul press 
corps to write about our security contractors’ recklessness, whenever there was an 
opportunity. Whether we were the impetus or not, the New York Times’ October 2004 
article, “The Intimidating Face of America” seemingly got the Diplomatic Security 
Bureau of the State Department’s attention; they sent out an Inspector General to 
investigate.3 (Security contractor reform, however, would not happen until 2007, when 
Americans employed with another U.S. security contracting firm, Blackwater, fired on 
and killed 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad.)4  
In Afghanistan, we were another club of reporters and officials, trying to 
challenge assumptions by our respective colleagues in Washington. While some 
important stories were filed in 2004, the power of just a handful of people in Washington 
to shape the U.S. news landscape was even more stunning from the embassy in Kabul 
than from the West Wing. The dynamic would ensure that Afghanistan did not grab the 
conscience of the American public until 2009, when President Barack Obama would 
make the war a priority for U.S. foreign policy. Civilian missions and development goals, 
while essential in this conflict, rarely made for good copy and the lack of troops to fight a 
resurging Taliban made the security frame a difficult one to utilize and grab the American 
public’s attention.  
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Within my corner of the U.S. embassy, we were also confused over what our 
contribution to the Afghan news media should be. While, at first it was a delight to see 
our press releases printed verbatim on the front page of an Afghan newspaper, we would 
cringe shortly after – it was hardly the mark of a professional press. How should we 
support the development of Afghanistan’s first-ever free press? And how do we—should 
we?—support the development of our counterparts who worked for President Karzai? 
The concept of press-state relations was entirely new. Was it within our purview to 
professionalize and develop the dynamics between Afghan “reporters and officials”? 
   While determining what the most responsible course to take was, the head of 
South Asia public diplomacy at the State Department in Washington, Larry Schwartz, e-
mailed me in February 2004. He wanted me to organize media tours for foreign 
journalists, giving them an incentive to come to Afghanistan and report on the progress 
that had been made. Since many weren’t covering Afghanistan issues from Afghanistan, 
he argued, we should bring them to the story. Larry suggested the first batch of 
journalists be from Pakistan. Although Afghan and Pakistan are neighbors, there were no 
Pakistani journalists stationed inside Afghanistan; they were covering the story from 
Pakistan, mainly through a mix of news sources and hearsay.  
In April 2004, a group of 10 Pakistani reporters landed in Kabul, just a 30-minute 
flight from Islamabad, for the first time. I came to the airport tarmac to greet them. Most 
of them seemed amused to see me, a 25-year-old American official. I got the instant 
sense that this effort would backfire.  
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The friendliest Pakistani reporter was Yousaf. He was also young, represented an 
English-language daily newspaper, and had a smile that reveled a seemingly genuine 
excitement to be among such distinguished colleagues. His presence reassured me. 
On the second day of their visit, the journalists sat down for a roundtable 
discussion with Ambassador Khalilzad, who the Pakistanis saw more as an Afghan than 
an American. Once the Ambassador made some welcoming remarks, the journalists all 
clamored to ask the same question: “Ambassador Khalilzad, should Pakistan be doing 
more?” The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, also known as the Durand line, 
imagined by colonial Great Britain in 1893 but traditionally rebuffed by the tribes that 
live along it, was a volatile, jagged space. Much of the fighting was along it and 
Khalilzad was beginning to criticize Pakistan for its inability to stop the Taliban from 
crossing into Pakistan only to regroup to fight another day in Afghanistan.  
My colleague and I looked at each other worriedly. Ambassador Khalilzad had 
been increasingly complaining about Pakistan’s seeming complacency with the Taliban, 
seeing the Pakistani military and intelligence services as using the Taliban as a kind of 
insurance policy: If the Americans left neighboring Afghanistan in chaos, the Taliban 
could be dispatched again to quell the violence and defer to Pakistan in matters of 
regional security. Washington had signaled their discomfort with Khalilzad being 
outspoken on this issue, as such criticism would jeopardize Pakistan’s cooperation in the 
war.  
But, in his answer, Khalilzad gave a diplomatic response: “We all need to do 
more. The United States needs to do more, the UK needs to do more, the Europeans need 
to do more, the Afghans need to do more, and Pakistan needs to do more.” 
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We relaxed as the reporters wrote down the answer. There were a few more 
questions, but not many. The roundtable was finished in 20 minutes, 25 minutes ahead of 
schedule. Ambassador Khalilzad looked at us, thrilled to be finishing early. We shrugged, 
and then led the reporters to the filing center we had set-up for them to write their stories. 
Later, they returned to their guesthouse, slept, and the next morning, flew off to visit a 
military base in Paktika.  
A day later, Larry e-mailed me with one line: “What happened?” 
I looked at the Pakistani press clips the reporters had filed after their interview 
with Khalilzad. A majority of them had in the headline the phrase, “Pakistan Should Do 
More.”5  
I took the tape recording of the interview, put on my headphones, pressed play 
and started transcribing the discussion to assure Washington that the articles were a 
misrepresentation of the interview.  
But the damage was done. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Islamabad used its 
weekly press conference to react to news reports of the interview. The spokesman said 
that Khalilzad "seems to be suffering from attention deficit disorder." The spokesman 
then declared, "We will lodge protest to the U.S. government on the foolish and 
irresponsible utterance of the U.S. ambassador in Kabul."6  
We spent the rest of the day dealing with the issue as it reached the attention of 
Secretary of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, who had to address their 
counterparts about the incident.   
Later that night, the Pakistani journalists returned from Paktika. They were flying 
back to Pakistan early the next morning. With nowhere else to go, we brought them to the 
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Marines’ chow hall for dinner on the embassy grounds, where they were served spaghetti 
and chicken fingers by Halliburton-employed Indian cooks, and then sat amongst the 
young American Marines to eat it.  
I saw Yousaf and walked to him with my notebook. “A lot happened while you 
were gone,” I remember saying. I explained that we had gotten the news stories they filed 
from the Khalilzad interview with several inaccuracies, and that they had caused an 
unnecessary clash between Washington and Islamabad.  
I handed him the transcript, “This is what he said.” Then, I handed him the story, 
“And this is what you wrote.”   
Yousaf, I recall, looked at both, nodded his head, and picked up his news story. 
He said, “This is what we heard.” 
I tried harder. “I don’t think you understand. This interview was inaccurately 
reported and has caused diplomatic tension between our two countries.” 
Yousaf looked up and smiled wider. “It’s all over the Pakistani press?” I nodded. 
He responded with satisfaction, “So now we return to Pakistan famous.”  
My eyes widened and I stared at him while he, gleefully, looked back at his 
colleagues to inform them of the good news.  
I felt incredibly naïve. I couldn’t say a thing. 
 
I left Afghanistan in late November 2004, a year after I arrived. I also left the U.S. 
government and took refuge in my home city of San Francisco. In 2005, I began to work 
for The Asia Foundation and, among travel to other South Asian countries, returned to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan periodically to handle some crisis public relations situations 
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and conduct trainings for Afghan and Pakistani staff on how to work with their local -- 
and U.S. -- media. My experiences with a weak Afghan press and an animated Pakistani 
press repeated themselves in various permutations. I also continued to stay in touch with 
the U.S. reporters assigned to cover the two countries, especially as the Taliban began its 
resurgence in 2006. With each year, I realized increasingly that I wanted to channel my 
professional frustrations into a constructive, academic environment to discover how, if at 
all, these dynamics fit together.  
I came to Columbia in September 2007 to examine several issues: the increasingly 
important place of communications theory in international relations; the inattention of 
U.S. media to foreign news; the nonsensical abandonment of a U.S.-led war in 
Afghanistan in U.S. news; the shaky development of media in Afghanistan and Pakistan; 
and the ever-changing digital and transnational landscape of news. Plus, I wanted to 
investigate why the U.S. constantly seemed to fumble public diplomacy, the current term 
for the active engagement between the U.S. government and foreign publics. Public 
diplomacy as an academic sub-field was beginning to generate interest and I wanted to 
help give it some academic grounding separate from the myopic rhythms of Washington.  
Perhaps, I thought, an under-investigated component of America’s image in the 
world was our news: How our national story travels in the world and affects global public 
perceptions. With this dissertation, I wanted to produce something that showed how the 
traditional U.S. national security narrative, nurtured within the insular world of 
Washington, was perceived overseas. And to question if, perhaps, what we tell each other 
as Americans to make sense of our role internationally could have an unintended effect in 
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the very countries we deemed vital to our national security in the first and second decades 








CHAPTER 1. The Afghan, American, Pakistani Entanglement 
 
 America is physically more than 5,000 miles away from Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
yet it has felt much closer than that to Afghans and Pakistanis during the past three 
decades. Directly and indirectly, the United States has been a central actor in their daily 
affairs since the late 1970s, when South Asia became a Cold War battleground.  
On Christmas Eve 1979, the Soviet Union, fearing that the Afghan Communist 
government was too weak to stand on its own, invaded the country and began a nearly 
decade-long occupation. Earlier that year, American President Jimmy Carter ordered the 
U.S. government to begin covertly supporting the mujahadeen, or Afghan freedom 
fighters, against the increasing Soviet presence. Yet the U.S. could not do so without 
neighboring Pakistan’s support. Until then, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship had been 
contentious. In the 1970s, Pakistan relentlessly pursued a nuclear weapon to balance 
India’s power and fulfill its energy needs despite the U.S. government’s disapproval. But 
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan became an indispensible American ally. 
In the 1980s, the Reagan administration overlooked Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions and 
gave it roughly $5 billion in economic and military aid to become a key transit country 
for U.S. arms supplies to the mujahedeen, and to support the millions of Afghans who 
took refuge in Pakistan almost immediately after the Soviet invasion.7  
The three countries have been entangled in one another’s affairs ever since.  
 Once the Cold War was over, America moved on from Afghanistan. The Soviet 
military left in February 1989 and the U.S. largely withdrew its aid to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. Anticipating a power vacuum that mujahadeen leaders would rush to fill, the 




diplomatic mission to Afghanistan across the border to Peshawar, Pakistan and watched 
from there as Afghanistan began to plunge into a devastating civil war. With the Soviets 
no longer uniting them, the mujahadeen fractured into a confusing set of factions, their 
leaders becoming warlords who scrambled to control territory. In the process, they 
destroyed Afghanistan’s infrastructure. Kabul city, once the “Paris of Central Asia,” 
filled with Western tourists to in the 1960s and 70s, was in ruins.8  
Through the 1990s, the Afghan refugee community in Pakistan remained at 
roughly 4 million people, putting an enormous strain on Pakistan’s resources.9 
Meanwhile, President George H.W. Bush suspended all economic and military aid to 
Pakistan in October 1990 upon suspicion that Pakistan was again pursuing nuclear 
weapons. Pakistan was: In May 1998, the Pakistani military conducted six nuclear bomb 
tests in reaction to India’s five nuclear bomb tests, shocking the world. Pakistan’s 
military leaders also actively sought solutions both to quell the civil war chaos in 
Afghanistan and to control the Afghan leadership without American assistance. At the 
end of the decade, the Taliban became the Pakistani military’s panacea for the chaos that, 
in their view, the Americans had left behind in Afghanistan.  
Taliban, by definition, means “students” in Pashto, a language spoken by the 
Pashtuns that live in southern and eastern Afghanistan, and western Pakistan. They were 
known to be pious Muslims – some of them former mujahedeen – who wanted to create 
an Islamic state of Afghanistan. The Pakistani military’s intelligence wing, Inter-Services 
International (ISI), supported their move into southern Afghanistan in 1994. At first, the 




who had terrorized communities and destroyed much of the country. Gradually, by 1996, 
the Taliban, gained control of most of the country, and took over the national government.  
As the Taliban began its brutal regime, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates recognized them as legitimate rulers.10 The American government 
largely ignored them. The Taliban enacted Shar’iah law, and their form of justice was 
swift, unforgiving and cruel. Women were not allowed to work, let alone out of their 
homes. Music and imagery were banned. Life became extraordinarily dull, and 
Afghanistan was frozen in time, divorced from the world. While the Taliban government 
provided no services for their citizens, it welcomed Osama bin Laden and members of his 
al Qaeda network as their guests. They granted them safe haven as they planned attacks 
against the United States and the West.  
 The September 11, 2001 attacks solidified America’s place within the Afghan and 
Pakistani public psyche; the U.S. became an everyday actor in the Afghan and Pakistani 
governments’ routines, and their media’s. More than a decade later, Afghans physically 
see tens of thousands of American soldiers, diplomats and aid workers who provide 
security and aid with mixed results. Pakistanis do not see American troops first-hand, but 
U.S.-operated, unmanned drones attack militants in Pakistani tribal areas from the sky. 
Since 2002, the U.S. has spent at least $529 billion on the war and given more than $29 
billion in economic aid to Afghanistan; it has also given Pakistan $25 billion in economic 
aid and reimbursements to the Pakistani military for fighting “America’s war.”11 During 
this war on terror as during the Cold War, the U.S. made Afghanistan and Pakistan a 




The task of explaining the U.S. government’s policies and the American nation’s 
attitudes has largely fallen to the journalists who report for U.S. news organizations. 
American journalists’ easy access to U.S. officials, and their built-in understanding of 
American-style democracy and political dynamics, has made their reportage invaluable to 
Afghan and Pakistani journalists who have to live with the war’s ramifications. Afghans 
and Pakistanis see the U.S. government as having hegemonic control over global events. 
They therefore assume that the American press channels government policy. They look to 
the U.S. press to describe the operations of the U.S. government. It was the American 
press that told the region that planes had hit the World Trade Center in New York and the 
Pentagon on September 11, 2001. It was the American press that told them that the U.S. 
was waging war against terrorism in the sovereign state of Afghanistan on October 7, 
2001. And it was the American press that told Afghans and Pakistanis that Osama bin 
Laden had been killed on Pakistani soil.  
 At 11:35 p.m. eastern time on May 1, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama 
announced from the White House that bin Laden had been killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan 
by a team of American Navy Seals.12 To Americans, bin Laden was a murderer and a 
terrorist. “An Emblem of Evil in the U.S., an Icon to the Cause of Terror,” was how the 
New York Times headline described him on May 2, 2011. It was his vision and leadership 
that killed thousands of Americans and compelled President George W. Bush to start in 
2001 what ultimately became America’s longest war. For many Americans who saw the 
twin towers fall, and especially for the younger generations that came of age in the post-
9/11 decade, the news was cathartic. Dan Barry from the Times described the American 




[that] ranged from jingoistic bursts of boast to halting expressions of dread; from joyous 
shouts for the strike of a winning goal to somber reflections about that dish best served 
cold, vengeance.”13 The Washington Post called it, “a moment of national unity.” Dan 
Balz explained the “spontaneous flag-waving crowds” outside the White House as “a 
small symbol of the emotional relief that swept across the country” after Obama’s 
announcement.14  
This American narrative did not resonate with the Pakistanis. Pakistani television 
aired footage of the U.S. celebrations, but the Pakistani people did not rejoice in bin 
Laden’s death.15 Pakistanis learned early their morning of May 2, 2011 that U.S. forces 
had killed Osama bin Laden on their soil. That day, Pakistan’s Foreign Office released a 
statement confirming the news: 
[in a raid] conducted by the U.S. forces in accordance with declared U.S. policy 
that Bin-Laden will be eliminated in a direct action by the U.S. forces, wherever 
found in the world…It is Pakistan's stated policy that it will not allow its soil to be 
used in terrorist attacks against any country. Pakistan's political leadership, 
parliament, state institutions and the whole nation are fully united in their resolve 
to eliminate terrorism.”16  
 
The Pakistani government hadn’t been warned of the incursion. The U.S. government did 
not trust them to cooperate in the raid. The Pakistani media largely saw this as a major 
breach of Pakistan’s sovereignty, another humiliation that symbolized America’s power, 
and its ability to act with impunity outside its borders. 
In 2011, 72 percent of the Pakistani public said that they did not know who was 
behind the September 11 attacks; 19 percent thought that the American government had 
instigated them to have an excuse to invade Afghanistan and flex its power in the region; 




that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda were the culprits.17 On Geo TV, Pakistan’s most 
popular television station, senior correspondent Ansar Abbasi said on May 2, 2011 that 
bin Laden was not a terrorist and that the Taliban and al-Qaeda “have never been enemies 
of Pakistan.”18 According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, an overwhelming majority 
of Pakistanis concurred: only 14 percent of them thought that bin Laden’s death was a 
positive event.19 In an article in the conservative, English-language newspaper, The News, 
Hamid Mir, the first and last journalist to interview bin Laden after September 11, 
insisted that bin Laden never took credit for the attacks, but now that he was dead, the 
U.S. should stop its war in Afghanistan and drone attacks in Pakistan.20  Several pundits 
and newspaper editorials agreed with this sentiment.21  
The Afghan news media and leading government officials also learned about the 
news from the United States. Unlike Pakistan, the Afghan news media welcomed bin 
Laden’s death in Pakistan as a positive event – and a large majority of Afghan people 
agreed.22 But this was mainly because it confirmed to Afghans that Pakistan was the 
United States’ main antagonist in the region, not Afghanistan.23 Tolo News, 
Afghanistan’s most popular news source, almost boasted in its May 2, 2011 broadcast: 
“Pakistan has always rejected the al Qaeda leader's presence in its territory, claiming that 
he was living in Afghanistan. However, the Afghan people and officials repeatedly 
rejected the claim.”24 Former director of the Afghanistan National Directorate of Security 
(NDS) Amrullah Saleh said, “Now the world should realize that the Afghan people are 
right and had already accused Pakistan of providing sanctuaries for terrorists.” President 




proved that Pakistan was the cause of turmoil in Afghanistan and that the U.S. should 
redirect its military resources there instead of Afghanistan.25  
This was mainly the Kabul elite speaking. Education and information is grossly 
uneven in Afghanistan, and those who live in parts of the country that suffer the most 
from conflict are often left to speculate why things happen. In an earlier poll conducted in 
2010, the International Council on Security and Development found that 90 percent of 
Afghans living in the south, where fighting is the heaviest, did not know about the 
September 11 attacks. They also did not know that the attacks were the catalyst for the 
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001.26 They assumed, like many Pakistanis 
who did not believe al Qaeda engineered September 11th, that the Americans were there 
to occupy them to expand their empire. Just as the Mongols, Persians, British and Soviets 




Walter Lippmann famously said in Public Opinion (1922) that “the only feeling that 
anyone can have about an event he does not experience is the feeling aroused by his 
mental image of that event.”27 Almost a century later, this is still true: We all relate to 
others and the complex world beyond through the “pictures in our heads.” And the source 
for the mental images we construct most often is news. In the United States, we can form 
opinions on domestic events and issues through direct experiences, or the experiences of 
friends, family, colleagues and acquaintances. News media for domestic events, in other 




can relate to what happens within American borders through more channels than the 
world beyond American borders.  
News reports on foreign issues or events, on the other hand, have considerable more 
power in shaping Americans’ mental images of the world – and the U.S.’s role in the 
world. Lippmann’s quote applies more to what is mostly intangible for Americans: 
Foreign people, foreign cultures, foreign issues and foreign events. We are less likely to 
directly experience wars, disasters and systems of governance other than democracies. If 
we do, it is because we came to the U.S. to flee them, or because we travel to a sample of 
countries for leisure or work. We often turn to journalists, whose job it is to cover foreign 
news – either from the United States, the country being discussed or its neighboring 
region – to give us a snapshot of the issue or event so we can create a mental image of the 
place and its importance.  
But Lippmann also made a second point in Public Opinion: Until “we know what 
others think they know,” he said, “we cannot truly understand their acts.” How can 
someone understand the perceptions of another? One way is to consume the news media 
of the Other: to read what they read, to watch what they watch, to listen to what they 
listen to. That can happen within domestic spaces – in the U.S. a liberal seeking to 
understand a strong conservative’s mindset may elect to tune into Fox News; while a 
conservative wanting to understand a liberal’s point of view may watch MSNBC. But this 
also applies on an international scale: Global citizens looking to understand a national 
mindset of another country can read or watch their news outlets within that country. 
Specifically, for the purpose of this dissertation, citizens of other countries who are 




Pakistanis, can watch and read what U.S. policymakers and citizens watch and read to 
gain better insight as to how they think – and try to predict how they will act.  
Today, that is not difficult to do. The U.S. news media is part of a transnational, 
instantaneously available digital media landscape in which information flows within and 
between nations faster and in more quantities than ever before in history.28 News is not 
confined to one national audience. Global journalists are exposed to several narratives 
each of which represents a distinct version on international agreements, disasters and 
wars. The imagery and narratives U.S. journalists provide for Americans can also be 
consumed by anyone in the world who speaks English and has access to the Internet, 
and/or satellite television. Global audiences for American news can produce unintended 
media boomerang effects: Whatever text is written, whatever pictures are taken, whatever 
words are said about a foreign land for a U.S. audience can travel back to the government 
officials, journalists and citizens of the nation American journalists are talking about. 
What is created for one group of people living in a society can fairly easily be accessed, 
interpreted and relayed to another. The unanswered question is, what happens next? 
American journalists mediate the space between the government and the public. But 
U.S. foreign policy often affects global publics more than the American public, except for 
the small minority of U.S. citizens involved in military and diplomatic communities and 
international business. And global publics can share, too, in the public information 
provided for U.S. policymakers and the American citizenry – and look to it for insight 
into why America acts the way it does internationally. This is especially the case for 
foreign journalists who need to report on America’s impact on their respective countries. 




anywhere in the world as long as local news gatekeepers see it as having value.29 Yet for 
reasons of their own, journalists and editors select agendas and frames that help fix the 
identities of their people and their nations.  
Some see this free exchange of news as having significant potential to bring global 
communities closer together.30 Lester Markel, for instance, the former Sunday editor of 
the New York Times, wrote in 1983, “We cannot have understanding – and thus peace – 
among the peoples of the world unless they come to know one another better, unless they 
have better, truer, information about one another.” This information cannot come from 
government-sponsored broadcasts like Voice of America, the BBC, or Radio Moscow, he 
said. “The main instrument for communicating such information, for bringing about such 
understanding is the newspaper…it is the day-by-day flow of the news.”31 To understand 
how the world communicates, it is important to understand the stream of news stories—
and the way they come to stand for an entire nation in the imagination of outsiders. But 
Markel’s assumption was that a greater flow of news and information could bring 
understanding and peace between peoples and nations.  
U.S. news about the world, however, is understood ethnocentrically. U.S. journalists 
not only project a certain identity of the U.S. to Americans and the world, but the identity 
of other nations as well. How is that identity welcomed within the countries that are being 
written about? Does U.S. news encourage greater understanding between the United 
States and other nations? Or does it remind Americans and other nations too much of our 
differences? Does it help transform and open worldviews – or does it harden the 







In the main, this dissertation examines how American news about the world travels, 
and, in particular, the role it has played in this decade-long war. It examines hegemony in 
U.S. news, and how American news narratives resonated in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
from 2010 to 2012. The study also looks at the sociology of news development in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan since their media systems were freed in 2002, and the habits 
and underlying philosophies their journalists have created.  
The core of this work takes the form of four working hypotheses. First, Afghan and 
Pakistani journalists use American news as their principal source material for 
understanding America and U.S. foreign policy. They see elite U.S. publications (the 
New York Times and Washington Post, especially) as authoritative voices on the United 
States and ritually relay information from these publications in their own copy and 
broadcasts. Second, these journalists have a complex attachment to the American news 
media, which they scour for facts and insight, but also resent for what they deem to be 
negative news frames about their countries. They also take exception to ethnocentrism in 
U.S. news reportage, which they identify in the close relationships U.S. journalists 
maintain with U.S. government officials. Third, Afghan and Pakistani reporters relay the 
U.S. news within frameworks that make sense for their national audiences. There is some 
variance in how Afghan and Pakistani journalists reflect U.S. news because of their 
distinctly different relationship with the U.S. and the degree of maturity in their 
respective news medias. Fourth, Afghan and Pakistani journalists insist that they are 




their country and society’s interests, which is the same ethnocentrism they dislike in 
American news. 
A transnational news system in which national news narratives are shared does not 
foster transnational consensus: In an international media landscape, news narratives, 
themes and frames remain decisively national. Nationalism in the press is hardly an 
American phenomenon. Most journalists see themselves as part of a nation they feel 
responsibility toward. Countries in conflict with each other can see the other nations’ 
news about it as troubling at best, since the narrative can often be negative.32 But there is 
a widespread, long-standing perception in developing nations that American and other 
Western news media stain the reputation of people and countries throughout the world.33 
Just as the U.S. exercises global hegemony in a material sense, the U.S. media is 
powerful in shaping the “pictures in the heads” of American and international publics. In 
the American news media’s attempt to inform and educate Americans on Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, they often create an image that the residents, journalists and government 
officials of those countries can perceive as being drastically oversimplified. The news 
stories they tell often create more friction than understanding.  
 
The Chapters  
 
This dissertation has four parts. The first aims to give the reader background on the 
scholarly literature that provides the framework for this study, and the U.S. news 
narrative about the war in Afghanistan and “Af-Pak” policy, as it is described in U.S. 




sociology of news development in Afghanistan and Pakistan and how local journalists 
absorb U.S. news about their countries. These sections rest on 57 in-depth qualitative 
interviews that I conducted between 2010 and 2012 with Afghan and Pakistani journalists 
about their newsgathering habits, their perceptions of their news systems and American 
reporting about Afghanistan and Pakistan. The fourth part of the dissertation examines 
how the realities and worldviews of Afghan and Pakistani journalists conflict with 
American journalists’ perceptions. I interviewed seven U.S. foreign correspondents who 
report for elite news organizations from Afghanistan and Pakistan on how see their jobs; 
their reaction to the Afghan and Pakistani journalists’ criticisms of them; and what they 
deem the future of Afghan and Pakistani journalism to be.  
Part I: The Background. Chapter Two, the literature review, examines two bodies 
of work that are analogous, yet rarely linked together. The first is on hegemony in the 
U.S. news media and its relationship with American society and government, especially 
how it pertains to international issues and events. This also includes scholarship on 
indexing and cascading; agenda-building and agenda-setting; framing; and reporting 
during conflict. The second is on the American news media’s relationship with the world, 
and nationalism as a phenomenon in international news. This includes examining the 
different kinds of press systems that exist globally, and how they interact with each other.  
Chapter Three looks at the reality the U.S. news media has created about the war in 
Afghanistan and the entanglement with Pakistan. It provides some background on U.S. 
news organization’s treatment of Afghanistan – and to a lesser extent, Pakistan – since 
the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. It examines how the American news 




ethnocentric bias after the attacks and the beginning of the U.S.-led war. The chapter then  
discusses the waning U.S. coverage of Afghanistan during the Iraq war and its increased 
coverage when President Barack Obama took office in 2009.    
Part II – The Pakistani Journalists. Chapter Four looks at how the privatization of 
Pakistani electronic media in 2002 unleashed a fiercely competitive broadcast media 
system that regularly promotes sensationalism and conspiracy. Chapter Five explores 
how 27 elite Pakistani journalists perceive their media history and its current state. It also 
focuses on Pakistani journalists’ relationship with their government, both the civilian and 
military arms, which they treat differently due to a deeply embedded deference for their 
military. Chapter Six looks at how Pakistani journalists consume U.S. news media, what 
meaning they create from it and how they relay it. 
Part III – The Afghan Journalists. This section is similar in structure to Part II on 
the Pakistani journalists, but it explores the distinctly different trajectory of the Afghan 
news media, the journalists’ relationship with government officials, and their use and 
perceptions of U.S. news about Afghanistan. Chapter Seven looks at the Afghan news 
media’s short history, which has been under authoritarian or hyper-partisan controls until 
the past decade. While there is much scholarship on the development and history of 
Afghanistan,34 with the exception of non-governmental organizations, inter-governmental 
organizations and bilateral aid agencies’ white papers, there is little academic work about 
Afghanistan’s media space.35 This chapter attempts to piece together what has 
contributed to the state of Afghan journalism today, and how the Afghan government 




Chapter Eight explains what 30 elite Afghan journalists think about the current state 
of their press, its future, and how the administration of Afghan President Hamid Karzai 
engages them. Chapter Nine begins to look at Afghan journalists perceive the “reality” 
American journalists have created about Afghanistan and how they make meaning from it 
and transmit it.   
Part IV – The American Journalists. Chapter 10 explores the views of seven 
American journalists who report for elite U.S. news organizations in mostly Afghanistan, 
but also in Pakistan. It discusses their hegemonic role as purveyors of information to their 
intended audience, Americans, and to the unintended audiences of Afghan and Pakistani 
journalists. The foreign policy narrative in Washington is set by small group of people, 
comprised of U.S. government officials and a cadre of international news reporters and 
editors for elite news agencies, like the New York Times and Washington Post. This 
chapter examines how they perceive their role in this entanglement and their 
understanding of how their reportage reverberates within Afghan and Pakistani media 
systems. It focuses also on the Afghan and Pakistani journalists’ criticism that U.S. 
journalists serve to promote U.S. national interests, and sometimes closely align 
themselves with the views and policies of U.S. government officials. Chapter 11 
examines how American journalists perceive the development of Afghan and Pakistani 
news media, and what they think their futures will be after U.S. troops withdraw from 
Afghanistan in 2014.  
 
The post-9/11 Afghanistan war provides a timely case study to understand how news 




– and the role of the United States in it – for their publics. A nation’s media system is 
deeply entangled with its government’s and population’s worldviews. Their journalists 
are profoundly affected by both the ills of their society and its successes. The current 
state of the Pakistani and Afghan news media show that they are eager to exercise 
freedom of speech and play a role in their young democracies. Yet, according to the 
journalists I interviewed in both countries, while they celebrate their relatively free press, 
they have enormous shortcomings in being a responsible press. In particular, they suffer 
both from massive self-censorship and government censorship. Afghanistan and Pakistan 
rank 150 and 151, respectively, out of 173 in the 2011-2012 Press Freedom Index.36 Yet 
the problem is even greater.   
In Pakistan, the mainstream press is addicted to sensational news stories on security 
and political intrigue. Their news reports are overwhelmingly choked with 
unsubstantiated conspiracy theories. Pakistani media reflects a culture and society 
anxious for change, but without a clear direction on how to make it happen. Instead of 
investigating the sources of their society’s problems and guiding the public and the 
government toward constructive dialogue on solutions, they set out to shame political 
figures. They are obsessively fixated on the notion that a press serves to destroy power, 
and that has become the foundation from which they operate. Yet they selectively go 
after the power they feel safe contending, such as the Pakistani civilian government and 
the American government. They feel less secure taking on the Pakistani military and 
Islamic fundamentalist groups. 	  
In Afghanistan, the free news media is much more timid in taking on the many 




journalism is a new phenomenon and Afghan reporters fall into the habit of reporting 
about the government without skepticism. Its capacity to report and investigate remains 
weak, yet journalists with the more popular news organizations are becoming more 
emboldened and professional. This is a result, however, of the strong Western, mostly 
American, presence in the country. Afghan journalists working for “free” news 
organizations rely on American economic support, on top of American news reportage on 
their country for information about the conflict, the U.S., and its own government.  
Given the 30-year entanglement between the three countries, a recurring subject for 
both Afghan and Pakistani news media is America: What is doing, why it is doing it, and 
what its intentions are for future action in their countries. Global news outlets routinely 
examine and relay American news about U.S. politics and our celebrity culture to keep 
their audiences informed about the health of the American government, and entertained 
by Hollywood. Yet elite Afghan and Pakistani journalists’ relationship with American 
news goes much deeper.  
Journalists who report for elite U.S. news organization are powerful but overlooked 
players in the international conflict. Not only do they influence U.S. policymakers and 
the American public, but they also represent the views of the United States in an 
accessible package that Afghan and Pakistani journalists (among others) can recycle for 
their audiences. In their eyes, the U.S. media is a credible purveyor of what the U.S. 
government wants the world to know. Therefore, U.S. journalists’ selection and 
representation of Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s realities, and the U.S. government’s 
policies towards both countries, make them unofficial diplomats for anyone seeking to 




effective and widely accessible liaisons. As U.S. foreign correspondents are the American 
public’s connection to a world unknown, they also serve as guides for the Afghans and 
Pakistanis about an America unknown.  
Yet Afghans and Pakistanis do not want to understand all of America anymore than 
Americans want to understand all of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Each population wants to 
know how the other country will affect them. They want to put their country at the center 
and use their worldview as the lens. This ethnocentrism helps manage and simplify 
complexity like this entanglement. For American journalists, that means promoting a 
worldview in which liberal democracies are the ideal form of government, and in which 
American material power must be used to keep the U.S. safe. American journalists may 
be holding the U.S. governments accountable for its actions, but Afghans and Pakistanis 
see no humility in their news coverage of their countries. They see a news media that 
follows the U.S. government’s lead and reduces their countries to one-dimensional, 
violent nations. For Pakistanis and, to a lesser extent, Afghans, a casual visit to the 
United States through its news media hardens a negative view of the U.S. they began 












CHAPTER 2. Nationalism in America, Nationalism Everywhere: Literature Review. 
 
This literature review explores several different bodies of scholarship pertinent to this 
study’s question. It is separated into two sections. First, it looks at issues of hegemony, 
and the U.S. news media’s relationship with American society and the government. This 
includes scholarship on ethnocentricity and enduring values in U.S. news; indexing and 
cascading; agenda-building and agenda-setting; framing; and war reporting. Second, it 
looks at the American news media in a global context. This includes examining the 
different kinds of press systems that exist globally, how they interact with each other, and 
whether ethnocentricity and nationalism in news are universal.  
While these two bodies of work are analogous, little work has linked them together 
and investigated how a U.S. national security narrative is received within a global context. 
The global effect of American news products and their function in shaping global 
perceptions about the United States and its role in the world is underexplored. How does 
traditionally nationalistic American news travel, and is it duplicated—or altered—for 
foreign journalists’ own purposes? 
In this dissertation, I focus on the elite U.S. news media. Elite media is defined as that 
“which has an impact with intellectuals and opinion leaders,” is respected within their 
communities, and has “the biggest impact on the serious thinking of a nation.”37 For the 
U.S., normally, it is just the elite brands – New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street 
Journal and Los Angeles Times, among the highest – that establish which international 
issues are the most significant for the country and explain how those issues should be 
explained to the American public.38 The elite U.S. press has long been seen as the 




world’s largest military power with dozens of bases around the world, but also because of 
its transnational reach. However, this global impact is disproportionate to the amount of 
information that Americans consume about the world. Traditionally, foreign news makes 
up less than 10 percent of total news content. But U.S. citizens and their elected officials 
depend on it for information about the world, as they can rarely rely on personal 
experience and interpersonal communication to understand events in the global arena. 
Less than one third of Americans have a passport and most citizens use that passport to 
travel to neighboring Canada and Mexico.39 The news media therefore is a vital 
intermediary between the American public and the state on issues of national security and 
foreign policy.40 
 
I. AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS IN AMERICA 
 
Government Affects Media: Hegemony, Indexing, Cascading 
 
Communications scholarship has long established that the idea that the press can 
provide unfettered, completely objective news is simply an ideal. And this is especially 
the case when it comes to foreign affairs reportage. A number of factors—not least 
expense and ignorance—limit the value of the coverage.  Moreover, national security 
apparatuses thrive on secrecy.  All in all, the image that U.S. journalists craft about 
America’s role in the world is largely based on what U.S. officials tell them.41 Journalists’ 
rarely challenge the consensus between executive officials and legislators on foreign 




the world; when it comes to issues of foreign policy and national security, the press 
normally follows the U.S. government’s lead, giving it a kind of hegemonic control over 
how the public sees the world.  
Todd Gitlin defined hegemony in The Whole World is Watching as the ruling 
class’s ability to persuade the subordinate class of a certain meaning of events, and the 
consent of that subordinate class that that meaning is correct.43 It involves, according to 
Antonio Gramsci, the “penetration of ideology (ideas and assumptions) into their 
common sense and everyday practice; it is the systematic (but not necessarily or even 
usually deliberate) engineering of mass consent to the established order.” Indeed, the 
image journalists craft about the role of the U.S. in the world depends on a certain co-
dependence between U.S. reporters and officials. 44  U.S. officials regularly establish the 
salience of a foreign policy for the governmental agenda45 and journalists regularly turn 
to official sources for information on it.46 When the salience of a foreign policy issue is 
being determined for the governmental agenda, journalists regularly turn to official 
sources for information and defer to their point of view – most especially during this 
policy formation stage.47  
Journalists bolster U.S. government positions through a passive acceptance of the 
frame government spokespeople use to describe an event or issue, repeating official 
talking points and relying on domestic sources to inform them of international issues and 
events.48 The U.S. government has good reason to work closely with the U.S. press to 
build its case for policy and action, especially during crises and war: In the twentieth 
century, governments became more concerned with their own popularity because support 




hegemony over the news agenda on foreign affairs is so vast, John Zaller and Dennis 
Chiu argued, that the U.S. press was actually “government’s little helper.” Their analysis 
of media coverage of 35 U.S. foreign policy crises between 1945 and 1991 found that the 
press rarely strayed from the government views and policy.50 Similarly, Piers Robinson’s 
review of U.S press-state relations found that the U.S. press has consistently supported 
the U.S. government during times of war, most notably the Vietnam War, the 1991 Gulf 




Journalists, the primary conduits between foreign policy officials and the public,52	  	  
tend to give weight and credence to the views and opinions of the former.53	  	  W.	  Lance	  
Bennett called this ritual reliance on government officials for source material – and 
journalists’ seeming inability to challenge the consensus between executive officials and 
legislators on foreign policy issues – indexing.54 He explained that journalists prefer to 
speak with officials—especially those in the executive branch—and to use them as 
principal sources in foreign policy stories. 
The American president has unrivaled access to the news media, especially 
network television, and he both benefits (and suffers) from constant coverage.55 
Reporters give more deference to the president and his executive branch than to the 
legislative branch, because they trust those closest to decision-making in Washington to 
explain U.S. foreign policy.56 For instance, Doris Graber found that from August 1994 to 




members of Congress, making the American president the central figure for the U.S. 
press.57  
U.S. news is indexed implicitly to the “range and dynamics of governmental 
debate,” and it is particularly relevant to issues that have a larger, global effect, which the 
public may not know much about without the media’s guidance – such as military, 
diplomacy, trade and macroeconomic policy decisions.58  This is especially pertinent to 
foreign because officials can control how the issue is framed – and a journalist rarely has 
access to intelligence or facts that could contest the official line.59 As Ole Holsti 
explained, “effective diplomacy requires… secrecy, speed, and flexibility,” which is not 
“enhanced by more active public participation.” Government, especially the executive 
branch, has the opportunity to carefully select attributes of a foreign policy to win the 
support of journalists, and the public.60 When foreign news is breaking, foreign policy 
officials, especially those in close proximity to the president, have a commanding 
influence, alternative sources are absent or neglected, and news frames tend to reflect 
official rhetoric frames.61 In these early stages of offensive or defensive foreign policy 
decision-making, the press is just beginning to understand the story and reporters’ 
investigative functions are limited.   
While journalists can consult pundits outside of government, officials are the most 
sought after because of their decision-making roles and access to classified information. 
Journalists tend to deem few sources in the legislative branch, academia, and think tanks 
as credible without validation from the executive branch; and non-credible dissenting 
opinions are perceived as deviant. This essentially represents the paradox of Washington-




deem insiders who control and promote policy to be credible sources for information and 
outsiders with dissenting views and not credible. This is especially acute during a time of 
crisis. O’Heffernan argued during his assessment of the 1991 Gulf War that reporters and 
officials have an “interdependent and mutually exploitive” relationship, which serves 
both their interests: the government wants to sell its policies, and the commercial media 
wants to sell papers or accrue high ratings.62 Over issues of national security and foreign 
policy, both reporters and officials cater to a patriotic and nationalistic norm to meet 
these goals.   
To also maintain their access to government officials, journalists are also likely to 
remain cautious about making judgments against them.63 Meg Greenfield, a former 
Washington Post editor and opinion columnist, argued that the need to protect and foster 
sources—compounded by the implicit code of conduct for Washington reporters to 
remain objective—demands that journalists bury their convictions and use of ideological 
frames to simply report what they are told.64 This is reflected in Bennett’s assessment of 
the U.S. news media’s handling of the 2004 Abu Ghraib story. Bennett found that while 
the event provided the news media an opportunity to act independently from the 
government and to raise the difficult issue of torture, the media framed the story as an 
isolated event—consistent with the Bush administration’s rhetoric on this issue—and did 
not provide an independent counter-frame to challenge the administration despite all the 
imagery and evidence that pointed toward torture.65  Bennett’s summary was that “event-
driven news reporting, particularly in matters of high foreign policy consequence, is 




This idea of deferential journalism intersects with what Daniel Hallin defines as 
journalists’ oscillation between a “sphere of consensus” and “sphere of legitimate 
controversy.” The sphere of legitimate controversy includes the central positions staked 
out in elections and legislative debates, which are established as credible by political 
actors; the sphere of consensus is the space of “motherhood and apple pie,” within which 
the journalist is expected to serve as a patriot and an advocate of policy.67 For the 
reporters who cover the discourse over foreign policy issues from Washington, once a 
foreign policy issue is removed from a sphere of legitimate controversy and inserted into 
one of consensus, the story loses its salience, as there is little credible dissent – or 
skepticism – to index coverage to. Washington-based reporters therefore rarely challenge 




The events of Sept. 11, 2001, according to Robert Entman, confirmed that the 
news media “patrols the boundaries of culture,” but also challenged the idea that U.S. 
journalists are automatically accepting of U.S. government views: There are ways that 
elites, the press and the public can challenge the official government line, although it is 
difficult to do. 	  
Entman built on the work of Hallin (1986) and Jonathan Mermin (1999) to create 
the cascade activation model68 that identifies when elite opinion – which index theory 
suggests is the main driver of change for news narratives on a particular issue -- can 
fragment.69 The model allows one “to measure the distance between the White House’s 




examining how much and how thoroughly the thoughts and feelings that support a news 
frame extend from the White House and the executive branch to “other elites” (i.e. 
Congress members and their staffs; think tank experts; former government officials; 
professors; interest groups, etc.) to the news media– and then down to the public.70  Each 
level of the model, too, has its own network of association “among ideas, among people, 
and among the communicating symbols (words and images)” and spreading 
interpretations within them is an automatic, largely unconscious psychological process.71 
The cascade model acknowledges that not all elites are created equal; “some individuals 
in Congress or the media, for instance, can get attention for their ideas far more easily 
than others.” 72 For instance, at the media level, elite outlets – like the New York Times 
and Washington Post – set the agenda for other news sources. 
The cascade model shows that how each level interprets an issue is not always 
pre-determined.73 At the top of the model is the presidential administration and at the very 
bottom is the public and “The farther an idea travels between levels on the cascade, the 
fainter the traces of the ‘real’ situation are.”74 The president and his staff enjoy the 
greatest power in selecting the mental images to associate with an issue and events, and 
then project them down the cascade. Ideas from the public, at the bottom of the cascade, 
can travel upward to change the media’s news frame, and then up to the elites, and then 
up to the executive branch – but this is rare. As Bennett explains it:  
As is true of actual waterfalls also moving downward in a cascade is relatively 
easy, but spreading ideas higher, form lower levels to upper, requires extra 
energy—pumping mechanism, so to speak. Ideas that start at the top level, the 
administration, possess the greatest strength. 75   
 
But if the news media can convince the elites and the administration that large swaths of 




collective perception on an event or issue, then the news media can affect how the leaders 
think about and act on them.76 It is possible, yet only to an extent.  
 
Media Affects Government: The CNN Effect 
 
The idea that media affects government, that it can shake officials out of 
complacency and force them to act, is popular among practitioners. This is the “CNN 
effect”: the concept that 24-hour news reportage and imagery can inflict pressure on the 
U.S. government to act globally and therefore has major influence on setting the national 
agenda for foreign policy. Practitioners like government and non-governmental officials, 
Bella Mody pointed out, have given credit to news agencies for stirring governments and 
members of the public to act – whether it be through donations or volunteer service. In 
1992, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for instance, said, “The day that [the 
media] began to pay attention to Somalia, we began to receive the support of the member 
states. Then they were ready to give us planes for transport and to provide more 
humanitarian assistance and the forces to protect it.”77 Former U.S. Secretary of State 
James Baker agreed. He wrote in his 1995 memoir, “In Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, 
and Chechnya, among others, the real-time coverage of conflict by the electronic media 
has served to create a powerful new imperative for prompt action that was not present in 
less frenetic times.”78 And in 2005, the United Nations Emergency Relief Commander, 
Jan Egland, emphasized that it wasn’t until news cameras arrived in Niger to document 
the famine that UN requests for donations were met.79 There is also the long-held belief 




Yet, while practitioners believe that media has power in policy-making and the 
CNN effect is real, many scholars do not place much faith in it. News can provoke 
discourse on an issue among policy decision-makers, Steven Livingston conceded.80 But 
it’s only when an administration is the least certain about its policy—either in its initial 
conception or during its early implementation—that the press has the greatest chance of 
affecting that policy.81 Daniel Hallin argued that “Media are most active when the 
administration fails to maintain the initiative on a major public issue”82—or in other 
words, when the public isn’t hearing clear messages directly from officials in Washington. 
Piers Robinson found that where policy on the issue is uncertain, and the media frames its 
coverage of the issue as one of critical importance and lends empathy to it, then there is a 
strong CNN effect. The media can be more convinced of the issue’s importance than the 
government, and its voice may therefore be stronger than the government’s. This was the 
case with two air-power interventions in Bosnia in 1994 and 1995, Robinson found. 
However, when policy was certain – as was the case with ground troop intervention in 
Somalia and Iraq in 1991; the air war against Serbia; and the decision not to intervene 
with ground troops in Rwanda – there was either a weak or no CNN effect.83 Robinson 
emphasized, however, that the news media normally made a strong case for minimal 
intervention that advocates more for the use of military air power, rather than ground 
forces.84  And normally, if there is a CNN effect, then it is just a short-term response to a 
specific episode – it does not affect long-term policy decisions.85  Journalists, in other 
words, are not policy makers.  
In 1995, Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus found that the “CNN effect” did not 




Baker asserting that it did. They argued that although media content was an important 
factor in eventually expanding the U.S. role in Somalia, it “came in response to official 
initiatives, and not the other way around.”86 Mermin likewise found in his study of 
network news coverage of the civil war and starvation crisis in Somalia in 1992 that 
television likely contributed to but did not drive the George H.W. Bush administration’s 
decision to airlift emergency aid in August 1992, and then deploy ground troops in 
November 1992. Evidence showed that “stories on Somalia appeared just after the 
articulation of demands for intervention in Washington in the summer and fall of 1992. 
Journalists ultimately made the decision to cover Somalia, but the stage for this decision 
had been set in Washington.” Journalists, he found, may set the news agenda, but they do 
so in close collaboration with officials and elites in Washington.87 
However, the idea of media’s influence on foreign policy, according to Mansour 
Farhang and William Dorman, is “too intangible to be easily quantified and too complex 
to be comprehended in isolation from other sources of influence” such as information 
flows and information management within a complex web of decision-makers.88 Eytan 
Gilboa agreed. “The linkages between media coverage, public opinion, and policy,” he 
said, “aren’t yet sufficiently clear, and researchers who wish to validate the CNN effect 
and rely on the assumption that the triangular mechanism is valid may be moving in the 
wrong direction.”89 
At best, we know that the news media can be an input source for foreign policy 
decisions: the quantity of an issue’s coverage, content’s tone, and intensity can signal to 
officials which policies they may need to adjust. Or, the media can be an input source for 




shape and deliver their messages on a policy.90 The media, through the frequency and 
depth of its coverage, can both directly and indirectly either confirm or refute which 
policies are most important.91 For risky, high-cost operations – such as one that require 
the deployment of ground troops – the CNN effect is a myth: Public pressure rarely calls 
for troops to enter combat. 92 It is also the same for policies in which the U.S. government 
is proactive and has taken the time to build a robust case with clear messaging that proves 
the case’s importance. Journalists’ use of official sources, and their own inclination to 
defend and promote their national identity, lead them to honor U.S. government policies 
and rhetoric. Again, the press can set the news agenda for the nation when it comes to 
foreign affairs, but they do so with government officials.  
  
Agenda Building, Agenda Setting and Enduring Values 
 
Agenda setting is the "ability [of the news media] to influence the salience of 
topics on the public agenda" by the frequency and prominence an issue receives in the 
news media, according to Maxwell McCombs’ and Donald Shaw’s 1972 definition.93 
This concept has been the topic of hundreds of systematic studies on domestic policy,94 
yet understanding how foreign news stories, which are reported less frequently, are 
selected for treatment is important in its own right. In 1963, Bernard Cohen, in his 
seminal work, The Press and Foreign Policy, systematically explored the nature and 
effects of foreign affairs reporting in the United States.95 He found that reporters have 




wrote, “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.”96  
In 2004, however, Wayne Wanta, Guy Golan and Cheolhan Lee contested Cohen’s 
argument that the media does not tell the U.S. public what to think – indeed, they argue, 
the news media does by giving the public an “agenda of attributes” – a second-level 
agenda-setting effect. Their research found that coverage of foreign nations in the news 
influences how important those nations are seen – and whether or not people have a 
positive or negative view of them.97 Second-level agenda setting, they argued, looks more 
deeply at the “transmission of attributes of actors in the news from media coverage of 
these attributes to the public’s recall of the same attributes—a much more subtle level.”98 
In other words, first-level agenda setting suggests that the news media affects what the 
public thinks about, second-level agenda setting, much like framing, suggests that media 
coverage influences how the public thinks about it. Similarly, John McNelly and Fausto 
Izcaray found that the news agenda for international issues and events that broadcast 
outlets selected do directly influence U.S. public opinion:99 The amount of news coverage 
and how they are framed, directly relates to how Americans perceive different countries – 
as positive, successful, or not.100 If a country is described negatively in the news, 
Americans will likely have a negative view of that country.  
The agenda-building notion, defined by Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, is an 
extension of agenda-setting and looks at how the media initially selects news and “why 
some controversies or incipient issues come to command the attention and concern of 
decision makers, while others fail.”101 Before reporting on a story, journalists make a 




depends on its timeliness, its newness, and whether or not it resonates with the American 
audience. These criteria do not always apply for foreign news, but if a story involves 
violence, conflict, disaster, or scandal, it is also more likely to be selected for coverage.102   
The emphasis on violence and conflict means that, when media are selecting international 
news coverage, wars, riots, and massacres—as well as intra-government disputes that 
place an issue in Washington’s “sphere of controversy”— are priorities for print or 
broadcast.103  
Political actors have a stake in agenda-building should they wish to keep an issue 
prominent in the media.104 Lang and Lang, in their 1981 case study on the Watergate 
scandal, argued that the public agenda is formed through four steps: the media highlight 
some events, activities, groups or personalities; these elements are then presented in a 
shared frame; the issue is then linked to “secondary symbols, so that it becomes part of 
the recognized political landscape”; and then government spokesmen promote these 
symbols that establish a feedback loop to media to increase coverage.105 While Lang and 
Lang’s research was based on American political actors reacting to domestic issues, the 
research also suggests that, should American political or policy actors largely reach 
accord on a foreign policy issue, putting it in the “sphere of consensus,” its salience for 
the media agenda may decrease.  
Indeed, conflict and drama – in Washington or overseas – involving foreign affairs 
issues is what drives most U.S. news media coverage of the world. How those realities 
are constructed depends on various decisions journalists make about which attributes to 
highlight: the amount of print space or airtime; the choice of vocabulary; the choice of 




covers the story -- sets the tone for the rest of the U.S. press.107 And elite news 
organizations, which have the most influence in setting a news agenda, usually abide by 
certain “enduring values” that limit coverage to a small number of countries and 
storylines.108  
Herbert Gans’s influential sociological study of newsrooms in the U.S., Deciding 
What’s News—written originally in 1979 but largely confirmed in his 2004 edition—goes 
into detail on how foreign news is often selected. American news, he explains, is 
primarily about our nation and society, which means that foreign news is largely 
concerned with depicting the nation as the unit. News, therefore, is U.S.-centric and 
“deals either with stories thought relevant to Americans or American interests.”109 
Because foreign news receives the least amount of print space or airtime in the U.S. news 
media, only “the most dramatic overseas events,” which normally involve pending or 
current conflict, are deemed newsworthy.110 Also, because American news values the U.S. 
as the most important and valued nation in the world order, news about foreign countries 
can include overt ethnocentrism and “blatant patriotism.”111 This makes U.S. foreign 
news less objective and prone to making “explicit value judgments that would not be 
considered justifiable in domestic news.”112 
Philip Powlick and Andrew Katz, in their 1998 study of international news 
selection, agree with Gans that when media are selecting international news coverage, 
wars, riots, and massacres—and arguments between government officials in 
Washington—are priorities for print or broadcast.113 But for the U.S., the factors that also 
determine international news coverage includes how the country ranks on the world stage 




economic development, its degree of press freedoms, and its cultural and geographic 
proximity to the United States.114 What countries make it into U.S. news depends on the 
position or material power that country has, either through nuclear or other weapons of 
mass destruction, troop levels, or it’s GDP and how much it exports.115 Tsan-Kuo Chang 
found in his research of international news on U.S. television that the most powerful 
nations in the world were regularly covered in the 1990s, while smaller countries on the 
periphery were not normally considered newsmakers.116 News of international events is 
normally focused on events or issues that violate U.S. or western norms -- or on how it 
involves the United States, especially if there are U.S. troops deployed in the country.117  
The U.S. press mostly ignores the developing world unless there is a disaster, war 
or other atrocity that shocks the world. The most frequent topics in international news 
rarely includes a country’s culture or society, it is mostly about their domestic 
government and diplomacy.118 Foreign news coverage, too, also had a particular impact 
on the U.S. public’s perceptions of foreign nations. Wanta, Golan and Lee’s qualitative 
analysis of 1998 newscasts and public opinion polling of Americans perceptions of 
foreign nations found that U.S. news provided the most negative coverage on Iraq with 
329 negative stories, followed distantly by negative news coverage of India (85), Pakistan 
(83), China (37), Iran (28), North Korea (28) and Mexico (22). Correspondingly, the 
American public had the coldest feelings toward Iraq, followed by Iran, North Korea, 
Cuba, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, India, China, and Russia. They argued that this 
proved that “the media can show the public both how vitally important countries are to 




editors in the United States still press for reporters to find the local angle in international 
news coverage.120 
 James Carey once referred to a lack of explanation in American journalism as part 
of the “dark continent” of journalism” – and this is decisively the case with foreign 
news.121 When international news coverage is included in the U.S. press, it is traditionally 
“breaking news,” which is episodic, has less explanatory power and is therefore less 
meaningful to the U.S. public than thematic, analytical reports.122 Like Gans’, Simon 
Cottle’s analysis of global crisis reporting shows that international reportage is shallow, 
intermittent and quick; it is determined by a sense of ethnocentrism, economic pressures, 
geopolitics and national interests.123 Christopher Beaudoin and Esther Thorson found that 
episodic news reports made up 73 percent of the Los Angeles Times’s international news 
stories.124 Paying sustained attention to a foreign news story often means that there needs 
to be an American troop deployment.125 Hallin and Gitlin found that during the 1991 Gulf 
War, 20 of America’s 25 newspapers increased in circulation while the Cable News 
Network (CNN), the only U.S.-based news agency in Baghdad during the time of the 
initial U.S. attack on Iraq, increased its audience share tenfold.126  Such coverage allows 
U.S. news media to celebrate consensual values and show the public that they are being 
responsive to the soldiers who are in harm’s way.  
The U.S. public wants imagery and narrative from the frontlines of war to try to 
understand the experience.127 War not only creates a supply of news, it creates a demand 
for it, a commentator told Harold Lasswell in 1927, after World War I.128 And for the U.S. 
public, it’s not any war – it’s our war; the U.S. news consumer must be invested in the 




when it comes to domestic issues and events; when it comes to war or any kind of 
international conflict, looking at both sides of the story would be deemed unpatriotic.130 
But it’s war that dominates foreign news coverage;131 it’s popular because it appeals to a 
sense of American ethnocentrism; which has been a core part of U.S. foreign 
correspondence since it began in the 19th century. Dell’Orto’s study of foreign 
correspondents from 1838 to 1859 found that “the most dominant discourse was of 
American superiority, especially political, that was constructed repeatedly as the United 
States’ providential mission to the rest of the world, either by ‘beneficial’ intervention 
(on the American continent) or enlightening example (to Europe).”132  This “enduring 
value” is reflective in Entmann’s 1991 study that showed that U.S. journalists explained 
the Soviets’ downing of Korean Air flight 007 in 1983 as murder; but when the U.S. 
downed an Iranian airplane in 1988, it was explained as a technical accident.133  
In sum, U.S. foreign affairs reportage is likely be periodic, to have a dramatic quality, 
to promote U.S. interests, and contrast that country’s values with American values. The 
developing world is largely ignored—unless there is a disaster or other atrocity that 
shocks the world, or if U.S. troops are involved in a war in the country.134 To American 
audiences, the U.S. is often positioned as the international community’s sole superpower, 
prepared to respond militarily to any threat against U.S. national security or the American 
way of life, or even in behalf of what are deemed to be larger “civilizational” values.135 
These “enduring values,” alongside a dependence on U.S. officials for information, 
normally guide U.S. news professionals to establish the salience of issues and set their 
news agendas, but how these issues are specifically framed can affects how negatively or 







Frames, Erving Goffman explained, organize knowledge by assigning issues and 
events categories, shaping one’s understanding of objects or situations, and then 
suggesting how one should act toward or within them.137 For journalists, frames are 
critical to sort out the world for news consumers as they “bundle key concepts, stock 
phrases, and iconic images to reinforce certain common ways of interpreting 
developments.138 As Gitlin described, an organized world helps journalists “package” 
information “for efficient relay to their audiences”139 and through frames, journalists can 
give news a storyline by selecting some aspects of a perceived reality—a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation—and make them more salient.140  
And how an event or issue is framed affects how that event or issue is perceived; 
frames help people “negotiate it, manage it, comprehend it.”141  The most influential 
media frames, Entman argued in 1993, were ones that use “culturally resonant terms” for 
their audiences. This is especially pertinent to American audiences trying to digest 
international news and foreign policy issues: Filtering complexity by giving news a 
simple storyline within a frame is especially common, as foreign events are often 
mysterious for American audiences.142  Foreign affairs also depend largely on 
conventional news frames, or on how similar stories have been explained to the public in 
the past – especially news on terrorism and conflict. The news is often slotted into 




problems by assigning familiar storylines. This was the case with Sept. 11, 2001, when 
journalists gave the U.S. public “consistent, predictable, simple, and powerful narratives 
that [were] embedded in the social construction of reality.”143 
These conventional news frames include three general categories to international 
news: “security,” “diplomacy” or “humanitarian.” Using them allows audiences to 
receive a snapshot of what the issue is, why it is important, and what the U.S. role is and 
should or should not be. But U.S. journalists frequently rely on the security frame and 
organize the world for Americans according to U.S. national security interests. This is 
certainly the case for countries that are at war – and especially for wars where U.S. troops 
are deployed. If a country is not described in security terms, then the country’s 
government, economy and its overall role in the international community are normally 
emphasized -- rarely does U.S. news include stories about a country’s culture or society, 
unless it is in the travel section or has a direct impact on the country’s commerce or 
politics.144   
The conventional news frame allows readers to quickly interpret, categorize and 
evaluate conflicts without giving them due analysis. And, in this case, the public could 
see the world as a dichotomy, just as it was during the Cold War. Until the 1990s, the 
Cold War news frame gave Americans a clean paradigm for the globe, but the 
“intellectual coherence and narrative power” of the frame gave way when the Berlin Wall 
fell and Central and Eastern Europe turned into electoral democracies.145 September 11 
gave the U.S. government and the media a “war on terrorism frame” to categorize the 
world again as U.S. friends or enemies. It was applicable to U.S. foreign policy as a 




could lump together different facts and personalities, and “make sense of a range of 
diverse stories about international security, civil wars, and global conflict” all the while 
“conveying U.S. foreign policy priorities to the international community.”146 
Substantive news frames, according to Entman, define effects or conditions as 
problematic; identify causes; convey a moral judgment of those involved in the issue; and 
endorse prescriptions to the problem being discussed. 147 With September 11, the problem 
was the deaths of thousands of U.S. citizens; the cause was terrorism; the moral judgment 
was to call the acts evil; and the remedy became war. “All four of these framing functions 
hold together in a kind of cultural logic, serving each other, with the connections 
cemented more by custom and convention than by the principles of valid reasoning or 
syllogistic logic. The two most important of these functions are the problem definition” 
since defining the problem sets the tone for the cause, the moral judgment and the 
solution. 148 A dominant frame, in which there is no other competing frame, “produces 
extraordinarily one-sided survey results” which discourage dissent – therefore further 
cementing the dominance of that frame – whereas the idea that there are two competing 
frames, or “frame parity” is the exception in U.S. news on foreign issues.149  There can 
also be several news frames to describe a news story.  
The effect that news frames about September 11 had on the public was strong, 
argued Norris, Kern and Just. Heightening risks to U.S. national security in the news 
resulted in Americans thinking that the threat of global terrorism was much more than the 
actual reality: The State Department Patterns of Terrorism report in 2001, which had 
tracked global terrorism since 1969, found that the actual dangers from terrorism had 




While news reporters and government officials can engineer both news agendas 
and frames, frames can also be built through a less-conscious, socially constructed 
process. This is true not just for Washington-based reporters who are remote from the 
foreign environment they are writing about, heavily reliant on government officials as 
sources, and under deadline constraints to generate news—but also for the field-based, 
foreign correspondents who monitor that policy’s impact abroad. Pan and Kosicki 
suggested that frames can be byproducts of social norms and values, organizational 
constraints, interest group pressures, journalistic norms, and ideological or political 
orientations of journalists.151 Especially because frames may be manifest in nuances of 
wording or syntax, frames can have effects that are difficult for journalists to predict and 
control.152 
 Frames are both mental images that live inside our heads and social objects that 
are embedded in our discourses, routines and institutions; they are often assumptions 
taken to be truth.153 They also give shape to the larger environment in which reporters and 
officials operate and interact; they can give shared meaning to the U.S. journalists and 
U.S. officials who are both working on national security issues or, in the case of this 
dissertation, working on policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. 154  This is especially 
the case for journalists who are working abroad. Foreign correspondents are part of a 
larger expatriate community in war zones that includes members of the diplomatic and 
NGO communities. They are all part of a community of expatriates who are struggling to 
make meaning of the foreign environment, and be effective within it. Frames can make, 
according to Weick, “assumptions and definitions taken as given” and create a “shared 




enable, and justify specific practices and policies while precluding others” and create 
dominant practices that, after repetition, are taken as natural and for granted.156 Instead of 
generating a counter-frame, journalists and officials can easily apply new information to 
a dominant frame. While they do not cause action, they make action possible by 
establishing “the conditions of possibility for objects or events.”157 Journalists have 
considerable responsibility in not just seeking to see beyond their own biases to fully 
understand a country, but to also try to project that to an American public. But, the 
normative framework of American journalism limits that.   
Political scientists like Barnett and Finnemore, Keck and Sikkink, have used 
frame analysis to understand international action, especially as it pertains to humanitarian 
movements involving non-state actors.158 Frames can shape how people decide what is a 
problem and what is not. In other words, problems are constructed and the American 
public’s shared definition of success and failure in Afghanistan and Pakistan may be 
completely different than what Afghans and Pakistanis think inside those countries.159 But 
how these officials and journalists define foreign events and issues and try to make sense 
of them – especially during conflict – can largely be a reflection of the sociological 
constraints they face in trying to do their jobs.  
 
Constraints Journalists Face in War Reporting  
 
 Relying on a certain normative framework to understand complex and foreign 
scenarios is a crutch within the arena of war reportage, especially a war the U.S. is 




audience, it normally needs to make the U.S. a central piece of the story and rely on a 
security frame to tell the story.  
 This is normally the result of sociological constraints that U.S. journalists in 
conflict settings, like Afghanistan and Pakistan, face that include battlefield censorship; 
deadlines; broadcasting standards; and security, language and cultural barriers. 160  
Journalists covering conflict are mostly conveying what they can determine in a fog; it is 
not necessarily a full and accurate representation of reality.161 Pedelty, who conducted 
ethnographic research on U.S. foreign correspondents working in El Salvador, described 
foreign correspondents’ pace as “frenetic”; and the workday, Hannerz added, can also be 
“ordered by two clocks, the one at home and the one on the beat.”162 Due to these 
demands, attributes of a story highlighted in a conflict setting are often ones that are 
available to the reporter, not selected.163 A foreign correspondent’s newsgathering routine 
can be a sort of trial and error process, and reporting fully on a conflict environment is 
impractical. This is where relying on both U.S. officials and established, contemporary 
news frames and storylines comes into play. Foreign correspondents must then find a 
news “peg”: an organizing device for drawing audience attention, which is normally a 
crisis, disaster, or conflict happening in the country—usually with importance to the U.S. 
interests.164 Foreign correspondents can revert to already-established story lines to 
organize news; and Washington-based editors are much more likely to “index” the 
foreign coverage to what is happening in Washington.165  
There are also the issues of the physical location of the reporters, their tendency to 
self-censor, the means in which news is distributed and the communications efforts of the 




that overworked idiom: the fog of war.” 166 And that is mostly what journalists covering 
conflict are conveying, a fog; it is not necessarily a full and accurate representation of 
reality.167 The organizational impact on foreign correspondents is great. Van Ginneken 
explained that news agencies can “discipline” foreign correspondents’ work, “sometimes 
in such routinized and subliminal ways that individuals may be largely unaware of the 
forces constraining them, and determining not only which stories are covered but how 
they are framed.”168 There is often tension between the correspondent and their U.S.-
based editor, who is removed from the foreign correspondent’s day-to-day reality and 
responding to pressures from his or her superiors. Sometimes the correspondent pitches a 
story to an editor but, because of the limited space available for foreign news reporting, is 
told not to bother pursuing it.169 These constraints rarely allow for “why” and “how” in 
addition to “what” and “where.”170 
 The reporter-official dynamic can spill out beyond Washington as journalists 
depend on the U.S. officials in the country they are reporting on. According to Cook, 
most news relayed by U.S. press during the 1991 Gulf War was gathered from the 
Pentagon, State Department and the White House.171 Reporters do not set out to a combat 
zone with full independence to report what they see. Two forces normally send a U.S. 
journalist to a conflict setting: the U.S. government’s determination that the country in 
question matters to the U.S., and that journalist’s news organization’s determination that 
the country in question matters to their news coverage.172  The latter is more decisive 
because covering the world is expensive, particularly for television, for which the costs of 





 Another factor that influences foreign correspondence is “pack reporting,” which 
can also contribute to maintaining a consensual frame: If the majority of foreign 
correspondents choose one storyline, other ones can seem deviant and will often be 
perceived as biased.174 In Washington or in the field, diverging from the consensus can be 
considered fringe reporting and therefore dismissed as not credible. This is made all the 
more complicated when you factor in the reality that much coverage of war is not based 
on what the writer observes first-hand, but what he derives from secondary sources.175 
This has increasingly been the case as foreign news bureaus shut down and agencies rely 
on local stringers and newswires for information.     
While reporting from overseas, especially during a conflict, maintaining 
objectivity is a supremely difficult task. For Americans, a war can be ‘our war’ and a 
journalist working for a U.S. news agency can be seen as an American first, and then a 
journalist. A U.S. journalist, therefore, “walks a very thin tightrope attached to two cliff 
edges labeled ‘objectivity’ and ‘patriotism,’” Taylor explained, as the U.S. audience 
normally has a “subjective desire to see everyone support the national war effort.”176 
Similarly, British journalist Max Hastings, during the 1982 Falklands conflict between 
the United Kingdom and Argentina, argued that when a foreign correspondent is covering 
his/her nation is at war, objectivity is impossible.177 Besides a sense of nationalism, there 
is the inevitable murkiness and uncertainty of wartime that yields confused reports 
throughout large swaths of the country – yet the journalist can only physically be in one 
particular location at one time.178 
McLaughlin’s interviews with 15 war correspondents in 2002 found that they are not 




they think is the story and then get out.  Talk to most foreign correspondents in-depth, 
McLaughlin argued, and “they reveal the conflicts and dilemmas that constantly haunt 
their efforts to ‘get the story’ more than their more conventional colleagues on purely 
political or diplomatic beats. They want to find the stories that must be told, and no one 
would know about otherwise.”179 What they face in a modern war environment – 
McLaughlin described as a “high-octane, high-risk space” – are a host of sociological 
constraints, including risks to their personal safety, plus “a range of military, political, 
technological and economic pressures” that include self-censorship, restrictions on 
movement and having to deliver for the 24-hour news cycle. All of this can push 
journalists to be, knowingly or not, selective with the facts.180   
Moreover, editors may not accept news stories offered by their reporters unless they 
have already been reported by prestigious organizations and deemed by the journalistic 
community to be on the news agenda.181 When the Times, “runs an international story, it 
serves as a cue for other media outlets to pick up on the issue as well,” argued Powlick 
and Katz.182 Journalists are avid consumers of journalism – and, especially when it comes 
to foreign affairs, they often look to elite news organizations for cues on what to cover, 
and how to cover it. This leads to the concept of “borrowed news” or derivative 
journalism, which is the re-packaging of news stories already in existence instead of 
producing original reportage.183 For U.S. journalists trying to explain the world with all 







A scholarly consensus has been established:  the depth and breadth of 
international news is limited, and often fits within a security frame because of a reliance 
on official sources, inherent ethnocentrism and other sociological constraints faced 
during the newsgathering process. Objectivity may be the glue that binds professional 
journalism together, but it’s hardly the norm in U.S. news about the world: The U.S. and 
the West are regularly promoted as the most significant actors in international affairs.184  
But the focus of this literature reviewed so far has been how these dynamics affect the 
American public. While U.S. communications scholarship has largely focused on 
interaction within the United States, the audience for American news is now 
transnational.185  
The U.S. news media plays a mediating role not just for the government and the 
public in the U.S., but between governments and governments, publics and publics, and 
journalists and journalists worldwide.  But even as the U.S. media are not confined within 
U.S. territorial boundaries, the global effect of American news products, is largely 
unexplored.186  There are few answers on how American news – that normally focuses on 
crisis is episodic and inadequate in terms of historical context, and can give ethnocentric 
and racist descriptions of people in developing countries – is perceived and used abroad, 
especially in a conflict environment. 187    
Carey said in Communications as Culture that “reality is brought into existence, is 
produced, by communication — by, in short, the construction, apprehension, and 
utilization of symbolic forms.” Unless the American public follows presidential and 
congressional speeches, academic analysis, or experience foreign issues and events first-




just influence how the public understands realities or how policymakers react to realities, 
but to create those realities.188 And, typically, the reality that U.S. news media constructs 
is based on a consensual way of talking about American society, American culture, and 
the place of the United States in the larger geopolitical structure.189  Even when we are 
talking about the world, we are still emphasizing our place in it – we are still talking 
about us.   
The question is not just whether U.S. journalists objectively and fairly convey 
information about the rest of the world, or help legitimize official positions, or create 
realities for Americans -- but also how they create meaning for foreign audiences. Do U.S. 
journalists create the same-shared reality in other parts of the world? If not, how does this 
reportage reverberate inside the country that is the subject of the news coverage?  
 
II. AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY NEWS IN THE WORLD 
 
Transnational technology has created routes through the global news terrains, 
ensuring that news is not confined or beholden to a single national audience. Audiences 
for today’s news media, Reese argued, are “increasingly de-territorialized” and 
journalists must “navigate between [their] ‘vertical’ orientation aligned with [their] host 
nation-state and a ‘horizontal’ perspective—a global outlook characterized by more 
cosmopolitan, pluralistic, and universal values that transcend narrow frameworks.” 190  
Because media can transcend boundaries, it has a “spatial” quality; because news is 
available to multiple audiences simultaneously, it also has a “temporal” quality.191 
However, despite the span, interconnectedness, and “virtually real-time properties of 




and abiding by the patriotic norm. Satellite news and the Internet build a global arena, yet 
the American national security narrative rarely adapts to it.  Rather, it maintains the U.S.-
centric idea of the nation and the frames of conflict, disaster, and crisis. In other words, 
even when we are talking about them, we are still talking about us. But this is not a 




The United States is the most talked about country in the world: According to 
Wu’s 2007 comparative study of international news reported by 38 nations’ media 
systems, the United States was referenced and editorialized the most.192 Reporters, 
opinion writers, columnists, talk show hosts, headline writers, photo editors and 
cartoonists in other countries generate journalistic images and messages of the U.S. from 
their respective locations; and the few foreign news agencies that have the budget 
dispatch journalists to cover Washington to garner first-hand knowledge of a country that 
has a profound impact on the rest of the world. 193  U.S. news narratives can flow rapidly 
around the world and be picked up by another nation’s journalists, who then interpret and 
relay them. But no matter where they are reporting from, foreign journalists do not 
always see the world as American journalists do.   
For instance, U.S. news on the Falklands War described the Soviet Union as a key 
antagonist that wanted to increase its military and commercial connections with Latin 
America. It’s unlikely that Argentines saw the situation that way. The British, too, likely 




imperialism, and that they were trying to resolve a political dispute with force, Wasburn 
argued. U.S. news, on the other hand, rarely described the U.S.’s deep involvement 
throughout the Western Hemisphere during the 1980s – in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, and Grenada – as being about American imperialism but rather a struggle for 
“freedom” and “democracy.” 194  With Iran, many Americans become aware of the 
country through the Iran hostage crisis and not the Iran-Iraq war or, for that matter, the 
American-sponsored overthrow of a democratically elected government in Iran in 1953. 
The revolution was explained by Ayatollah Khomeini’s taste for tension and martyrdom, 
not the dynamics of Iranian opinion.195 In general, the U.S. media has depicted countries 
going to war as being aggressive, but within the U.S., U.S. aggression is often 
rationalized as according with U.S. interests.196 What U.S. audiences see as information, 
foreigners often see as propaganda -- which can make them hesitant to accept the U.S. 
news media’s view of the world. 
The traditionally nationalistic U.S. news frame on foreign policy was not echoed 
in British, Canadian, French, Indonesia, Japanese or Russian news coverage, Wasburn 
found in 2002.197 Likewise, Rusciano discovered – through his study of Arab, Chinese, 
Indian, Israeli, Nigerian, Russian and U.K. news – that how the events that triggered the 
war in Afghanistan, the September 11 terrorist attacks, were framed and explained to U.S. 
and its western allies’ audiences was largely exclusive to the U.S. and its western allies. 
While western newspapers described themselves as leaders in an international fight 
against terrorism that was in their national and moral interests, Arab newspapers did not 




reaction to the Sept. 11 attacks. Other non-western countries, too, were wary of the west’s 
consensual narrative, and reaction to the events.198  
Two studies of international coverage of the Iraq War in 2003 reiterated this 
finding that the U.S. media’s interpretation of events is different, but also found that, like 
American national security news, other nations are also “culture-bound” and influenced 
by their nation’s own political context.199 Lee and Yang found that journalists from five 
different countries – Australia, Canada, China, Japan and the U.K. – who covered the 
same event – the return of Hong Kong to China in 2000 – employed their own national 
lenses to tell the story to their audiences.200  Sharma, likewise, interviewed journalists 
covering the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Summit and found that journalists from India and 
Nigeria acknowledged that they used the angle of national interest in their reportage (the 
U.S. correspondent interviewed, however, insisted he was detached from the subject and 
the U.S.’s stake in it).201  
Every country has its own national interests and state governments can accuse 
news agencies of being unpatriotic if they challenge or criticize the national interests, or 
aims, of the country. This is especially the case when a nation is in conflict with another, 
either through trade wars, cold wars, combat wars, or other kinds of wars. It’s an 
“undeniable historical fact,” argued Taylor, that a country’s “national media have helped 
the prosecution of wars far more than they have ever hindered them.”202  This is in part 
because governments have developed more sophisticated strategic communications 
techniques but also because, during wartime, journalists are just like their fellow citizens 
-- perhaps more so, in that they’re occupationally disposed to pay more attention to the 




entity, patriotism will be high. In the mid 1990s, for instance, Wasburn found that the 
language and explanatory frameworks that made up Japanese news reports on trade 
disputes with the U.S. were staunchly pro-Japanese and served the objectives of the 
Japanese state.203 
Nationalism as a principle is universal, and each country has its own brand of it.204 
Similar to the U.S., most news coverage around the world is seen through a “national 
news prism” and primarily produced by a national news agency for a national audience.205  
Journalists reporting on the world normally report the world as they see it and, while 
there may be a global convergence on journalistic values, like professionalism and 
objectivity, Reese argued, in action, journalists tend to report on issues that are local, not 
global.206 Therefore, U.S. standards for what constitutes news about a country are rarely 
shared by the residents of that country: What is knowledge about Afghanistan or Pakistan 
to an American is not the same as what an Afghan considers knowledge about 
Afghanistan, or a Pakistani about Pakistan.  
Even the news agencies that are transnational have a physical headquarters in a 
certain country, where they make editorial decisions on content often based on their 
geopolitical location, Hafez found in his 2007 study on international news agencies.207 
Mody, similarly, found in her study of news representations of the conflict in Darfur that 
how different news agencies describe cross-national foreign events depends on the 
locations and characteristics of the news organizations that create the news: national news 
agencies tell stories that will make sense to their audiences.208 If “objectivity were 
humanely possible, reporting on an event would be identical in all news media around the 




depending on where you are standing worldwide. While some believed that transnational 
news stations – like Al Jazeera, CNN, France 24, China’s CCTV and Russia Today – 
could help bring about a global civil society, news can have a decisively national feel.210 
The CNN that one watches in Lahore, Pakistan is not the CNN one watches in San 
Francisco, California: CNN distinctly tailors its programming for its audiences. As does 
the BBC World Service -- the news agency that comes closest to reaching all corners of 
the globe through radio, the medium that accesses the largest swaths of populations 
worldwide.211 Al Jazeera, too, Ayish argued in 2002, diverts from the principle of 
objectivity when it comes to issues that have a pan-Arab, public consensus.212 When 
given the choice, Straubhaar found, audiences around the world choose their national 
news broadcast over an international news agency’s broadcast.213 And national interest is 
the most frequently determined influence on media coverage throughout the world.214 
The virtue of patriotism, indeed, is part of journalism thought and practice 
everywhere. Independent news outlets would commit a sort of commercial suicide if they 
didn’t support their country’s war effort, and nationalistic news coverage is also certain 
when the news is state-owned.215  For most of the world, the state controls the press: The 
World Bank found in 2002 that, in 97 countries, state governments controlled an average 
of 29 percent of newspapers, 60 percent of television stations and 72 percent of radio 
stations; in 43 countries, the state had complete oversight over television.216 The 
government is most likely to control the press in poor countries with weak markets: Most 
state-owned media is in Africa, and most independently owned media in Europe and 




The developing world’s press, much of it under control of the state, has long 
complained that western news agencies socially construct political conditions and events 
that maintain the national interests of their countries and that lend legitimacy to the 
international political structure and norms that keep their countries in leadership 
positions.217 But developing countries’ press corps, too, tend to construct news that aligns 
with their own political, economic and cultural interests. This is reflected, Wasburn found, 
in the coverage of the 1991 Gulf War, when the West and rich oil states were aligned 
against a relatively poor Third World country, Iraq. 218 During the 2003 Iraq War, Ravi 
similarly found that Indian and Pakistani journalists focused on Iraqi civilians points of 
view because they sympathized more with the Iraqi people than with the U.S. and its 
allies’ goals.219  This is, perhaps, one of the most interesting points of tension: Foreign 
journalists are dependent on the Western news narratives that reach their countries for 
content, but are simultaneously frustrated with the agendas, frames and tones of those 
narratives because they conflict with their nation’s news agendas, frames and tones. The 
journalists may need and accept the facts, but the worldview of the Other that frames the 
report is an annoyance.  
 
Western Media in a Global Setting 
 
U.S. news can have a global impact precisely because of the international reach of 
U.S. based news agencies. Most of the global news flow is coming from the West, or 
North, and flowing to the South – rarely does it go in the opposite direction. There exists 




countries news agencies -- the Associated Press and Reuters, and CNN and BBC World -
- seem to dominate western news flows.220 Ten years ago, the CNN News Group, with 42 
bureaus worldwide, was available to 160 million homes in 212 countries and BBC World 
was available to 167 million homes in 200 countries.221 English is the lingua franca of 
international communication, and major western news institutions—not just through wire 
services or satellite, but through the Internet and/or the international publishing of 
western newspapers and magazines—have expanded their reach significantly because of 
increasing technology and a growing global demand for it.222 
A country’s place in the international system depends on not just its material 
might and clout in international economic and political systems, but also how well it is 
covered in these news flows. As Chang said, “all countries [are] not created equal to be 
news” and global publics definitely sense that when they look at U.S. and western 
journalism.223 But the news agenda and frames western news agencies select can be 
contested and resented. Quantitatively and qualitatively, the west has been seen to create 
and reinforce images and stereotypes that are “harmful, biased, and unrealistic… 
concerned only with bad news—catastrophe, corruption, social disorder, and national 
failure” which a developing country cannot effectively challenge with their own news 
systems.224  
In the late 1970s and 1980s, many in the developing world called this a kind of 
neo-colonialism: the West, they argues, who were former colonizers, were still 
controlling the news inflows and outflows from countries they once controlled. 
Journalists in recently independent Asian, African and Caribbean countries that 




countries.225  Controlling the news narratives and images of developing countries, 
dependency theorists argued, was a sort of neo-colonialism that could disrupt those 
countries’ ability to turn into developed, democratic societies.226  It was a popular 
argument that inspired international action.  
 In 1976, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) General Conference in Nairobi published the report One World, Many Voices, 
an overview of communications and society that focused on imbalances between the 
Western and non-Western world. The one-way flow of communication, dominating from 
the West – or the North -- provoked calls for a New World Information Communication 
Order (NWICO).227 In 1977, the Washington Post even ran a sympathetic editorial 
acknowledging the reluctance of letting U.S. journalists serve as the image-makers for a 
country: “One does not have to accept the third-world charges that Western news 
agencies are cultural and political predators in order to understand a country’s reluctance 
to have its picture of the world, and the world’s picture of it, drawn entirely by foreigners 
who are sometimes knowledgeable and sympathetic, sometimes not, but who 
nevertheless are foreigners.”228 And, in 1979, the MacBride Commission -- chaired by 
Irish attorney, Sean MacBride and sponsored by UNESCO -- argued that it’s not the 
media’s job to inform, but to assist. It’s report stated:  
What communication can do is focus attention, point out opportunities, attack 
indifference and obstruction, and influence the climate of opinion. 
Communication thus plays a supporting and participatory role in development, 
but its contribution can be significant. This applies to the mobilization of public 
opinion in developing countries, and to the spread of greater understanding in the 
developed.229  
 
Developing countries that supported the commission called for an order to seek 




flows should focus on supporting the development of countries and not focus on their 
failures – or realities. The news agencies of the United States, United Kingdom and other 
European countries responded that this was a kind of “pre-censorship” and that the 
commercial and political constraints already made reporting on these countries 
difficult.230 They pointed out that third world news was heavily loaded with government 
press releases – reflecting the very state controlled news systems that suppress freedom 
of information and the pursuit of truth. Despite pleas for a New World Order in 
communications a decade before, a 1985 follow-up study undertaken for UNESCO found 
that the richest countries with the most considerable sway over international politics 
continued to be covered the most in global news, with the U.S. in a big lead over France 
and the U.K., and Russia and Africa covered the least.231 
The sway that geopolitics has on international news flows continues, many 
scholars argue. Roxanne Doty, in her 1996 book, Imperial Encounters, found that news 
representation reinforce the developed world’s hegemony over the developing world.232 A 
news organization that is based in a major power, and belongs to a strong military 
alliance and the G20, has considerably more influence than a new agency based in a weak 
country that is not a member of any exclusive, international clubs.233 
 Some scholars agree that Western institutions fundamentally misunderstand the 
problems of developing nations, and how Western states – especially colonizers – made 
states weak.  For instance, Columbia University professor Mahmoud Mamdani has 
argued that colonialism continues to exacerbate tensions in Africa because the institutions 
it left behind encourage racism and division.234 Similarly, Severine Autessere has argued 




local context of each issue.235 This has contributed to the media’s general mis-
conceptualization of international affairs dilemmas, and therefore to misdiagnoses and 
misleading ideas about quick fixes.236 This fits with Bella Mody’s analysis of the U.S. 
elite media’s coverage of the Darfur crisis in Sudan. She found that American journalists 
frequently distorted the reality by referencing tribalism and ancient hatreds to describe 
the crisis without explaining the role colonial legacies. Susan Carruthers similarly 
explained Western media’s lack of context in its reportage on Africa “explanatory 
impoverishment,” which lets the West off the hook for setting some of the very 
conditions during colonialism and unfair trade practices that created or heightened the 
crises.237 The frame is security, and the constant direness of the developing countries – 
and not the scary odds that they face, and why the face them.  
By dominating the global media market and global news flows, the Western press 
accentuates images and fixes identities around the world. Often, countries with nascent 
press corps, like Afghanistan and Pakistan, are dependent on Western-centric media for 
information, despite the ominous stories that are told of Afghanistan and Pakistan.238 
Once news is broken it is a sort of common property that journalists can repeat; they only 
need to quote another outlet’s reportage if they use the exact wording.239   
Foreign journalists reporting on the U.S. regularly seek U.S. news to aid them in 
their reporting on the U.S. For them, reporting a country fully and creating new 
knowledge from reality is not always a possibility; local media—radio, television, and 
print must serve as source material. In 1996, Hess found that The New York Times and 
Washington Post had the greatest readership among the foreign journalists he surveyed, 




printed for foreign publications.240 In one of the other few studies on foreign journalists 
covering the U.S., Wasburn found that the foreign journalists were very reliant on 
American news sources, and especially the New York Times, which was perceived to be 
an agenda-setter for American policy.241  While several more American news sources 
were available—Washington Post, Economist, Newsweek, etc.—the Times was deemed to 
be the most important. Because of the American nation it represents, its arguably the 
most important news organization in the world.  
 
*** 
Journalists who report on foreign issues for their national audiences can virtually 
create the world for them.242 Hall argued that the question is not whether news media 
objectively and fairly represent reality, but how written representations give meaning for 
the realities that are reported: The news media can help form a consensus, which lends 
legitimacy to what is common sense and real for a society, and then marginalizes 
alternate accounts.243 Journalists everywhere are likely not to provide critical distance 
from their respective government—the focus on the national is normal for a country’s 
press corps. This much is well established in the scholarly literature.  But the literature 
has not come to grips with the ways in which local journalists use American news to 
understand not only America’s conduct but also their own country. In Afghanistan, a 
country at war, where U.S. troops are fighting, do Afghan journalists look to U.S. news 
about Afghanistan to try to understand what Americans think they know so they can 
understand their acts? 244 How about in neighboring Pakistan, where the U.S.-led war in 




CHAPTER 3. Twice the Forgotten War: American News on Afghanistan & 
Pakistan, 2001-2012  
  
On September 11, 2001, Barry Bearak, a New York Times correspondent, reported 
from Afghanistan that Ahmed Shah Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance, the 
rebel opposition group to the Taliban, might have been assassinated. The Taliban likely 
hadn’t killed him, he explained, but Arabs linked to al-Qaeda – Osama bin Laden’s 
terrorist network that the Taliban had granted safe haven to —might have. The Taliban’s 
foreign minister, Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, told Bearak that they weren’t responsible for 
what had happened to Massoud. "If we had carried out this attempt,” he said, “we would 
have announced it.”245 The killing was the precursor to both the September 11th attacks 
that would happen hours later in the United States and the consequential U.S.-led war in 
Afghanistan. 	  
 The New York Times was lucky. The news organization hadn’t had a full-time 
reporter assigned to Afghanistan for decades, yet Bearak would be there to cover what 
would become the first U.S. ground war since 1991. He would also become the first 
resident of the Times’ Kabul bureau, the largest American news bureau in the country to 
this day. The story that originally brought Bearak to Afghanistan was essentially 
American-centric: He was following the case of eight Western aid workers, two of them 
American, affiliated with Shelter Now, a humanitarian organization operating in 
Afghanistan. A month earlier, the Taliban had accused them of preaching Christianity to 
Muslims, a grave offense to the fundamentalist government that lived by Shari’ah law.246 
This was the biggest story to come out of Afghanistan since March that year, when the 




and more than 1,500 years old. Buddhist monks created them when Bamiyan, located in 
the center of modern Afghanistan, was part of the Kingdom of Gandhara – before the 
Muslim Saffarids, who were part of the Persian dynasty, conquered the land in the 9th 
century. People of all faiths revered them for centuries. Yet the Taliban leader, Mullah 
Omar, declared in 2001 that they had been “gods of the infidels” and ordered their 
destruction.247 International leaders were outraged, but the Taliban’s Minister of 
Information and Culture told Bearak that he didn’t understand what the big deal was: 
“The statues are objects only made of mud or stone,” he told him.248	   
Both stories – the destruction of renowned historical symbols and the kidnapping 
of aid workers – violated western norms and shocked the world.  For U. S. international 
news coverage, two enduring values were at stake.249 And with the aid workers in 
captivity, Bearak was well positioned to re-introduce the American public to a country 
U.S. news had largely overlooked since 1989, when the Soviets withdrew from 
Afghanistan and the U.S. suspended its diplomatic mission there soon after. 	  
After the Taliban took control of the country in 1996, Afghanistan had only 
received episodic coverage during events which editors classified as crises. Beverly 
Horvit’s review of Afghanistan coverage in eight American newspapers250 from 
September 11, 1996 to September 10, 2001, found that the Los Angeles Times, New York 
Times and Washington Post ran an average of 50 stories a year about Afghanistan.251 
Sixty-five percent of that coverage was about Taliban diplomacy and violence; 13 percent 
was about human rights, most especially the Taliban’s atrocious treatment of women. 
Rarely was there analytical, in-depth reportage to increase American audiences’ 




September 10, 2001, though, was an indication that what happened inside Afghanistan 
would matter again for the West.  
 It was early evening in Afghanistan when the September 11th attacks took place in 
New York, Pentagon City and Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Shortly afterward, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation linked the hijackers to al-Qaeda and Bearak’s U.S.-based 
colleagues identified bin Laden’s home as Afghanistan.252 But the Taliban, Bearak 
reported, rejected the idea that bin Laden had anything to do with the attacks. A foreign 
ministry spokesman explained, “If we want peace for ourselves, we want peace for others. 
But such coordinated attacks cannot be carried out by one man or by the Islamic Emirate 
of Afghanistan.” In August 1998, after bin Laden was suspected of bombing the U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the U.S. had launched 70 Tomahawk cruise missiles at 
what were suspected to be al-Qaeda camps along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Bin 
Laden survived, but there were Afghan and Pakistani civilian casualties. Afghans, Bearak 
speculated on September 12, 2001, “may well come to dread a similar reprisal from the 
United States, especially here in Kabul, the capital, and Kandahar, the city where Mullah 
Omar [the Taliban leader] resides and Mr. bin Laden has recently been seen.”253 	  
Less than one month later, on October 7, 2001, President George W. Bush 
announced that Mullah Omar and the Taliban had refused to hand bin Laden over to the 
Americans and to stop giving safe haven to him and al-Qaeda. The war began. With 
Afghanistan firmly linked to the September 11th attacks, a November 2001 Gallup poll 





 Changing the News Paradigm  
 
International reportage in the United States has traditionally made up a small 
percentage of overall news, but the percentage dropped considerably when the Cold War 
ended in 1989. The Cold War had been an organizing mechanism for U.S. policymakers 
and journalists alike: The idea of a bipolar world, the U.S. versus the Soviet Union, 
allowed them to neatly frame issues around this dichotomy. Within this worldview, issues 
and events were byproducts or manifestations of the Cold War. If the issue wasn’t 
specifically about the U.S. or the Soviet Union, then it was related to the ideological 
struggle between democracy and capitalism versus communism. As the Cold War ended, 
international news budgets were slashed. U.S. news corporations closed foreign bureaus 
and invested in more popular, inexpensive and local news stories.255  
As the world became more complex in the 1990s, many journalists and scholars 
lamented that foreign news coverage was waning.256 Smaller conflicts plagued countries 
in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia, making the world both more complicated 
and less reported. In 1994, former New York Times editor Max Frankel noted the high 
monetary cost of foreign reportage for U.S. outlets, and the general disinterest of 
Americans in what happened beyond U.S. borders:  
A great shroud has been drawn across the mind of America to make it forget that 
there is a world beyond its borders. The three main television networks 
obsessively focus their cameras on domestic tales and dramas as if the end of the 
Cold War rendered the rest of the planet irrelevant. Their news staffs occasionally 
visit some massacre, famine, or shipwreck and their anchors may parachute into 
Haiti or Kuwait for a photo op, but these spasms of interest only emphasize the 
networks’ apparent belief that on most evenings the five billion folks out there 





In the early 1970s, 10 percent of U.S. news among elite broadcast and print news 
organizations was dedicated to international news; by 1990, it was less than 3 percent.258 
In the 1980s, the average number of foreign news stories on U.S. network news was four 
stories per week; in the 1990s, the number dropped to two stories per week.259 After the 
Cold War ended, U.S. news agencies had fewer permanent bureaus overseas – and the 
bureaus that existed were often one-man operations. Even more than before, U.S. news 
organizations relied on “parachute journalism,” meaning that a roving foreign 
correspondent would spend a limited amount of time in the country, yet be responsible 
for explaining its complexities to a national audience. News about the world became 
more general; in-depth reports decreased.260  
However, September 11th gave American news organizations both a new 
paradigm to tidily explain the world, and a reason to re-invest in foreign news coverage. 
President Bush presented a new dichotomous world order in a joint session to Congress 
on September 20, 2001 when he declared to a global audience, “You are either with us, or 
you are with the terrorists.”261 U.S. government leaders, like others, often select language 
and symbols that will evoke support, pride and public unity for particular political and 
foreign policy goals.262 The aftermath of September 11th was also an opportune time for 
the president to encourage a sense of fierce nationalism in the American public. The Bush 
administration used the opportunity to, according to Robert Entman, “propound a line 
designed to revive habits of patriotic deference, to dampen elite dissent, dominate media 
texts, and reduce the threat of negative public reaction—to work just as the Cold War 




world of good vs. evil, one of terrorists vs. non-terrorists, with the U.S. once again cast as 
the force for good, as during the Cold War. 
By highlighting certain events and issues, the American president can define the 
news agenda and bring drama and urgency to foreign policy.264 But the events of 
September 11th were not just dramatic—they were traumatizing. As media sociologist 
Michael Schudson explained, U.S. journalists abandon efforts to provide neutral 
reporting under at least three conditions: tragedy, public danger and a grave threat to 
national security. The September 11th attacks “combined all three moments into one.”265  
In times of crisis, the American public, like the media, tends to become “psychologically 
reliant on the president”266 and to invest great trust in his words and actions. Framing 
issues as matters of national security traditionally signals that the president will “take 
care of constituents in any emergency; has the best access to needed sources of 
information in order to make policy decisions; and will always act in the best interests of 
the nation.”267 During a crisis, the U.S. media can rely heavily on official sources for 
information and journalists take their cue to act as patriots within the sphere of consensus. 
They overwhelmingly trusted his decision to invade Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.  
The Bush Administration’s strategic communications operation – “in which 
leaders craft their public language and communications with the goal to create, control, 
distribute and use mediated messages as a political resource” – after September 11, 2001 
described a “war on terrorism” in which the invasion of Afghanistan would be the first 
step.268  President Bush’s remarks explaining the October 7, 2001 invasion framed the 
war in both security and humanitarian terms, which rarely intersect so clearly in U.S. 




only a direct result of the attacks, but also a humanitarian act, in the sense that U.S. forces 
would liberate the Afghan people from dire Taliban rule and give them hope for a better 
life within a democracy. A November 16, 2001 Gallup poll found that a strong majority 
of the public approved of the president’s performance. He received an 89 percent 
approval rating, while his Secretary of State, Colin Powell, received 87 percent.269 The 
American media, too, signaled support for the U.S. government and its new foreign 
policy.	  270   
 
Elite U.S. News Coverage of September 11, 2001  
 
Crises habitually can consume American news organizations, but September 11th  
sent journalists, editors and producers into overdrive. That day, 3,025 people were killed 
on U.S. soil – 2,801 in the World Trade Center, 184 at the Pentagon and 40 in 
Shanksville. This was second only to the number of U.S. casualties in the Civil War 
battle of Antietam.271 The Poynter Institute’s gallery of 190 front pages showed 119 mid-
sized and large daily newspapers marked as “extra” editions, responding to a great 
demand for information on why the attacks happened and their impact.272 The U.S. news 
media was the conduit for the government and the public, and for the public to connect 
with each other. The American public turned to their news media for explanations and 
guidance; and to unite with the rest of the nation through sharing information and 
emotions.273 American journalists, argued Patricia Aufderheide, took on “a therapeutic 
role as grief counselor for the nation’s inner child, nurturing insecure viewers who had 




But the public appreciated this work. The Project for Excellence in Journalism 
and the Princeton Survey Research Associates reviewed almost 2,500 stories from 
television, magazines and newspapers in the first three months after September 11 and 
gave U.S. journalists high marks for their reportage, saying it was solidly documented, 
factual and straightforward.275 This coverage, they noted, may have contributed to “the 
first measurable upturn in public approval of the press in 15 years.”276	   
Americans were shocked by the September 11th events mainly because of the 
scale of death and destruction, but also because the U.S. had been isolated from such 
attacks for almost 60 years. Soon after, explained Pippa Norris, Montague Kern and 
Marion Just, news stories about terrorism on network news skyrocketed “from around 
178 in the twelve months prior to September 2001 to 1,345 stories in the twelve months 
afterwards, not counting, of course, the extensive number of 24/7 extended news bulletins, 
round-the-clock cable news, local news programs, news magazine special reports and 
documentaries.”277 And public anxiety about terrorism correlated to the scale of news 
coverage. When Gallup asked Americans what the most important problems facing the 
country were, ”the proportion nominating ‘terrorism’ shot up from zero in the three 
months prior to September 11 to almost half the population (46 percent) immediately 
after 9/11.” This number subsided, but remained high one year later when one-fifth of the 
public thought terrorism trumped economic or social concerns.278 But the press did not 
set this public concern into context. American journalists and commentators created a 
perception that what changed with 9/11 was an increase in the overall levels of 
international terrorism events, but they had not.279  




complete support for the war that followed in Afghanistan.280 There was a large 
Washington consensus in favor of it, and few dissenting, credible opinions that a 
journalist could credibly source.281 When the war began on October 7, 2001, elites, 
including congressional Democrats, who were in the minority, did not dissent from the 
president’s decision. Congress had voted overwhelmingly on September 14, 2001 – with 
only one dissenting legislator out of 531 – to give the president authorization to “use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determine[d] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred 
on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.”282 The media, 
therefore, had no credible opposition within the U.S. legislature to report.283  
American journalists at U.S. news outlets have an ethnocentric bias.  They hold 
the same beliefs and values of their fellow citizens and – in a time of crisis – their 
government leaders.284 They do not want to be seen as being too far out of step.  News 
values that decide what makes it to print or air are part of a society’s political, cultural 
and economic structures, in addition to the institutional practices of a news agency.285 
Editors, producers and reporters select and construct media messages to cater to what the 
public wants.286 This process is normally done “instinctively”; editorial decisions are not 
based on quantitative polling, but a “sense” of what the public wants or needs.287 With 
the commitment of U.S. troops to Afghanistan, the American news media had a new war 
to focus its attention on and news professionals sensed that the American public wanted 
to know about it.  
The September 11th attacks had given U.S. journalists – and the U.S. presidency 




report the news from abroad. Most of the reportage was Washington-based. Just six daily 
newspaper groups – New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Chicago 
Tribune/Los Angeles Times, Christian Science Monitor and Baltimore Sun – had foreign 
news bureaus. In 2002, these papers represented just 20 percent of total newspaper 
circulation in all U.S. dailies, but they syndicated to many more local papers. The 
American newswire, Associated Press, also served as a linchpin for American news 
organizations.288 This small group of editors and journalists who worked for seven U.S. 
news organizations were the prime sources for foreign news for the American public.289  
Nationalism permeated their news coverage. The New York Times and the 
Washington Post, especially, focused on the domestic effects of the terrorist attacks. 
Changho Lee’s analysis of their coverage found that the Times and the Post gravitated 
toward ethnocentric reportage.290 These elite papers have a more profound effect on the 
public and policymakers during crises; they are also less likely to take a critical stance 
toward the government during emergencies.291 U.S journalists fixated on the material 
aftermath of the attacks, and how they would affect the economy and security of the U.S. 
They did not try to find reasons why the attacks occurred, or to investigate the social and 
historical roots and context of terrorism.292 They focused on U.S. officials’ actions on 
behalf of the national security of the U.S. The Post and the Times, especially, “became an 
important channel for transmitting the idea of war as a solution to the terrorist attacks,” 
explained Lee, without exploring its consequences.293 
Both newspapers’ editorial boards, however, initially urged that the Bush 




link between al-Qaeda and the Taliban before invading Afghanistan. The Washington 
Post wrote on September 23, 2001:  
The United States must make clear to other countries why it is sure that al Qaeda 
and Osama bin Laden were behind the attacks in New York and Washington, and 
it must work hard to line up allies for a potential battle with the Taliban…in this 
new kind of war, civilian casualties and suffering probably would strengthen 
rather than weaken al Qaeda, winning it new recruits in both Afghanistan and 
elsewhere in the Muslim World.294 
 
The New York Times’s editorial board similarly wrote on September 22, 2001:295 
It is a reasonable presumption that the terrorists who attacked New York and 
Washington aimed not just to kill American civilians, but also to draw the United 
States into an indiscriminate and brutish military response that might attract 
Muslims around the world to their cause…Washington must be smart in selecting 
targets and cognizant of the political consequences that its military operations are 
likely to produce in the Islamic world.296 
 
The Times editorial board prescribed that President Bush narrowly target groups that 
were involved in the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks rather than extend “the 
fight to countries more broadly linked to international terrorism, possibly including 
Iraq.”297  
While the editorial boards initially urged caution, the U.S. mainstream media 
were largely supportive of the invasion of Afghanistan. Over time, both the Times and 
Post editorial boards supported President Bush’s declaration of war against the Taliban 
on October 7, 2001.298 The Times wrote that the American people “will support whatever 
efforts it takes to carry out this mission properly…Mr. Bush has wisely made providing 
humanitarian assistance an integral part of the American strategy,” but it criticized the 





Billeaudeaux et. al, too, in their research on the Times and Post’s editorials 
between the September 11th terrorist attacks and the invasion of Afghanistan found that 
the very high U.S. public support for the war in Afghanistan – and the overall war on 
terrorism – influenced other reporters, government officials and citizens. In 26 days, both 
papers ran 24 editorials that addressed the challenges and goals of the wars that set the 
agenda for other news organizations in the country.300 What was reported and opined in 
elite publications like the Post and Times mattered, Billeaudeaux et. al argued, because 
members of Congress (who voted overwhelmingly in favor of both the September 14, 
2001 joint resolution on military action and the October 26, 2001 Patriot Act), 
government officials, academics and think tank experts regularly consume these 
publications. Moreover, they wrote, “not once in the 24 editorials analyzed was there 
explicit criticism of the Bush administration’s plans for or communications about the war 
on terrorism.”301  
It was the most non-controversial start to U.S. involvement in a war in American 
history.  
    
Elite U.S. News in Early Stages of the Afghanistan War 
 
Once American intelligence determined that Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda 
network were responsible for the attacks, President Bush received an international 
mandate to pursue them in their known safe haven, Afghanistan. However, few 
Americans, including the policymakers at the White House and the journalists covering 
their decisions, had personal experience with Afghanistan or knew much about its history 




Afghanistan since January 1989.  It was a closed society under theocratic Taliban rule, 
and had received scant attention from American media after the Cold War ended. 
 Once again, Pakistan and Afghanistan became focal points for the American 
picture of the world. Elite U.S. media agencies struggled to send reporters to the region to 
cover what they could. In the first weeks of the Afghanistan air attacks, eight western 
journalists were killed while trying to enter the country from Pakistan.302 In a country 
where the Internet was absent and less electricity was consumed than anywhere else in 
the world, broadcast and print journalists alike reported via satellite phone.303  
The first international broadcast news organizations to report from inside 
Afghanistan were the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Doha-based Al Jazeera. 
With a bureau already inside Afghanistan, Al Jazeera immediately began to supply 
images of unfolding events in Afghanistan after the October 2001 U.S. air war began.	  304 
But they also served as alternative sources for the U.S. news media: ABC News’ Peter 
Jennings, for instance, was able to report from an Al Jazeera feed given to CNN that there 
were explosions in Kabul on September 11, 2001. While then-Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld denied that the U.S. was involved in the explosions immediately after 
the attacks on the U.S., American reporters now had greater access to Afghanistan via al 
Jazeera, the BBC, New York Times’s Bearak and some newswires.305  
While wars are inherently dramatic, American-fought wars traditionally receive 
substantial coverage since they are deemed essential to American interests.306 But the 
Afghanistan quickly decreased in relevance for the White House and the press. In 2001, 
the war was the most-covered news story on CBS, NBC and ABC. The U.S. press began 




Afghanistan, and the diplomatic efforts to maintain a global alliance to fight terrorism-at-
large.307 By December 3, 2001, more than 2,000 foreign journalists had become 
accredited in Tajikistan to cover Afghanistan, separate from those journalists who entered 
Afghanistan with the U.S. military.308 Still, one year after the Afghanistan war began, as 
the fighting in Afghanistan continued, American news reports diminished. According to 
the Tyndall Report, Afghanistan received 106 minutes of airtime on network evening 
news when the war started; by January 2003, before the Iraq War even began, it received 
11 minutes; and by March 2003, Afghanistan news was reduced to a total of 60 
seconds.309 By the end of 2003, Afghanistan had received only 80 minutes of coverage 
from the three networks, and it no longer ranked in even the 20 most covered stories of 
the year.310  
This is mainly because Afghanistan was receiving less attention in Washington. 
By the time of his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush defined Afghanistan 
as a conflict of more humanitarian concern than security; the security concern now 
extended to the larger war on terror. In the 2003 State of the Union address, President 
Bush mentioned Afghanistan only three times, but he spent one-third of the speech 
building the case for the war in Iraq.311 The urgency and crisis associated with 
Afghanistan had passed and many Americans got the impression that the war had been 
won.312 
The second post-9/11, U.S.-led war began in Iraq on March 19, 2003. While the 
New York Times, Washington Post, AP and other print news bureaus remained open in 
Kabul, the networks mostly withdrew from Afghanistan and began to rely on stringers 




the fact that U.S. troops were still fighting there.313 The new Iraq War had a certain 
“displacement effect” on the war in Afghanistan: It supplanted Afghanistan on the public 
agenda, therefore shifting the public’s awareness and their ability to make informed 
opinions about the Afghan war.314  
Unlike the Afghanistan war, the Iraq war became one of the most thoroughly 
reported in U.S. history. More than 600 accredited journalists were embedded in combat. 
Hundreds more attended military briefings in Doha, Qatar, and more than 2,000 reporters 
covered the war without being embedded.315 And the press had largely echoed the Bush 
administration’s case in the build-up and initial execution of the war. The support was so 
intense that, in 2004, when the war in Iraq was increasingly spiraling out of control, the 
New York Times apologized to its readers for “coverage that was not as rigorous as it 
should have been” as the White House made its case for the war in 2002 and 2003.316 
For American citizens to receive news about Afghanistan, Pakistan, or anywhere 
else in the world, they would have had to seek it out.317 The Afghanistan war had lost the 
American government and media’s attention as they focused on another, more lethal 
conflict in Iraq. So while the Afghanistan war story began in crisis, by 2003 – perhaps 
because of the decreased intensity in conflict – the news coverage hit a plateau and then a 
decline by 2005.318 Since it is habit for news organizations to focus almost exclusively on 
the top story of the day, journalists typically wait for foreign news stories to explode.319  
In 2006, with a resurgent Taliban dragging U.S. and European soldiers into intensified 






Elite U.S. News Coverage of “Obama’s War”  
 
For eight years after September 11th, news on Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan 
largely ebbed. But in spring 2006, the Taliban carried out their biggest offensive since 
2001. They infiltrated southern Afghanistan in droves; suicide bombings quintupled to 
136 from previous years. More than 190 American and NATO troops died, which was 20 
percent more than in 2005. The Taliban also set up checkpoints, burned schools and 
assassinated Afghan officials in the provinces. For the first time since the Iraq War began, 
Afghanistan was as statistically dangerous for U.S. soldiers as Iraq was.321	   
On February 15, 2007, President Bush gave his first policy speech on Afghanistan in 
years, warning that the Taliban was rising again and that the U.S. and NATO needed to 
intensify their joint military and aid mission there. “The snow is going to melt in the 
Hindu Kush mountains. And when it does, we can expect fierce fighting to continue,” 
President Bush said. “Taliban and al-Qaeda are preparing to launch new attacks. Our 
strategy is not to be on the defense but to go on the offense…This spring, there's going to 
be a new offensive in Afghanistan, and it's going to be a NATO offensive."322  This 
speech merited some renewed American press attention to Afghanistan, though not much. 
In 2007, Iraq ranged from 11 to 26 percent of the total U.S. news coverage and 33 percent 
of Americans thought that Iraq was the most important problem facing the U.S.323 The 
Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism, however, found that Afghanistan made up less 
than 1 percent of American news coverage in 2007 and 2008.324 Another American 
president, however, would ensure that U.S. media attention was focused on the first post-




In 2008, then-candidate Barack Obama made a campaign promise to focus on the war 
in Afghanistan and end the war in Iraq. In 2008, international issues consumed 21 percent 
of total media coverage, with more than half of that focused on U.S. foreign policy 
discourse inside Washington.325 In 2009, when President Obama was inaugurated, news 
of foreign events was also at 10 percent – but coverage of U.S. foreign policy issues grew 
from 11 to 16 percent. Much of that was due to the increased coverage of Washington’s 
revised planning for the Afghanistan War under Obama.326 The president’s decision to 
take most of 2009 to decide what to do in Afghanistan made the issue hotly political. 
News on Afghanistan and Pakistan was indexed to Washington, and followed the 
President’s creation of a new “Af-Pak” paradigm, which determined that Afghanistan and 
Pakistan were so intertwined that any policy needed to take both into consideration. In 
2009, news about Afghanistan, which now frequently referenced Pakistan, received five 
times the coverage it had in 2007 and 2008, and more than double the coverage of Iraq 
during the year. The time devoted to the war on American television, from 2003-2009, 
peaked in 2009 at 9.26 hours while Iraq only received 1.33 hours.327 Much of this 
coverage occurred in the second half of the year as the U.S. strategy review of the war 
was completed.  
 In 2009, the Pew Center found that Afghanistan, or “Af-Pak,” news coverage was 
consistent among the five media sectors—television, radio, newspaper, magazine and 
online; it ranged from 4 to 5 percent of the total news coverage in each.328 As President 
Obama made clear in the first half of the year that Afghanistan was a foreign policy 
priority, the country accounted for about 2 percent of the newshole. But coverage did not 




the topic accounted for 10 percent of total American national news—its single biggest 
week of coverage to that point. And then, in the last five months of the year, it was the 
third biggest U.S. news story, receiving 8 percent of news coverage, trailing only health 
care and the economy – a place it hadn’t claimed since October 2001.329 On December 1, 
2009 the Washington debate was settled: President Obama announced at the U.S. 
Military Academy at West Point that he would send 30,000 “surge” troops to Afghanistan 
on a counter-insurgency mission for 18 months.  
In the eyes of the television networks, it was almost as if the war had begun in 
2001, ended in 2002, and then started up again from scratch in 2009. When the networks 
ABC, NBC, CNN and Fox re-established bureaus in Kabul in 2009, “news executives 
said they had taken their cues in part from the United States presidential election” that 
Afghanistan would become a foreign policy priority.330 The elite print and broadcast 
outlets were quick to comment on the upsurge in media coverage of Afghanistan, and 
how they had overlooked it. Richard Engel of NBC News told Brian Stelter of the New 
York Times in October 2009, “It’s like the Baghdad class of 2003 is now the Kabul class 
of 2009.”331 Lara Logan of CBS, an outlier who had consistently covered Afghanistan for 
the network, explained to Stelter that “Afghanistan has always been the poor man’s war” 
that wasn’t as exciting to cover for broadcast networks.332 Time magazine wrote in its 
feature story on October 12, 2009, “The War Up Close,” “If it’s true that sometimes 
we’ve let ourselves lose sight of Afghanistan, then as a start, let’s look here.”333 
But the breakdown of sub-themes within U.S. news agencies’ Afghanistan 
coverage is telling: Throughout 2009, 46 percent of the coverage was devoted to the U.S. 




9 percent, was concerned with the internal affairs of Afghanistan—much of that about 
disputed Afghan presidential elections.334 That almost half of the coverage was about 
policy deliberations in Washington reinforces the idea of indexing, which states that most 
foreign news in the U.S. is based on what the U.S. government says and does.335 This 
increased coverage of Afghanistan, particularly the U.S. policy debate aspect, was 
responsible for a modest uptick in overall foreign news, to about 26 percent in 2009 from 
about 21 percent in 2008.336  
 By 2011, however, news about Afghanistan had fallen back to 2 percent of total 
U.S. news coverage.337 This was despite the majority of U.S. elite news organizations 
that continued to have bureaus in Kabul: New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles 
Times, NPR, CNN, Fox News and the Associated Press all had full-time staff in country. 
The New York Times, Washington Post and AP also had full-time reporters in 
neighboring Pakistan, becoming the most reliable sources for daily news coverage on the 
region.  
Yet for these journalists, covering the region is dangerous and exhausting. In 
Afghanistan, Times reporter Alissa Rubin told columnist Bill Keller that major news 
outlets don’t let reporters leave Kabul. “To travel with Alissa into the war-wracked 
countryside [of Afghanistan],” Keller wrote, “is to fully appreciate the meaning of the 
word ‘meticulous.’ Reporting ventures are planned, mapped and timed in exquisite detail, 
and everyone is alert to signs of potential danger.”338 Yet Keller insisted that having eyes 
on the ground in Afghanistan and other world tough spots is vital not only for the 




portion of the information governments call ‘intelligence’ is nothing more than an 
attentive reading of the news.”  
 The question now is how much longer the Times, Washington Post, and other elite 
U.S. news agencies with Kabul and Islamabad bureaus, will deem Afghanistan and 
Pakistan to matter. Much of it depends on U.S. policy, specifically how much longer the 
U.S. government deems Afghanistan and Pakistan to matter. With President Obama 
maintaining a promise he made in December 2009 to bring the majority of U.S. soldiers 
home in 2014, many believe that U.S. journalists will leave the region with the troops.  
Throughout this fluctuating decade of U.S. news coverage about the region, 
American foreign policy has been central to both the Afghan and Pakistani publics’ daily 
lives. The two countries press corps have relied on U.S. news to inform them about how 
the American government and public understood their countries. But also, American 
reportage has become source material for Afghan and Pakistani journalists. The twisted 
entanglement between the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan has been captured by 
the three countries’ news media as they try to make sense of events, and each other. Just 
as Afghanistan and Pakistan rely on the United States for aid, they depend on the 
American media to make meaning of America’s heavy involvement in their countries, 
and sometimes their own governments. And because Washington’s focus on Afghanistan 
and Pakistan have fluctuated so greatly the past decade, Afghan and Pakistani journalists 







PART II: The Pakistanis 
 
27 Pakistani Journalists:  
Abida  Print, English-language.  
Aban  Print, Urdu-language. 
Bahaar  Television, Urdu-language. 
Danish  Radio, Pashto-language 
Hali  Television, Urdu-language. 
Hamid  Print, Urdu-language. 
Imran  Print, English-language.  
Jabbar  Television, English-language.  
Ibrahim Radio, Urdu-language.  
Mahmood Print, Urdu-language.  
Malik  Print, Urdu-language.  
Muhammed Print, English-language.  
Mumtaz Radio, Pashto-language.  
Nadia  Print, English-language.  
Nabeel  Radio, Pashto-language.  
Omar  Radio, Pashto-language.  
Parvez  Radio, Pashto-language.  
Raheem Print, English-language.  
Rao   Radio & Print, Urdu & English-language.  
Salim   Television, Urdu & English-language. 
Shaid  Television, Urdu & English-language. 
Sharif  Print, Urdu-language. 
Usama  Print, English-language. 
Wali  Television, Pashto-language. 
Yousaf  Print, English-language. 
Vazir  Print, Urdu & English-language. 




CHAPTER 4.  From Quiet to Chaos: Pakistani Media History   
 
 
In 2002, the look, rhythm and impact of Pakistan’s news media drastically 
changed with the introduction of private electronic media.339 The change was driven by 
geopolitics, but not necessarily by the September 11th attacks and the U.S.’s subsequent 
invasion of Pakistan’s western neighbor, Afghanistan. General Pervez Musharraf, dual-
hatted as Pakistan’s president and chief of the army, was focused on Pakistan’s eastern 
neighbor: India. Hoping that Pakistani media would strengthen national identity and 
advocate for his foreign policy, he decided to allow for private Pakistani television and 
radio stations for the first time in the country’s 55-year history.  To understand his 
decision, some background is needed. 
Since the bloody partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, the government and 
people have seen India as their enemy. In particular, the question over who owns 
Kashmir in the north has kept the two countries in seemingly perpetual conflict. (At 
present, the Indians control 43 percent of Kashmir, the Pakistanis 37 percent—and the 
Chinese 20 percent.) Kashmir is a symbol of ongoing tension between the two countries 
and a reference point for the state of their relations. The dispute has also helped to 
consolidate the Pakistani identity not just as Muslim, but also as anti-Indian.340  
In May 1999, under the orders of General Musharraf – then just the army chief – 
Pakistani soldiers and insurgents, who were also fostered by Pakistan’s powerful military 
infrastructure, invaded Kargil, an area nestled high in the mountains in the Indian-




was also the first major military engagement between the two nuclear powers, who had 
fought previously in 1948, 1965 and 1971.342  
Pakistan retreated from Kargil at the end of July and the crisis between the two 
nuclear powers was defused, but the tension remained. Pakistanis’ animosity toward 
India is entrenched in Pakistani identity, seemingly part of their genetic make-up. A 
strong majority of Pakistanis see India as an existential threat, in part because they 
perceive it as not acknowledging Pakistan’s right to exist.343 The core of this is religion: 
Indians question how a state can be based on religion, as Pakistan is on Islam. Shireen 
Mazari, the influential editor of the Pakistani English-language paper, The Nation, wrote 
in 1997: “From the Pakistani perspective, the Indian leadership continues to be perceived 
as one that persistently refuses to accept the finality of the creation of the state of 
Pakistan.”344 It’s a view than an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis hold. Even in 2012, 
78 percent of Pakistanis had a negative view of India and 59 percent say that India – not 
the Taliban or al Qaeda – is the biggest threat to Pakistan.345 Sixty-eight percent still see 
Kashmir as a “very big problem” for their country.346 
Despite the hostility, for nearly a decade, elite Pakistanis became acquainted with 
India and Indians through satellite television. In 1991, satellite TV arrived in India, 
making it the third largest cable television market in the world, behind the United States 
and China, with approximately 85 different stations featuring news, music, sports and 
entertainment programs.347 Pakistanis, on the other hand, had just three Pakistani state 
television stations—all featuring the official view of the Pakistani government—to be 




acquire satellite dishes and watch Indian television for views beyond their own, one-sided 
state broadcasting agencies.  
The 1999 Kargil conflict had been the most televised war in India and Pakistan’s 
history. Journalists on India’s robust, private network of television stations virtually 
never questioned the Indian government’s Kashmir policy and were fiercely pro-state. In 
an effort to attract ratings, Indian television stations had become competitive in how 
jingoistic they could be with coverage of the summer war, and the Indian public seemed 
attracted to the real-life drama and glorification of it.348 All of this became strangely 
valuable to Pakistanis for information on what was happening in isolated Kashmir, and 
the South Asian region. 
When the war ended, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was so angered by the 
Pakistani state-run media’s inability to win the media war against India that he set up a 
government inquiry to see how Pakistani state television could improve, and how 
Pakistan could get more favorable coverage from the international stations that the state 
media often borrowed from, CNN and BBC.349 However, Sharif didn’t have much time to 
remedy it: On Octpber 13, 1999, Musharraf overthrew Sharif in a bloodless coup and 
made himself the new head of state; he would technically serve as the “Chief Executive 
of Pakistan” until taking the title of “President” on June 20, 2001. 
Three years into his tenure, Musharraf, like Sharif, was bothered by the 
encroachment of India’s nationalist media into Pakistan – and the Pakistani state media’s 
inability to energize the public, or to support him. Musharraf’s failure and retreat from 
Kargil haunted him. In addition, Pakistani-based militants had hijacked Indian Airlines 




circuitous and terrifying journey from Amritsar, India; to Lahore, Pakistan; then to Dubai, 
UAE; and, finally, to Kandahar in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, where the Indian 
government agreed to release Pakistani insurgents who were jailed in India. With both 
Kargil and the hijacking, it seemed as if India had won the regional media war against 
Pakistan. Pakistan’s electronic media was completely inferior to India’s.350 
Pakistani state television was loyal to the Pakistani government, but newspapers 
had led the criticism of Musharraf’s policies. Musharraf wanted a deferential national 
press corps that would support him and his national security policies the same way 
Indians – and Americans – supported their government leaders in time of conflict. The 
state-controlled electronic media didn’t satisfy the Pakistani citizenry, he recognized, 
especially now that they had been subjected to the diverse media possibilities in India, 
and the world beyond, via satellite.  He wanted a Pakistani media that could offset the 
threat from India—one that would rally behind his foreign policy efforts in a volatile 
neighborhood.351  
In 2002, Musharraf created by fiat new liberal media laws, which broke the 
Pakistani state’s monopoly on electronic media and allowed for private licenses for TV 
broadcasting and FM radio. He hoped that after liberalizing the media, he could still keep 
it in line with the Pakistani national interest. It was a risky proposition as there were no 
guarantees that the private channels would be pro regime. Soon, however, Pakistani 
journalists would become powerful players in Pakistani politics and society.352 Their 





Pakistan’s Media Origins 
  
In the 1940s, near the end of British India, several newspapers began to advocate 
for a partition that would give Indian Muslims their own country. Nawa-e-Waqt, 
Pakistan’s first Urdu-language newspaper, was first published in 1940 and strongly 
supported the views of conservative Muslim elites who supported an independent 
Pakistan. The English-language newspaper, Dawn, first published in 1941, was similarly 
dedicated to advancing the idea of an independent Pakistan that would be home to South 
Asia’s Muslims.353   
Pakistan’s partition from India in 1947 sparked two diverging opinions about the 
kind of country it should be and Pakistani newspapers reflected this uncertainty. For 
Pakistan to make sense, to have gone through the horrifyingly violent partition from India, 
it needed its own defining characteristics. Pakistan’s national poet, Allama Iqbal, wanted 
Pakistan to be an Islamic state, an instrument to establish God’s law. Pakistan’s founding 
father, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, on the other hand, wanted Pakistan to be a secular state 
that protected the socio-political and economic rights of Indian Muslims. However, in 
1948, just a year after partition, Jinnah died – unable to steward the young nation 
between the two competing claims on what its state identity should be. The post-Jinnah 
administration found itself promoting the religious narrative of Iqbal and, according to 
the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, an Islamabad-based think tank, the Pakistani 
government and its people “found refuge in the religious concept of the state.”354  
Pakistan’s first constitution was not agreed to until almost 10 years later, in 1956, 




the old British-installed constitution and established Pakistan as a liberal country; in law, 
it made conservative religious forces subordinate to the state.356 But an ongoing clash 
between liberal and religious forces began. To appeal to the public, government officials 
often used religious rhetoric and symbols as tools for their own survival.357 State 
institutions, education and the media were all utilized to advocate Pakistani unity and 
nationalism, with Islam binding the country together.358 Article Eight of the constitution 
guaranteed freedom of expression in Pakistan, but it was compromised by a penal code 
that explicitly stated that the press could not criticize the state.359  
The Pakistani media evolved under these socio-political circumstances. For the 
majority of the Pakistan’s media history, the Pakistani government controlled the press: 
Constitutional controls, along with the lack of democratic norms and weak institutions to 
protect the press, made the news media a weak component of Pakistani society that was 
subject to state controls for decades.360 The government also kept control over the press 
by granting – or withholding – advertising funding, which was crucial in a country with a 
weak economy and media market.361  
However, newspapers proliferated: By 1959, there were 85 daily Pakistani 
newspapers. While only one percent of the public understood English at the time, 
English-language publications were the most influential with urbanites, the military and 
government officers, academics and businessmen.362 Pakistani state media, though, often 
weakened the voice of independent print media, which was certainly the case when the 
Pakistan Television Corporation, or PTV, was established in 1964.363  
For almost 40 years, PTV monopolized electronic media as the only television 




watchdogs of the Pakistani state. But they could only do so to an extent. In addition to the 
constitutional clauses that forbid journalists from going against the “interest of the glory 
of Islam” or “the integrity, security or defense of Pakistan,” the Pakistan’s Press and 
Publications Ordinance of 1963 set up the National Press Trust, a regulatory body of 
government that oversaw the print media – arresting journalists and closing publications 
it could not control.364 Despite this, a pattern seemed to emerge with print journalists: 
While they were nationalistic about the idea of Pakistan, they took a critical stance 
against the actions of Pakistani state authorities. 
   
1970-1988: General Zia’s Military Dictatorship  
 
Pakistan’s ruling elite believed the media, and all of civil society, should be 
subservient to the government and, by the 1970s, just a handful of newspapers survived 
various press crackdowns by intolerant, military rulers.365 The Pakistani civil war of 1971, 
which saw the partition of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (now 
Pakistan), brought on cataclysmic change – strengthening Pakistani identity as both 
Islamic and anti-Indian. India had inserted itself into the war, supporting Bangladesh’s 
independence. Many elites looked to this as proof that Jinnah’s vision for a secular 
Pakistani state was not strong enough to unite the many cultural, ethnic and linguistic 
differences among Pakistanis – only religion would unite them.366 In 1973, Pakistan’s 
constitution was revised to reflect changes from the civil war, making Islam the state 
religion and requiring that both Pakistan’s prime minister and president be Muslim.367 For 




speech and freedom of press.368 However, it also included that citizens and the press will 
be: 
…subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory 
of Islam or the integrity, security or defense of Pakistan or any part thereof, 
friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in 
relation to contempt of court, (commission of) or incitement to an offense.369 
 
In other words, the government expected the media to be nationalistic and unquestioning 
of its efforts to unify the country. 
And then, beginning in 1977, Pakistanis witnessed a series of events that made the 
United States, along with Islam and the military, powerful and central actors in Pakistanis’ 
daily lives. Pakistan’s second military dictator, General Zia ul-Haq, ousted Prime 
Minister Zulifikar Ali Bhutto on July 5, 1977, and took control of the country. On April 4, 
1979, Bhutto was hanged. Zia began an intense period of Islamization which would 
continue for over a decade, making Jinnah’s version of a secular Pakistan increasingly 
irrelevant.370 And, on December 25, 1979, the Soviets – allied with India – invaded 
neighboring Afghanistan. Zia, fearing a communist takeover of Pakistan, quickly aligned 
Pakistan with the United States to help fuel an anti-Soviet insurgency inside Afghanistan.  
The Pakistani press had a difficult time contesting these policies. In Zia’s Pakistan, 
the United States, Islam and the Pakistani military became dominant themes, and the 
Pakistani press seemingly could not reset the national agenda from an intense focus on 
religion and security. They had reason to be timid: The constitution and Pakistan’s Press 
and Publications Ordinance gave the journalists little space to question Zia’s actions. 
Pakistani newspapers therefore provided monotonous accounts of events with little 




work – or to even follow-up on previously reported stories.371 Zia’s military regime 
controlled the news media and could say little or nothing without their approval.372   
In 1985, however, the print media boldly opposed the presidential election, which 
included no political parties and served only to legitimize Zia’s power. Only state-owned 
media approved the elections. While subservience to the government was still the norm in 
the Pakistani news media, journalists started to intelligently criticize the government.373 
Three years later, Zia died in a mysterious plane crash. Pakistan’s second military 
dictatorship ended and Pakistan’s Press and Publications Ordinance was repealed, giving 
Pakistani journalists the space to pursue a slightly more independent course.  
 
1988-2002: Democracy  
 
In the 1990s, Pakistanis could still only receive electronic information through 
state-controlled radio and television, but the Pakistani print media grew in reach and 
depth. Print journalists were hardly defiant—part of their strategy for self-preservation 
entailed abiding by government views. But some dynamic, independent Urdu- and 
English-language newspapers and magazines emerged that gradually gained credibility, 
and survived despite the wishes of government regulators.374 
The 1990s also spawned a new generation of journalists who were eager to see, 
write, observe and analyze events from their own perspectives. The content of Pakistani 
newspapers increased considerably with news feeds by the Associated Press of Pakistan, 
a state-controlled newswire, and the private Pakistan Press International, Network News 




coverage from the international newswires, especially Agence France Press, Associated 
Press and Reuters.375 A monthly magazine dedicated only to investigative reporting, 
Newsline, also emerged. Some Pakistani journalists felt as if they were re-inventing 
themselves by representing diverse viewpoints that often quarreled with government 
rhetoric.376  
But while Pakistani journalists became more vociferous, they didn’t necessarily 
become more professional, investigative or vigilant enough to discover news on their 
own— even when stories originated in Pakistan. In 1995, for instance, they relied on 
international news, especially CNN, for information on the arrest of Ramzy Yousf—one 
of the masterminds of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing—in Islamabad. News on 
U.S.-Pakistan relations, too, largely came from U.S. newswires and not original reporting 
inside Pakistan.377  
The 1990s were, nominally, a time of democratic rule in Pakistan, a reprieve from 
Zia’s military rule. But electronic media remained under state control: Imagery of events 
inside Pakistan was largely left to the Pakistanis’ imaginations. Pakistan had two 
television stations: Pakistan Television 1 (PTV1) and Pakistan Television 2 (PTV2), 
which reached 85 percent of the population and broadcast normally for nine hours a 
day.378 A third station, the Shalimar Television Network (STN), episodically carried 
foreign news programming—most notably CNN and BBC—but it was monitored by 
Pakistani government press censors and pulled from the air if the censors did not approve 
the content.379 This was the case with any CNN coverage on the 1999 Kargil conflict, the 
1991 Gulf War and the 1992 destruction of the Babri Mosque in India.380 Such censorship 




government, rejecting any programming or commercials that did not advance its agenda. 
(In one case, PTV refused to air a commercial that Imran Khan—a celebrated cricket 
player, at the time—had created asking for charitable donations to his cancer hospital 
because, presumably, he had also began to dabble in opposition politics.)381 
As the 1990s progressed, though, Pakistanis found a way to get the information 
their state-controlled press was not giving them. They began to access news through 
satellite dishes that were in high demand and available in local markets, in affluent and 
poor areas alike.382 In addition to CNN and BBC, Pakistanis with television satellites 
could now receive Indian stations such as Zee TV and Vee TV that provided Hindi-
language entertainment, news and music.383 Some Pakistanis complained about a “culture 
invasion” from satellite imagery coming from India and the West, but largely the 
Pakistani public—especially the elites— became accustomed to accessing views that 
contested the narrow vision of the world that their Pakistani government preferred them 
to see. 
Pakistani print journalists, too, worked within the boundaries of the constitution – 
and the general intolerance Pakistan’s civilian rulers in the 1990s, Benazhir Bhutto 
(1988-90; 1993-96) and Nawaz Sharif (1990-93; 1997-1999), had for them. Bhutto and 
Sharif moved toward liberalization of the new media, but the solidification of democratic 
norms – one of them being a free press—were slow-moving.384 Both leaders made it 
known that they saw an emboldened Pakistani media as a nuisance. In April 1998, Sharif 
stated that “newspapers should not give verdicts like judges.”385 Later that year, Bhutto, 
reacting to a widespread, one-day Pakistani newspaper strike protesting newspaper taxes 




politicians and government leaders, too, were consistently disturbed with what they 
described as an “over-empowered press.”387 But, according to a 1998 report by the 
Pakistani Media Association on the state of the Pakistani media, the more government 
leaders lambasted the press, the more popular and significant it became with Pakistani 
society: “Media in general have become a link between various, yet converging processes 
of economic, social and political development in the country,” they stated.388  
This dynamic created a pattern in Pakistani press-state relations not unlike that 
prevailing in western democracies: Pakistani politicians would nominally state support 
for a free press, but then resent unfavorable coverage and try to control it. But the 
resumption of military rule in Pakistan in 1999 set 21st century Pakistani media on a 
course of fluctuating press freedoms, a growing sense of nationalism, yet a 
simultaneously adversarial—even hostile—stance against the Pakistani government and 
the United States.   
 
Musharraf’s Rule: 1999-2008 
 
In 1999, when Musharraf took power from Nawaz Sharif in a military coup, 
Pakistan’s latest attempt at democracy had failed. In 2000, the media continued its 
deferential treatment of the new ruling elite, finding their interests best served by 
supporting them.389 Few newspapers operated with a democratic ethos that embraced 
professional values—most seemed to have fallen into a pattern where they just reported 
what they were told to.390 But it was under Musharraf’s period of military rule, from 




for his foreign policy against India, Musharraf privatized electronic media. The amount 
of Pakistani television stations went from three state-owned stations to more than 70 
independent ones. Simultaneously, print media continued to evolve. In 1997 the total 
number of daily, monthly and minor publications was 4,455; by 2003, only 945 remained 
but the daily circulation of publications increased to 6.2 million for a population that was 
44 percent illiterate.391  
In March 2007, Musharraf suspended Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry 
for refusing to condone his extra-constitutional assertion of a dual role as both president 
and army chief. The chief justice was the closest to a personal embodiment of “the law” 
to be found in Pakistan. His arrest enraged Pakistani citizens.392 Pakistani media – most 
especially Geo TV, Pakistan’s first independent station, established in 2002 – rallied 
behind Chaudhry and the country’s lawyers, giving them a national platform.393 At the 
time, the New York Times described the Lawyers’ Movement, as it was popularly known, 
as “the most consequential outpouring of liberal, democratic energy in the Islamic world 
in recent years.”394 This was a turning point for Pakistani media, civil society and 
Musharraf’s political career. Realizing that he had little backing from either civil society 
or the army, which sensed the popular outrage against Musharraf’s action, Musharraf re-
instated the chief justice and called in July for a presidential election to challenge his 
rule.395 As a result of that election, held in October 2007, Musharraf became Pakistan’s 
democratically elected president. But the press and the judiciary declared it to be 
fraudulent, and television anchors openly called for his resignation.   
In response, Musharraf imposed a national state of emergency on November 3, 




BBC, were taken off the air as part of a national media blackout.397 As in the 1990s, only 
PTV1 and PTV2 were available to the public.398 The Pakistan Electronic Media 
Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) required that all private electronic media sign a 14-page 
code of conduct before they could resume transmission. By November 16, 2007, 15 
broadcasters agreed to the new restrictions and were back on the air. But Pakistan’s four 
most popular independent news broadcasters—ARY, OneWorld, AAJ, Geo and Dawn 
TV— remained shuttered until December 15, 2007, when the state of emergency 
ended.399   
In December 2007, according to the English-language newspaper Dawn, more 
than 70 percent of Pakistanis surveyed said that they were opposed to closure of private 
television channels and to the general state of emergency.400 When the blackout was lifted, 
the electronic media—with pent-up resentment and more ammunition than ever against 
Musharraf – intensified their fierce criticism. On August 18, 2008, facing mounting 
pressure and threats of impeachment, General Musharraf agreed to resign as president. 
He fled the country quickly after.  
With Musharraf’s exit, the producers and journalists of Geo TV, especially, felt as 
if it they had become crusaders for democracy. Geo was Pakistan’s most popular news 
channel and had quickly established itself as the agenda-setter for the country’s news 
media. In addition to the 2007 Lawyer’s Movement, the network had campaigned in 2006 
against Islamic laws that equated rape with criminal adultery (in other words, if a woman 
was raped, she was not a victim but an adulterer) a project that even critics acknowledge 
led to the laws’ amendment.401 But Geo was also accused of instigating hate. The 2008 




constitution as not being true Muslims – were widely attributed to being inspired by the 
hate-laced comments of Geo’s religious talk show guests.402 But despite confronting 
President Musharraf for keeping his chief of the army title, Geo rarely challenged the 
Pakistan’s military as an institution.403 Geo was nationalistic but not blindly loyal to its 
civilian leadership. Much of its nationalism stemmed from being anti-Indian – and anti-
American. The station was a fierce opponent of Musharraf’s relationship with U.S. 
President George W. Bush, which they saw as acquiescence to American power. It 
acquired high ratings for its style of pro-Islam, pro-Army and anti-American coverage – 
and other Pakistani media followed its lead.  
	  
Pakistani Media Today 
 
Pakistan’s privatization of electronic media came at a time when the country was 
becoming more violent, more unpredictable and more insecure about its place in the 
world. Violence inflicted by the Pakistani Taliban, al Qaeda and other militant groups led 
to thousands of casualties and internally displaced persons while weak governance failed 
to keep the country together. The Pakistani media struggled to make sense of this all. 
With the market for media quickly expanding, the information trickle most Pakistanis 
were used to for over half a century became a deluge they could not live without.   
Within eight years, Pakistan had more than 90 television stations in seven 
languages, creating a rich media ecosystem for Pakistani society. In 2010, one-third of 
Pakistan’s 180 million people had access to it via cable and satellite.404 Television 
became the most popular medium for a country where the literacy rate is 54 percent – 68 




US$840.405 More than one- quarter of these television stations are round-the-clock news 
stations.406 
Pakistani state television, however, is the only network that provides terrestrial 
services to all of Pakistan’s population; private channels have licenses for satellite or 
cable service only. This gives PTV a great advantage in influencing rural audiences, who 
do not have access to cable or satellite television.  PTV also has another financial 
advantage over private stations: It receives 70 percent of the Pakistani government’s 
public advertisement budget, estimated to be in the tens of millions of dollars.407 The 
remaining 30 percent is normally allocated to news agencies that are sympathetic with 
government policies. The Pakistani state also has the largest nationwide audience share, 
with 31 stations covering 80 percent of Pakistan territory and reaching 96.5 percent of the 
population.408 In addition to more than 90 television stations, Pakistan has more than 130 
radio stations on the air. In rural areas, where electricity is sparse, radio is especially 
influential.  
There are also approximately 10, 000 newspapers in Pakistan, but only 142 of 
which, according to the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, are “proper” ones, meaning 
that they offer consistent content and are ran by professional journalists and editors.409 
The “improper” ones are largely vanity publications that surface occasionally to promote 
a narrow purpose. Total newspaper circulation in 2010 was estimated to be 
approximately 3.5 million nationwide.410 While television is overwhelmingly broadcast in 
the Urdu language, the official and dominant language in the country, print media 
demographics, on the other hand, reflect a multi-linguistic, multi-ethnic and stratified 




smattering of media in the vernacular languages, such as Pashto (spoken mainly in the 
tribal areas along Afghanistan and Pakistan), Punjabi (spoken mainly in Punjab) and 
Sindhi (spoken in Sindh and Balochistan).411  
Urdu-language newspapers are widely read by the majority of Pakistanis who live 
in rural areas, where it continues to have an impact on public opinion due to a tradition of 
communal and collective newspaper-reading that is deeply embedded in the Pakistani 
culture.412 And Urdu-language newspapers, especially, aim to entertain: They are 
religiously conservative, sensational and often folkloristic.413 The two threads that tie the 
very diverse Urdu news media together are a pervasive sense of Pakistani nationalism 
and Muslim identity in each news article and editorial. Most coverage also provides 
analysis that is critical of local and national politics.414 
English-language news media, on the other hand, is urban and elite-centric. It is 
widely considered, especially by its readers, to be more liberal and professional in 
comparison to the Urdu news media and to have greater leverage with Pakistani’s elite: 
the opinion makers, politicians, the business community and general upper strata of 
society that are fluent in English.415 When compared to Urdu-language and other 
vernaculars – including the Pashto language, which is spoken in the tribal areas along the 
Afghan border – only 300,000 of the total newspaper circulation of 3.5 million is 
reserved for English-language newspapers.416 The English-language press is also confined 
to reporting from five urban areas: Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta. 
This is compared to Urdu newspapers, which are published in nearly all of Pakistan’s 130 
districts.417 News provided in English matters, however, because English in Pakistan is, 




and the language of the foreign policymaking.”418 Elites often read and write for the 
English-language press to solidify themselves as elites; they aim not to sway the minds of 
the general public, but to influence decision-makers. Amir Ahmed Khan, editor of the 
English-language monthly magazine, Herald, stated that Pakistanis who speak only Urdu 
“do not have an understanding of complicated issues involving foreign policy decisions 
though they may have strong views” which the policymakers want to appeal to.419 But the 
information and opinions espoused for the English-language press are also regularly 
translated, and eventually make their way into the more mainstream, Urdu-language news.  
Such a mass mediated Pakistan requires substantial manpower. Pakistan is the 
seventh most populated country in the world, numbering approximately 182 million 
people – at least 72 million of whom cannot read.  The number of journalists in 2002, 
before private electronic media, was 2,000; today, it is estimated to be 17,000.420 Before 
the electronic news transformation, journalism was an unglamorous career. Today, its 
celebrity-making power has attracted scores of young people to the craft. The average age 
of a journalist is now 23-years-old.421 Their habits, attitudes, and inexperience drive 
media culture and it is that reality which makes Pakistani media uneven in its 
professionalism yet simultaneously powerful in its impact.422  
Most of Pakistan’s journalists claim to be professional and hold a strong sense of 
ethics. A study of journalists in 21 countries – from the U.S. to Uganda to Pakistan to 
China to Bulgaria to Brazil – found a large consensus when it came to deficiencies in 
journalistic ethics. In Pakistan, however, journalists claimed to be more ethical in their 
work than other global journalists. On a scale of one to five, with five being the strongest, 




averaged 4.11 globally, but averaged 4.55 in Pakistan. In the U.S., it averaged 4.11. To 
the statement, “I remain strictly impartial in my work,” the global average was 4.11 – 
with Pakistani reporters saying 4.41 and American reporters saying 4.02.423  
 But remaining impartial is tough in a country whose public holds such 
overwhelmingly unified views in how they feel about their civilian government, their 
military, Islam and the United States. In June 2012, a Pew Global Attitudes Survey found 
that 68 percent of the Pakistani public believed their media was having a positive 
influence on Pakistan (down from 76 percent in 2011); 77 percent of them trust their 
military (down slightly from 79 percent in 2011); 66 percent of the public trust their 
religious leaders (up from 60 percent);424 and 76 percent has a negative view of their 
civilian government. Pakistanis’ faith in their democratically elected leaders has eroded 
significantly since 2009, when 40 percent thought the civilian government was having a 
positive effect. Their faith was even higher in 2007 – the year Pakistan’s judiciary and 
media sought General Musharraf’s overthrow. At that time, 59 percent approved of his 
government; in 2002, 72 percent did.425 In the June 2012 poll, 85 percent have an 
unfavorable view of President Zardari (while only 54 percent unfavorably viewed 
Musharraf). This number is comparable to the 88 percent who had a negative opinion of 
the U.S – and 74 percent believed the U.S. is their enemy.426  
Pakistani journalists inevitably fall into the strong majorities that see the U.S. and 
their civilian governments negatively, but trust their media, military and religious 
leaders.427 According to Dr. Mosharraf Zaidi, in an article for The News in January 2010, 
“Pakistan’s media…is a reflection and an extension of Pakistan at large.”428 It is also, 




corrupt politicians, dictators and military leaders, as those are matters for the government, 
military and the judiciary, but they can publicly shame them.429 More than any other time 
in Pakistani history, journalists can hold Pakistan’s leaders accountable. As journalist 
Nasim Zehra stated in January 2012, in Pakistan, “the independent media has ensured 
that every move by every player on the national power scene is examined threadbare. 
This exercise in itself is both a leveller [sic] and a restrainer.”430 But whom, exactly, the 
Pakistani journalists want to hold accountable for their actions depends on the time, 
situation and general relations between the military, civilian government and general 
public.  
It also depends on what stories will bring high ratings. With the prevailing 
conflict within Pakistan and its neighbor, Afghanistan, one could argue that violence and 
turmoil have demanded the attention of journalists. But television stations are under 
intense competition for viewership. And the desire to make money and acquire high 
ratings has trumped the quest for quality journalism.431 As a result, producers, journalists 
and talk show hosts habitually shun coverage of social issues and gravitate toward 
providing sensational programming; hourly news has relied on violent conflict and 
politics, which can be dramatized further for entertainment.432 In order to meet a 
perceived consumer demand for excitement, there is also a fair amount of debate and 
disagreement over not just political and military affairs, but religion.433  
The general tilt toward sensationalist reporting also applies to news and 
commentary about the United States, which is central to the nationalistic Pakistani 




common refrain in the Pakistani news media. Saleem Safi, a talk show host on the Geo 
network, summarized the surefire rule for the news media as this:  
If you are a journalist and you want high ratings, start verbally abusing America. 
If you abuse the Taliban, al-Qaeda or the Pakistani establishment, you face threats 
to your life — people say you are a non-Muslim. If you are talking against 
America, you become a hero.434 
  
Anti-Indian and anti-U.S. sentiment has become so entrenched in Pakistanis psyche that 
moving away from it could be commercial suicide for the media, and the governing 
elite.435  For the Pakistani political and media culture, focusing on the negative and 
wanting to “score points” is habitual; this makes forming any kind of conciliatory policy 




 The people who often drive the culture are the owners of three, national media 
corporations. In a 2010 study on global journalism, Pakistani journalists said that owners 
of media groups pressured them the most to shape their reporting.437 They can force 
journalists to sensationalize their stories for higher ratings – or to report on issues that 
will favor a certain political party or agenda, government policy, military action, or social 
or religious movement.438  The power in Pakistani media today is dispersed between three 
major media groups. First, is the conservative Jang Group, Pakistan’s largest, which 
publishes the Urdu-language Daily Jang and the English-language The News 
International (among other less-read publications) and owns the Geo television 




which runs the popular English-language newspaper, Dawn, and the Urdu-language 
television station by the same name.440 Then there is the ultra-conservative Nawa-i-Waqt 
Group, which publishes the Nawa-i-Waqt paper in Urdu—Pakistan’s oldest newspaper--
and the English newspaper, The Nation.441  
Trusted by two-thirds of the Pakistani public, the Pakistani press can determine the 
most salient issues for the nation and guide their reactions. Political, religious, military, 
corporations and social groups all want to impact the public through the Pakistani press – 
sometimes by punishing its practitioners with violence.442 According to the Committee to 
Protect Journalists (CPJ), Pakistan ranked in the top-five deadliest countries for 
journalists between 2005-2011.443 From 1992 to 2010, extremist groups or government 
authorities had a “confirmed motive” to kill a total of 36 Pakistani journalists. In 2011, 
one of the most talked about cases was the torture and death of Syed Saleem Shahzad, a 
freelance reporter for the Asia Times. In May 2011, Shahzad had written a story on an al 
Qaeda attack at the Pakistan Naval Air Station Mehran that killed 10 Pakistanis 
associated with the base. In his report, Shahzad alleged that the attack was punishment 
for the Pakistani military’s crackdown on sailors who had been plotting to kill Americans 
with al Qaeda operatives.444 Essentially, Shahzad had exposed connections between the 
Pakistani military and Islamic militants – a humiliating report on the heels of the U.S. 
Navy Seal raid in Abottabad on Osama bin Laden.445 He was allegedly abducted and 
murdered by Pakistan’s ISI, the intelligence wing of the military. 
The Pakistani civilian government normally applies pressure on the media 
indirectly. The government can cut off unfriendly media from public advertising dollars 




broadcast media by suspending their licenses or simply threatening to do so. There is 
plenty of precedent so: After Musharraf blacked out media nationwide in November 2007, 
Zardari did the same in March 2009, singling out Geo television exclusively.446  
 The civilian government can also be incredibly passive to extremism in Pakistani 
news. Huma Yusuf, a columnist at Dawn, wrote in June 2012 that the civilian 
government does little to counter the extremist narrative: “Rather than articulate clear and 
consistent messaging against militant groups, the government stood by while the 
mainstream airwaves were hijacked by extremist viewpoints.” Politicians do not use the 
press to run campaigns against fundamentalism or to promote social causes. Instead, they 
play the role media producers want. They “use media appearances to raise their 
individual profiles and trigger political storms. Their time on air is about being 
argumentative rather than developing and sustaining a coherent argument around a 
relevant issue; it’s about reactive politicking rather than proactive, issue-based politics,” 
she wrote. The Pakistani government has no clear stance on any major policy issue. 
Yusuf continued, 
To be clear, the only reason this government has not invested in communications 
strategies is because, despite the hue and cry about democracy, the concept of 
consensus-building among the public remains alien. The impetus to earn 
legitimacy for political action by winning public support — in other words, 
representative politics — does not yet exist. 447  
 
 
Until 2002, the Pakistani news media was struggling to hold their government 
responsible for its words and actions. In its most recent, electronic form, it has branded 
itself as being so adversarial to the civilian government, so hooked on conflict and 




reflects a culture and society eager for change for a stable and liberal society. But with a 
powerful military, weak civilian government, and Islamic extremists operating with 
impunity within Pakistani borders, the press has no clear direction on how to make that 
change happen. As we will see in the next chapter, Pakistan’s more moderate journalists 





Chapter 5. “We realized our power”: The Pakistani Journalists’ Experience.  
 
From March 2010 through May 2011, I interviewed 27 Pakistani journalists who 
work for elite Pakistani news organizations in Islamabad, Lahore, New York and 
Washington. Some of them were eager to share their own reflections on Pakistani media 
history and its explosive growth since 2002. Many of the journalists began their careers 
in the 1990s, a time when print journalism became bolder, mostly because of the events 
they witnessed – and largely kept silent about – in the 1980s under the rule of General 
Zia ul-Haq.  
 During the 1980s, Pakistani progressives were “largely disillusioned,” Sharif, an 
Urdu-language journalist, explained, because they watched the United States embolden a 
military dictator. The U.S. Congress and Pentagon particularly, he said, “turned a blind 
eye to General Zia’s human rights violations because they needed his support next door 
in Afghanistan.”448 Journalists felt they could not fully expose Zia’s wrongdoings—nor 
could they count on the United States to do so. Rao, another Urdu-language journalist, 
admitted that that absence of private television and the suppression of Pakistani media 
made for less public protest. There was much violence in Pakistan, especially along the 
border with Afghanistan, but “because there was no media there was no hysteria, no 
panic,” he said.449  But the lack of news media meant, too, that the public was largely 
ignorant of the host of problems and general dysfunction within the country. The 
journalists became increasingly determined to not let these facts go unspoken.  
 The 1990s saw more intrepid reportage, but the Pakistani print media also began 




explained, and of their society as a whole. Sometimes journalists and editorial writers 
offered constructive criticism, but most of the time they were out to humiliate Benazhir 
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, and their respective administrations.450 Nawaz Sharif, 
especially, did not tolerate media criticism of his administration and, depending on his 
mood, he would shut newspapers down, recalled Shafqat.451 But that just made 
newspapers – and journalism, as a career – more popular.  Journalists certainly became 
more defiant against the Pakistani government and were, “growing up,” explained Urdu-
language journalist Sharif, and seeing for themselves the value in an independent press 
that challenged government authority and kept it accountable to the Pakistani public.452 
 By 2000, the journalists were about to embark on a new era of Pakistani media 
with Musharraf’s decision to privatize television and radio. Before, Pakistanis had no 
choice but to turn to Indian news channels to try to understand what was happening in 
Kashmir, and the rest of the world, remembered Rao, an Urdu-language journalist.453 
There was little alternative to understanding the world beyond Pakistani state television – 
and no broadcast outlet for them to report news independently. The journalists 
interviewed uniformly revered Musharraf’s decision. Yousaf, an English-language 
journalist said simply, “Thanks to General Musharraf, there was suddenly much freedom 
of expression in Pakistan.”454 But this freedom also allowed the long-suppressed 
journalists to chastise their head of state more openly – freedom they had wanted with 
General Zia, Prime Minister Bhutto and Prime Minister Sharif, but were long denied.  
Musharraf’s decision was the “proverbial genie out of a bottle” Rao said.455 And 
what happened after privatization, the journalists said, was not what he intended. 




by opening the Pakistani media space, and then regulate Pakistani media agencies heavily. 
But the journalists unleashed on Musharraf decades of pent-up resentment against 
Pakistani governments.456 On television, they constantly questioned Musharraf’s 
legitimacy as an unelected head of state and the simultaneous head of the Pakistani 
military. By holding both titles, explained Yousaf, Musharraf was bucking the laws and 
rules of the constitution – and he couldn’t publicly refute the criticism brought on by the 
electronic media.457 And that criticism, Hamid, an English-language journalist, told me, 
was brought on consistently.458   
 It was from 2007 to 2008, in the final year of Musharraf’s rule and his ultimate 
downfall that the journalists realized they had power. Essentially, explained Wali, a 
Pashto-language journalist, the Pakistani media “wanted Musharraf’s ouster” so bad that 
they heavily promoted the 2007 Lawyers’ Movement.459  Months after the movement, 
when Musharraf relinquished his military title and was elected as a civilian president in 
October 2007 after a questionable electoral process, he imposed a state of emergency in 
November 2007 that shuttered Pakistan’s five-year-old independent television stations. 
The value of the news media in Pakistani society became more obvious to the Pakistani 
public. Urdu-language journalist Salim recalled receiving a phone call during the 
blackout that another military coup was taking place. There were many disruptive rumors. 
After five years of independent information, he explained, the Pakistani public was again 
consuming mainly what the government wanted them to. The public realized that they 
could not live without Pakistani independent media, especially television.460  
With the blackout over, the journalists’ sense of purpose heightened. Wanting to 




real time that refuted the official government line and ignited public sentiment. This was 
especially so among the 40 percent of the public who could not read and had, until then, 
relied on state-controlled radio and television. While the Pakistani journalists appreciate 
Musharraf for expanding their press freedoms, they told me that they feel stronger than 
the Pakistani government – at least the civilian government.  
 
“A Huge Explosion of Media” 
 
With the increase from three to more than 90 television stations, Pakistani news 
media has undergone what Sharif called “a huge explosion of media.”461 It is now, 
according to Rao, the freest in the entire Islamic world – and as vibrant as anywhere else 
in the world.462 Some, like Wali, said that this freedom was ideal, but others, like Salim, 
an Urdu-language journalist, said it was difficult to say if such a mass mediated Pakistan 
would be a good change for the country.463 In the current state of the Pakistani media, 
more news outlets can make the field more competitive and, to attract ratings, this means 
more sensationalism and falsehood. 
Television is at the core of this pride and concern about the future of Pakistani news. 
A majority of the Pakistani journalists told me that television news is more entertainment 
than information—a dangerous reality as it lends towards conspiracy thinking in the 
society. Television is popular especially for Pakistan’s illiterates,  but it also gives them a 
false sense of knowledge: they feel as if they are being informed without having to read 
or consult a wide range of sources.464 Pakistani citizens watch the news intently and are 




with opinion and little fact.”465 Broadcasters, agreed Imran, an English-language 
journalist, are more celebrities than journalists.466  
 
Professionalism Is Inconsequential 
 
The journalists I interviewed believe that their peers often report stories incompletely 
before printing or broadcasting them, and that where they lack information, fabricate 
details to make the story complete. They believe that, to assert authority, their peers never 
admit they do not know something, and construct reality instead. While they chastise 
their civilian leaders, Pakistani journalists are often too quick to fault Pakistan’s 
neighbors – especially India and Afghanistan – for their country’s volatility. Their peers 
often worry about what the United States – what they think is the most powerful actor in 
their domestic affairs -- thinks of them and will do next.  
Vazir said Pakistani journalists are almost a self-loathing group that doesn’t inspire 
confidence.467 Many who pursue a career in journalism, he noted, do so because of its 
celebrity-making power and desire to be rich and join the elite class. They are eager to be 
on television and score high ratings, and ignore professional standards in favor of 
sensational storytelling. Most of them work in the Urdu-language news media, are from 
the traditionally conservative, lower middle class, and are normally sympathetic with 
jihadist ideology and fundamentalists.468 The education that they do receive emphasizes 
respect for the military, police and judiciary -- and deference to authority. Journalists are 
not just poorly educated but poorly compensated, corrupt and imprisoned in tribal 




unaccountable.  There is no culture of fact checking, for it would get in the way of a good 
story, Vazir said.469 There are no repercussions from fabricating material: “You can report 
one thing and you can get away with it. No one will come after you and ask why you 
reported stuff when it's not true.”470  
Usama, an English-language journalist, agreed that journalists, eager to keep up 
with information, often do not stop to analyze events. He gave the example of U.S. drone 
attacks on Pakistani territory, a popular subject with the Pakistani media. Many rail about 
how the U.S. is undermining Pakistan’s sovereignty by allowing for the drone attacks, 
which are said to target the Taliban, al Qaeda and other militants along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border. Usama posed a question that reflected Pakistan’s tendency to look 
externally for a cause of its problems, rather than internally: “Why aren't we talking about 
the fact that we’d already lost our internal sovereignty to the [homegrown] terrorists” 
who are the targets of these drone strikes?471  
Terrorist suicide bombings spur instability in Pakistan. Between 2002 and 2011, there 
were over 300 suicide bombings in the country – a phenomenon that did not occur before 
2002, when the U.S. began their sustained presence in Afghanistan. These bombings have 
killed more than 4,800 people.472 Mahmood, an English-language journalist, explained 
that suicide bombings and political assassinations (including Benazhir Bhutto’s in 
December 2008) have pre-occupied the media.473 And almost always, the conclusion 
drawn was that a “foreign hand” was to blame for the events.  
Pakistani journalism may have the veneer of professionalism but it thrives on 
conspiracy theories proven with cherry-picked or outright fabricated information.474 




Because liberal, moderate opinion does not sell in Pakistan, Pakistani journalists are in 
the business of selling “half truths and half lies to cater to public opinion,” Hamid 
explained. Editorial writers and talk show hosts, he said, “play to the lowest common 
denominator” in Pakistani society.475 Journalists lean toward sensationalism and 
conservative thought, Omar – a Pashto-language journalist – agreed, because of a 
perception that the audience wants it.  
The disproportionate divide in Pakistan between those who can read and those who 
cannot is further divided between those who can speak and read English, and those who 
cannot. Pakistanis who are highly educated and can speak English, Omar said, amount to 
20 percent of Pakistanis. Within that fifth of the population, he estimated, 40 percent of 
them are inclined to be conservative -- and 60 percent of them are liberal. By his estimate, 
that means that only about 12 percent of the Pakistani public is liberal and seeks 
moderate views in their news, while the majority of Pakistanis is not educated and 
automatically sympathizes with conservative and religious news agencies for information 
and analysis.476  Most Pakistanis, too, Vazir said, are drawn to Urdu-language newspapers 
because they are cheap and entertaining: The Pakistani public is “addicted,” he said, to 
fabricated content that speculates about the actions of the Pakistani, Indian and American 
governments and often encourages conspiracy theories.477  
Pakistani journalists, in short, are unprofessional by Western standards. Young 
Pakistanis seek a career in journalism more for fame and money than for the pursuit of 
truth and constructive contributions to Pakistani society. They want, the journalists told 
me, to be powerful, to take down a president, the way they did with Pervaiz Musharraf in 




to please their corporate owners. The journalists interviewed for this project said that the 
majority of their peers seek a career in journalism for their own personal enrichment and 
glory and not as a public service.478 The interviewees considered themselves atypical in 
this regard as they described themselves as being part of a respectable minority that wants 
to report news to serve the public’s best interests and not give in to the sensational news 
refrains.  
 
Pakistani Public Overwhelmingly Influenced by the Press 
  
A strong majority of the journalists supported the idea that the media—especially the 
broadcast media—has become stronger than the civilian government.479 They uniformly 
answered that English-language journalists influence the elite, including policymakers 
and diplomats, while Urdu-language journalists influence the masses.480 For this reason, 
in Pakistan, the Urdu-language journalists have much more power than the English-
language journalists. As Malik explained, “Whatever comes up on Urdu-language 
television broadcasts is how Pakistani public opinion is built.”481 
At least 90 percent of the Pakistani public, Hamid declared, was strongly influenced 
by the Pakistani press.482 Public trust in the media – which the Pew Global Attitudes 
Project said was at 68 percent in 2012 – has been high, Shaid said, ever since the 2007 
Lawyers’ Movement. Both the judiciary and the media are seen as “agents of change who 
are working to break the status quo.”483  
Television is the most popular source of news for Pakistanis.  It speaks to the illiterate 




were quick to point out that when the new Urdu-language television stations debuted in 
2002 (only one Pakistani television station is in English), many Urdu-language print 
journalists who were known for their jingoistic and conservative views migrated to 
television. Because of the high illiteracy rate, the uneducated masses of Pakistanis began 
to listen to and watch these journalists very carefully.484 Yousaf agreed that uneducated 
Pakistanis “blindly believe in news reports…and they totally think that what the media is 
reporting is correct.”485  There is a very big difference, he said, between how literate and 
illiterate Pakistanis respond to news.486 Illiterate Pakistanis see what is broadcast on 
television and take it for reality, while educated Pakistanis are more skeptical.487 
Wanting to appeal to their audience, the news began to entertain, Usama explained. 
Owners wanted high ratings and advertising dollars, and they saw an audience of 
Pakistanis who wanted to see reflections of themselves on television and hear the 
conservative views they subscribed to – views that sometimes dangled on extremism. 
News narratives were certainly pro-military, pro-Islam and hostile to the United States, 
India and the civilian government. This is why, Usama said, that so many news stations 
exist today: they want the 44 percent audience share of illiterate Pakistanis.488  
 The public appeal of the media in Pakistan is that it gives ordinary Pakistanis a 
voice: People see it as their medium to talk back to the Pakistani state, something they 
could not do for decades.489 Journalists, and those who work in news media, believe they 
are representing the Pakistani people – and the Pakistani people are engaged regularly 
with the news. Pakistanis live in a politically charged society; reading, digesting, and 
talking about news is a social act, Salim explained. “If you go to a barber’s shop you will 




politics for whatever knowledge they have. The only topic there you will find politics.” 
There are many other problems in Pakistani society that transcend politics, but the 
Pakistani people prefer to stay fixated on politics both inside Pakistan, and the 
international politics that define the region.  
The average Pakistani, said Salim, is “very, very politically aware – more so than the 
average American man.” The idea that Pakistani people are engaged and have a curiosity 
about Pakistan’s role in the world is a point of pride; Americans are seen in Pakistan as 
being more insular, uncurious people.490 But the Pakistanis’ national pastime is politics, 
and the evening talk shows are their preferred forum for making meaning amid great 
uncertainty about Pakistan’s economy, domestic government and security. Talk show 
hosts can construct meaning for otherwise intangible events.491 But the meaning that is 
offered is often just conspiracy theories, Usama explained. The hosts can solidify 
Pakistani public perceptions of misdoings; they have such sway over Pakistani public 
thought that “if it is day and the talk show hosts say it is night, then people are going to 
buy that it is night.”492 Yousaf agreed that people see what is broadcast on television as 
reality and subscribe to the opinions espoused by talk show hosts and anchormen.493 In 
this view, the news media indoctrinates the public. Yet it is more likely that the public 
looks for to the news for validation and not to be outright manipulated.  
The journalists also argued that the average Pakistani does not have time to question 
what he is told by people held up to be authoritative figures. Sharif, an Urdu-language 
journalist explained, “It’s human nature that people come back from their work, they 
switch on the TV and watch a sitcom, listen to news, and then they go to sleep.”494 They 




lives. The norm in Pakistan for decades has been to deeply mistrust the Pakistani head of 
state, and news narratives feed into this mistrust. The Pakistani public watches the news 
to hear their thoughts reflected back to them in a punchier, apparently fact-based form, 
without having the time to pursue any extra investigation or analysis of their own. If, 
according to the elite Pakistani journalists interviewed for this project, Pakistani 
television is a medium that entertains and confirms suspicion, then the majority of the 
public is living in a comfortable echo chamber.  
Some of the journalists, however, believed the public’s fascination with their 
electronic media is decreasing, for as journalists become more powerful, the public is 
growing suspicious of them, too. Salim explained:  “People have realized that some of the 
news outlets have their own agendas and they've become too strong.” As a result, some 
people think the press should be held more accountable. Yet the public has also become 
used to a certain volume of information, so much that the quantity and pace of news will 
not likely be scaled back. As Hamid explained, “I think we have now become so used to 
such great information flow that we can’t do much about it.”495 
 
Media is the Government’s Rival  
 
While American communications scholarship sees the U.S. press as the mediator 
between the public and the government, in Pakistan, the media is largely perceived to be 
the rival of the civilian government. One could find traces of this trend in the 1990s, but 
the liberalization of the press and the success of the 2007 Lawyers Movement—in 




take a seemingly automatically aggressive stance against the government’s domestic and 
foreign policies, warranted or not. This is especially the case when it comes to the 
Pakistani government’s relationship with its disenchanted alliance with the U.S. 
government.  
The journalists interviewed largely see the media as being more powerful than the 
civilian government because they are able to change “the opinions and thinking of the 
people,” which the Pakistani civilian government cannot.496 Part of its power, Rao said, is 
also in the fact that the media sets the public agenda for the country – much more so than 
the government.497 Pakistani journalists do not follow what the Pakistani president or 
prime minister project to be the most important issues for the country; the journalists aim 
to define for the public what the priorities are.  
The journalists conceded that they enjoy a remarkably high level of free speech, 
despite government attempts at censorship and military and insurgents’ threats. Salim, an 
Urdu-language journalist, acknowledged that the dynamic between the media and the 
government, was surprisingly, “not that bad.”498  Politicians and civilian government 
officials largely accept the criticism, even when broadcasters and talk show hosts are 
“clubbing the government,” he said, “they take it.” They do not impose media blackouts 
or threaten to revoke media licenses as much as they could – or used to. But, it’s because 
of the Pakistani media’s popularity that the government doesn’t have any choice but to 
tolerate the press a majority of the time.499 The Pakistani media today is a fragmented 
landscape, but they are united in their opposition to the government. If the government 
tried to shutter one media group, than the others would set off a rally cry for the public, 




The Pakistani press—print, and now electronic—is adversarial toward the 
government, varying only in degree. Pakistani journalists, she also pointed out, are not 
mature, ethical nor constructive when it came to Pakistan’s government.501 Abida, an 
Urdu-language journalist, thought that while the conflict between the media and 
government had been tempered, the general level of friction is a fixture in press-state 
relations.502 To be credible in the eyes of the Pakistani public, he said, the media must 
take on the government on both domestic and foreign policy issues. Shaid, an English-
language journalist, concurred that the media is serving a critical role at this stage in 
Pakistan, as the media is the “counter balance to [Pakistani state] power.” The media can 
quickly “galvanize public opinion” for or against the Pakistani government, although it is 
usually against the government.503  No news agency – with the exception of Pakistani 
state television or the Associated Press of Pakistan (a Pakistani government operated 
news agency, not affiliated with the Associated Press) – wants to be perceived as being 
pro-Pakistani government. “No channel in Pakistan can survive with being too close to 
the government,” Shaid said, as the Pakistani public will not trust it.504  This may change 
in 5-10 years, speculated Shaid, but for now it is the norm.505   
This normative framework for press-state relations bothered Malik, an English-
language journalist. “The Pakistani press is so powerful,” he said, “but it’s still hugely 
underdeveloped.”506 He suggested that members of the Pakistani press corps do not 
realize that being automatically critical of government policies can be destructive for 
Pakistani society. If journalists have a substantive argument against the government, with 
ample evidence to prove wrongdoing, then that is serving as a watchdog. However, he 




on about one thing without substantiating their criticism” and often “run campaigns 
against the government.”507 Anchors and talk show hosts on Geo TV, especially, said 
Malik, make predictions of when the Pakistani government will fall. In sum, he said, 
“opinions drive news in Pakistan.”508 
Hali, an Urdu-language journalist, agreed with Malik’s assessment. She also saw the 
Pakistani press as not being supportive toward the Pakistani civilian government or as 
serving the Pakistani public. Geo TV, she said, is especially “very hostile toward the 
Pakistani government.” In Hali’s view, this type of journalism is not providing a public 
service, but holding the country back from much needed progress in democratic 
governance: “In all, the Pakistani media is not being constructive—just finding 
opportunities for constant criticism.”509 Abida agreed with Hali and Malik; he, too, was 
frustrated that the Pakistani media often did not realize it could play a constructive role in 
Pakistani society. Journalists criticized the government’s incompetence, he said, but then 
presented no solutions to domestic problems.510 
The fixed mindset and mission of Pakistani journalists is to selectively look for the 
negative. Salim said he finds many recent actions of the Pakistani government positive, 
such as providing aid to people in Balochistan – an impoverished province beleaguered 
by abject poverty and a growing insurgency. However, no media has highlighted the 
positive news, he said, because the mindset of most journalists is that they should “have 
an adversarial relationship with the government.” He warned, though, that his fellow 
journalists were acting simultaneously like opposition politicians and members of a 
national jury, ready to “topple the government.”511 This was wrong, said Salim, because 




guidance.512 Salim distanced himself from his Pakistani colleagues by emphasizing that 
the approach of his English-language newspaper toward government is “very neutral,” 
offering both criticism and praise when it is warranted.513 
The Pakistani government has traditionally been opaque to the Pakistani public. How 
it makes its decisions about ensuring for the welfare of Pakistani citizens and the security 
of the Pakistani state has long been a mystery to them and the journalists are determined 
to put pressure on the government to become more transparent. Raheem, an English-
language journalist, gave government officials credit for trying to at least engage with 
Pakistani journalists. Government authorities give interviews and they show up for 
appearances on talk shows, but they, too, do not know how to have a constructive 
dialogue with a press system that seems hell-bent on bringing the government down.514 
Usuma, too, explained that Pakistani officials show up for interviews, but they then do 
not offer much information or try to disabuse the journalists of their misperceptions.515 
The politicians also do not make compelling arguments, Salim said, which causes the 
politicians and journalists to talk past each other.516 Both the press and the various 
government officials from the civilian and military sides appear to constantly be on the 
defensive. Seeking explanations from government officials really amounts to a 
meaningless exercise, Rao explained. While the Pakistani government should be “the 
largest repository of information, officials are not trained to be forthcoming with 
information.” This is why so much Pakistani journalism is not just critical, but 
“conjecture and imagined,” he said. It is also why his peers produce highly opinionated 
journalism with little fact.517  




terms, but Hamid acknowledged that journalists react very differently to civilian 
authorities than they do to military authorities. Specifically, they criticize the civilian 
government exponentially more than the military.518 But they have a right to be a fierce 
watchdog of the civilian government, Hamid explained, because it has been elected and 
“most policies in Pakistan are not being implemented as part of the rules.” Hamid 
mentioned at one point that he thought the Pakistani media was much more 
confrontational with the Pakistani government than the U.S. media was with the U.S. 
government. When I asked him why he thought that was, he replied, “Most of the policies 
I think in the U.S. are not against its law…but in Pakistan, most of the policies in 
Pakistan are not being met per rules and regulations.”519 The military, however, is a 
revered institution that has long been perceived as untouchable and has more of the 
public’s trust than any other Pakistani institution.  
The Pakistani media does not like the Pakistani government, Vazir reasoned, mainly 
because it is seen as being too close to the Americans and the normative framework in 
Pakistan is to be anti-American.520  While Pakistani journalists criticize the civilian 
leadership, its bureaucracy and politicians,” when it comes to the military, “you can't do 
anything. That is a red line you can't cross.”521 Despite its close amount of coordination 
with the U.S. military, the Pakistani military is acutely conscious of pervasive anti-
Americanism and presents itself to the press as being anti-American. They largely 
promote fear, he said, to keep themselves relevant and in a powerful standing with the 
public. The tragedy of Pakistan, Vazir said, is that the Pakistani military is the state. So 




produce one – because they can’t overthrow their military. The military maintains its 
strength and centrality to Pakistani politics by adapting to political change in Pakistan. 
The military also maintains its strength by threatening and bribing journalists. Vazir 
noted that the Pakistani military’s inter-services intelligence agency (ISI) – its spy agency, 
which is part of the military – especially threatens journalists and keeps Pakistani 
journalists on its payroll. The journalists take the money because they are unethical, 
ignorant, or intimidated. Vazir frequently receives threats from the ISI either directly or 
through messages sent to his colleagues and family.522 This is why Pakistani journalists, 
he said, will never investigate and criticize the military as much as it does the civilian 
government: Pakistani journalists have tried, and been killed. Fifty-one Pakistani 
journalists have been killed since 1994, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 
and 55 percent of them have been intentionally murdered. Twenty-five percent of those 
have been crime related, 39 percent related to the war, and 61 percent related to local 
Pakistani politics.523 In the case of murder, 96 percent of the suspects have had complete 
impunity.  
 
The Pakistani media’s newfound power makes them want to eliminate whatever 
other power they can. After years of media oppression, they want to hold their leaders 
accountable with a vengeance – but only the ones they feel safe doing so. They are eager 
to criticize and investigate civilian government leaders, but are more reticent when it 
comes to the military. They are also very cautious with Islamic extremists. This narrative 
of anti-government, anti-American but pro-military and – at times – pro-extremists, 




media, Pakistani television stations have seemed to adopt one mission: destroy power. 
While some see this as holding authority responsible, it is, many journalists 
acknowledged, not the same. Part of this is a sense of vulnerability within Pakistani 
society. Since they cannot change their military structure or Islamic extremism, they 
fixate on two other power sources: the civilian government and the American government.  
The journalists interviewed see these dynamics as unprofessional and disturbing, 
but do not think they can stop it. To them, mass sentiment and market forces are so strong 
that espousing moderate views would be commercial suicide. The safest way to move 
toward financial and physical security is to stick to a hyper-nationalist, anti-American 
script. This is especially the case with Urdu media, and to a lesser extent, with the 









CHAPTER 6. ‘So Much America Here, It’s Staggering’: Pakistani Journalists’ and 
America 
 
 In Pakistan, the topic of security dominates discourse in politics and the media. 
America is a dominant actor in Pakistan’s short history, and current reality. Since the 
September 11th attacks and the government’s support of U.S. military efforts in 
neighboring Afghanistan to deny al Qaeda a safe haven, the Pakistani public feels as if 
they have seen a dramatic influx of violence within their borders. For instance, before the 
U.S. war in neighboring Afghanistan began, suicide attacks in Pakistan were rare. But 
since 2002, roughly 300 of them have killed more than 4,800 Pakistanis and injured more 
than 10,100.524 Since 2009, the U.S. counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan have also 
led to a 100 percent increase of drone strikes along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, 
which have killed between 607 and 993 people, according to various estimates.525 The 
return of the U.S. to Pakistanis’ internal and foreign affairs is linked to a new phase of 
violence and Pakistanis perceive the U.S. to be a key actor in their state affairs. The 
Pakistani public associates the U.S. with the chaos within the country and feels that the 
U.S. contributes to their sense of vulnerability as a nation. 
 
America in Pakistan  
 
Each journalist interviewed for this study stated that the United States plays a central 
role in his or her daily media cycle in the sense that they both consume U.S. news and 
report on U.S. thought and actions toward Pakistan, and bordering Afghanistan.526 As 
discussed, Pakistani journalists are largely nationalistic, yet strongly contest the conduct 




duplicity and conspiracy and also, automatically, suspect U.S. government leadership of 
the duplicity and conspiracy. Pakistanis see the U.S. as much more powerful than 
Pakistan – and that power is often equated with efficient manipulation: The shared 
assumption is that every U.S. diplomatic or military action toward Pakistan or 
Afghanistan, and every consequence of that action, is planned; there are no mistakes. And 
there are enough empirical examples to prove that the U.S. does not respect Pakistan’s 
sovereignty – two of the most glaring being the ongoing U.S. drone campaign in the 
tribal region to kill insurgents, which is carried out with the support of the Pakistani 
government, and the May 1, 2012 Navy Seal raid in Abbottabad that killed Osama bin 
Laden, which was coordinated without the support of the Pakistani government. 
Afghanistan is a recurring topic in the Pakistani media, and the sizeable increase of 
U.S. troops there in 2010 meant that news narratives about Afghanistan often involved 
the U.S.; what is happening to Afghans, it seems to Pakistanis, is also happening to them. 
“The U.S. is an everyday reality here. More than Americans can ever imagine because 
everything here [in Pakistan] centers around security,” Rao, an Urdu-language journalist, 
explained. The emphasis on security within Pakistan means that the presence of the U.S. 
troops in Afghanistan and drone attacks in the tribal areas inspire much reportage and 
speculation on the threats the U.S. poses to Pakistan.527 Pakistanis used to fixate only on 
the threat of India, Rao explained, but after September 11th, “Afghanistan has had a deep 
bearing on everyday Pakistan because our foreign policy, economic policy, national 
security policy centers heavily on it.” The war in Afghanistan also simultaneously gives 
Pakistani government officials, journalists and citizens a distraction from Pakistan’s 




said, “at best, we are resource starved, deeply unorganized country, and we find that 
instead of focusing on our people and improving the economy, we just talk about what is 
happening in Afghanistan.”528 Focusing on U.S. actions in Afghanistan, and their 
spillover effects into Pakistan, is a comfortable – and therefore habitual – news narrative 
for Rao and his colleagues because it does not challenge them to provide constructive 
criticism for how to address their challenges at home.  
“There’s so much America and Afghanistan in Pakistani media—it’s staggering,” 
agreed Ibrahim, an Urdu-language broadcaster.529 Salim, an English-language reporter, 
also concurred that his fellow journalists “love to attack U.S. policy towards Afghanistan 
and Pakistan” and to make their case about hostile and destructive U.S. action, often 
using U.S. news report as source material. But because Pakistani journalists also widely 
distrust their own government, they “love to also try to prove that Pakistan is cheating on 
America,” he said, and therefore want to worsen the distrust between the two 
governments.530  Often such assertions are conspiracy theories that media representatives 
contribute to by reporting the facts, and then speculating about the Pakistani or American 
government’s intentionality. Still, these stories help Pakistanis who are looking to quickly 
make sense of the chaos within their country and the region.531  
This proclivity toward thinking that both the United States and Pakistan have 
malicious intents is a norm in Pakistan, Malik, an English-language print journalist, said. 
He explained that routine, widespread illiteracy and low levels of education in Pakistan 
spurred conspiratorial thinking, but educated Pakistanis also widely believe in conspiracy 
theories. During my interview with Malik, he pointed to his office television screen; the 




suicide attackers had walked into the Data Dabar shrine in Lahore and killed 38 people.532 
Black-and-white surveillance footage released to television stations showed the bombers 
enter the shrine. The first one entered the front area alone and, five seconds later, 
detonated a bomb hidden underneath his clothing. A mob of worshipers ran away from 
the explosion and toward the gate that served as the entrance and exit. But then, another 
suicide bomber entered the shrine to kill the people trying to flee. That day, this 10-
second footage ran repeatedly on Pakistani news stations.  
With the television on mute, Malik could not hear what the correspondent standing in 
front of the Data Dabar shrine was saying, but he guessed that the reporter was repeating 
a popular refrain in Pakistani storytelling: The bombers were neither Pakistani nor 
Muslim; a “foreign hand” was responsible. This was despite the fact that the video 
footage of the attackers showed that they might very well be Pakistani.533 The logic for 
the Pakistani people, Malik explained, is that the attackers cannot be from Pakistan or of 
the Islamic faith—they must be agents of a foreign power that wants to harm Pakistan 
and Islam. This foreign power, he said, could be the United States or India.  
The United States looms so large in Pakistan that it is part of a trifecta of power 
within the Pakistani consciousness. “In Pakistan,” Mahmood, an English language print 
journalist, told me, “three things matter: Allah, America, Army.” This, he said, is what is 
popularly known as the “Triple A concept.” According to this thinking, the U.S. is on par 
with the Pakistani Army and Islam; it is therefore stronger than the Pakistani civilian 
government – and certainly stronger then Pakistani civil society, including the media. 
This introduces a sense of powerlessness that Pakistanis feel toward the U.S. Mahmood 




Musharraf’s downfall in 2007, journalists also simultaneously perceive his demise to be 
the work of the American government. Yes, Mahmood said, the Pakistani people “came 
out to the streets” for the lawyers’ movement to protest, and the Pakistani media 
encouraged them to do so. But some Pakistanis also believed that the Bush administration 
weakened Musharraf because, after taking $20 billion from the U.S. government since 
2001, Musharraf had failed to stop the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan or to help 
capture Osama bin Laden.534 Mahmood explained that Pakistani journalists and the public 
strongly believe that “Americans instigate these kinds of things [government overthrows] 
because America is so powerful and efficient.” While the Pakistani people and media are 
proud of the role they played in weakening Musharraf, they believe they are subject to an 
even more powerful force: the hand of America, which overpowers all.  
This sense of vulnerability leads them to blame the U.S. for many of Pakistan’s woes. 
Some Pakistani journalists and pundits bash the United States in news narratives to feel 
stronger, and anti-Americanism can increase ratings and therefore bring in advertising 
dollars. So this practice is a fixture of their modus operandi. The practice is so habitual 
and pervasive that it would be an act of commercial suicide to promote a moderate view 
of the U.S. during a broadcast or in a newspaper. In order to be successful, Pakistani 
media must be focused on politics, anti-Americanism and Islam, Mahmood explained. 
Sticking to this formula is “the success of every news organization that’s coming into 
being, or whichever will come after.” There is a simple rule for creating content: When in 
doubt, criticize the Americans. 
This is especially true for the Urdu-language press, for which criticizing the United 




colleagues often say that “America is the source of all [of Pakistan’s] problems and its 
presence in Afghanistan is the source of all [of Pakistan’s] problems.”536 This is largely 
because, according to Yousaf, an English-language print journalist, Urdu-language papers 
portray America negatively to gain the support of a largely impoverished and deeply 
conservative section of the public. This is certainly the case for the Daily Jang, the most 
popular print publication that is known to print articles that cater to popular conspiracy.   
But its true for the English-language press as well. The English-language newspaper, 
The Nation, owned by the Nawa-i-qat group, maintains the same anti-American bent that 
Urdu-language papers have. The Nation came of prominence in the 1990s for its 
investigative reporting, explained Malik, but has since “become mainly an anti-American 
paper.” Pretty much any Westerner, he said, is considered to be a CIA agent.537 Malik 
alluded to the practices of The Nation’s editor-in-chief, Shireen Mazari, who received her 
doctorate in political science from Columbia University in the 1980s. Mazari left her 
position as editor-in-chief of The News – another conservative English-language daily 
owned by the Jang Group – after naming a U.S. embassy official, Craig Davis, as a spy in 
an August 26, 2009 column. The column that stated that the U.S. was “increasingly 
occupying Pakistan with their covert and overt armed presence.”538 When the U.S. 
ambassador at the time, Anne Patterson, complained to the Jang Group that Mazari had 
put an American official’s life in danger, Mazari left for The News’s competitor, The 
Nation. Two months later, under Mazari’s leadership, The Nation published the article, 
“Journalists as Spies in FATA?” It accused the Wall Street Journal’s South Asian 
correspondent, Matthew Rosenberg, of working for the CIA, Blackwater and Israeli 




correspondent in 2002 was kidnapped and then beheaded by Khalid Sheik Mohammed (a 
member of al Qaeda who the 9/11 Commission defined as the “principal architect of the 
9/11 attacks”)539 for being “an Israeli spy” in Pakistan, both the western diplomatic and 
journalistic communities were outraged.540 But less than two weeks later, The Nation 
published a front-page article titled “Mysterious U.S. Nationals” with a picture of an 
unknown westerner, accusing him of being a CIA agent in Peshawar.541 The westerner 
turned out to be Australian photographer Daniel Berehulak.542 In a November 21 letter to 
Mazari, Getty Images’ senior director of photography Hugh Pinney wrote that he was 
appalled by the photo and caption, clarifying that Berehulak, his employee, was not a 
CIA agent and has “never pursued any agenda other than, as a photographer, to capture 
important moments and events on camera for the historic record.” Pinney asked Mazari 
for a correction; Mazari has not obliged.543  
 The Nation and The News are largely English-language versions of their Urdu-
language sister newspapers. The English-language reporters interviewed who had a more 
liberal bent than these two papers admitted that they reach a small percentage of the 
Pakistani people. Mahmood, a self-described liberal, said that he tried to seek a pragmatic 
course in his reporting that does not habitually rely on American-bashing to sell papers. 
He wanted his paper to represent solutions-oriented journalism and identified religion in 
Pakistan as part of the problem. His reporting and editorials encourage “developing some 
kind of logical friendship and meaningful friendship with the Americans” since U.S. 
support is important for Pakistan’s development. Yet, he emphasized that while America 
needs to pursue its national interests, Pakistan also needs to pursue its own.544 And the 




combined with this sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis America, Mahmood explained, means 
that “Every view, every perception of the American media on U.S. foreign policy or on 
the South Asia region is taken very seriously.”545  
 
Pakistani Journalists’ Need American News 
  
 News reports and columns from the U.S. are pervasive in the Pakistani media 
landscape, and there was little difference between how journalists reporting for English, 
Urdu and Pashto-language news agencies used U.S. news. Because of the large American 
presence in the Pakistani media – and what might be called the country’s public psyche –  
Pakistani elite journalists turn to U.S. news copy for a greater understanding of American 
policy thought and action in the region. But it is also to understand their country and 
government. As Vazir explained, “Because of structural deficiencies in the Pakistani 
press—the lack of education, lack of good pay, lack of habits of investigative reporting – 
the Western press steps fills the void that the Pakistani news media leaves.”546 
Since September 11, 2001, American media has been an especially rich source of 
information for Pakistani reporters. The world is looking at Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 
Wali, a Pashto-language broadcast journalist, explained.547 And the fact that Pakistan 
became a more prominent news story in the U.S. after the 2009 U.S. troop surge in 
Afghanistan made Pakistani journalists’ jobs easier because there was an abundance of 
American news material of them who write about the U.S. and/or Afghanistan, actually 
travel to either country. Pakistani journalists develop their perceptions of the U.S. from 




American newspapers and television. 
The Pakistani journalists’ newsgathering routines differed, but they generally 
included looking daily to U.S. news either online, via news websites, or via online search 
engines to check for news relevant to them. But while U.S. news was source material, the 
Pakistani journalists repeatedly emphasized that they only used U.S. news about Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, India or the larger South Asia region. 548 
The New York Times and the Washington Post hold a prominent place in Pakistani 
journalists’ newsgathering routines, as they report on South Asia more than other U.S.-
based news agencies.549 These two papers are, according to Shaid, an English-language 
journalist, “on the must-read list [of] at least all the senior people in journalism.”550 They 
look to it as source material for reportage on terrorism and security, U.S.-Pakistan 
relations, U.S.-Afghanistan relations, and other diplomatic issues in the South Asia 
region. Hamid explained that to understand what the liberals thought about U.S. policy 
and the world, he had to read the New York Times, and to understand the Washington 
consensus on issues, he had to read the Washington Post (he did not mention where he 
looked for the conservative angle on news).551 He mentioned the New York Times several 
times during our interview; when I asked him if he felt that the Times played an agenda-
setting role with the Pakistani media the way it did for American media he replied, “Yes, 
very much so.”552 Parvez, a Pashto-language broadcaster, agreed, saying, “Particularly 
from the New York Times, we get some of the best stories.”553 And Vazir went so far to 
state that the best reporting on both U.S. policy and Pakistan came from the New York 
Times or Washington Post.554  




Street Journal,555 Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune and the Christian Science Monitor, 
for instance – also mattered to the Pakistani journalists.556 Newsweek, Bloomberg and the 
Economist were also looked to as source material.557  The Associated Press was routinely 
checked and incorporated into Pakistani elite news reporting, but unlike the U.S. 
newspapers, the U.S.-based newswire was perceived to be an “international agency” and 
not categorized as an American one. This is due to its fact-based reporting that rarely 
provides analysis that gives a pro-U.S. slant.558  
Pakistani journalists also look to U.S. broadcast news, although less now than they 
had in the past.559  CNN, while it provided one of the few windows to the world beyond 
Pakistan when Pakistani Television (PTV) carried it in the 1990s, became obsolete for 
both the Pakistani public and Pakistani journalists as Pakistani television stations 
proliferated after 2002.560 The American broadcast station that was the most useful to 
some Pakistani journalists was Fox News, not because it provided credible reporting on 
Pakistan and the region, but because it explained the popular psyche of the United 
States.561  Salim said that Fox became important to Pakistani journalists after September 
11, 2001 because it was seen as the “relevant mouthpiece” of the Bush administration. 
Today, Yousaf, an English-language print journalist, looks to Fox News because “it is 
against the Obama administration” and he wanted to understand the criticism against 
President Obama.562 No matter who is in power, though, Malik, an English-language 
journalist stated, Fox News has a powerful effect on the American public so it is an 
important media agency to track.563 He also saw parallels between Fox News and 
Pakistan’s own conservative Urdu-language press – both of which, he said, produce 




tank reports and statements for their reporting, especially the Council on Foreign 
Relations, Brookings Institute, U.S. Institute of Peace, and the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies.)565 
While a majority of journalists may not look directly at American news, Malik 
believed that “basically every newspaper and television newsroom has people who go 
online and scan news,” making it a routine part of virtually every Pakistani news 
organization.566 But not all of the journalists in the sample look to American news in-
depth. There was one outlier: Bahaar, a broadcaster, explained that his U.S.-news 
consumption routine was to just read headlines and not the content because American 
news “is not real news.”567 It is simply a reflection of the U.S. government. 
 
U.S. Reporters & Officials On the Same Team 
 
A majority of the Pakistani journalists interviewed think U.S. journalists align 
themselves with U.S. government officials, as if they were part of one team whose goal 
was to advance U.S. interests in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the entire South Asia region. 
Some reporters said that there is a clear difference between American journalism on 
domestic and foreign issues: On domestic issues, they think, U.S. journalists are 
adversarial toward U.S. policy and politicians; on foreign issues, they are deferential.   
The American press, Wali, a Pashto-language broadcaster, said was “the most free in 
the world” when it reports on domestic news. He gave the example of the 1998 scandal 
over President Bill Clinton’s affair with Monica Lewinsky. To him, the press’s reaction 




without fear of repercussions. However, he said, “On the international level, the media is 
serving the U.S. administration.”568 He felt adamantly that the New York Times and 
Washington Post are “just representing the thoughts of the U.S. government, not 
challenging them.”569 Hali, an Urdu-language broadcaster, likewise admired the 
American media because it is “very mature,” holds itself to ethics and standards, and 
provides “constructive criticism” for U.S. politicians on domestic policies.570 But when it 
came to U.S. foreign policy, she too said that U.S. journalists are usually deferential to 
the U.S. government. The same was the case for Bahaar, an Urdu-language broadcaster. 
U.S. journalists, for instance, can question President Barack Obama’s birth certificate, he 
said, whereas Pakistani journalists are reluctant even to acknowledge the fact that 
President Asif Ali Zardari spent eight years in jail on corruption charges.571 On the other 
hand, Bahaar said, the U.S. media narrative for U.S. foreign policy is “totally dictated by 
the State Department.” He did not think that U.S. news agencies do any independent 
reporting on foreign policy issues (“whatever is told to them by government officials, 
they just air it”) and they are not allowed to contest what they are told—all U.S. reportage 
on foreign policy had a uniform, pro-U.S. government angle.572 “American foreign policy 
news is always of one point of view,” he concluded. “There is no investigation and there 
are never two points of view” or any real pursuit of “the truth.”573  
When Pakistanis think about the U.S., Danish, a Pashto-language broadcaster said, 
they think of “one big monster that’s ready to swallow you” – and that monster is 
composed of the U.S. government, media, civil society and the public.574 Therefore, it is 
natural for Pakistanis – including journalists – to think that the U.S. media works with the 




explained that Pakistanis see the U.S. media as a reflection of the U.S. government, and 
that both have a hidden agenda toward Pakistan, which includes a possible U.S. invasion 
of Pakistan to acquire Pakistan’s nuclear weapons once the U.S. military mission in 
Afghanistan ends.575 He also said that many of his journalistic colleagues believe that the 
U.S. media and the American people “are working together, with the government to take 
over the world – and to kill Muslims.” He also explained that many Pakistanis believe 
that there is also an Israeli dimension to U.S. news and that the Israeli government 
specifically controls U.S. media coverage about foreign issues. As a result, “no one wants 
to believe what the New York Times said, or what CNN said because they are just 
[spouting] Jewish propaganda, Zionist propaganda.”576 While Mumtaz separated himself 
from personally holding these perceptions, these thoughts are so pervasive in Pakistani 
society that it is possible he was disguising his own beliefs.  
While the other elite Pakistani journalists say they do not agree that the Israeli state 
controls U.S. news agencies, they do largely assume that the American public is apathetic 
about U.S. foreign policy’s effect in the world and, therefore, American journalists are 
writing for—and in support of—U.S. policymakers. 577 After reading news copy every 
day from the New York Times on Pakistan and other U.S. foreign policy issues, for 
instance, Sharif, an Urdu-language print journalist, determined that “the New York Times 
is very close to the State Department.”578 And because U.S. journalists’ are mainly 
writing for U.S officials, the journalists want to partner with and please them. There is 
also a certain symbiosis between reporters and officials, Malik, an English-language 




American government.” The officials hear their words in the press and take that as 
affirmation, that their policy thoughts and actions are legitimate.579  
Most of the logic is that U.S. government officials reserve their most authentic 
opinions for U.S. journalists. U.S. government officials may make official statements 
from The White House, State Department, the Defense Department – or other 
government agencies – but they are sanitized for diplomatic purposes and therefore 
artificial. The Washington Post and New York Times, especially, present “the real story” – 
the expanded story – which government officials also control but do not want to say 
forthrightly in an official statement and rather hide behind U.S. journalism. This is why 
secondary source material is more significant to Pakistani journalists than original source 
material: New York Times and Washington Post reveal the U.S. government’s true 
sentiment when it comes to U.S. policy toward Pakistan. Imran, an English-language 
print journalist, offered that overall, the reason why U.S. journalists based in Washington 
and in the region cared about Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2010, was because these 
countries were “full of western interests” that journalists were required to cover for the 
benefit of U.S. officials, to see the impact of their policies.580  
Raheem, an English-language print journalist, especially subscribed to this view. 
He checked the Washington Post regularly, he said, because “The Washington Post is the 
mouthpiece of the U.S. government.”581 The U.S. government, he said, often leaks 
information to the Post because officials know that it has an international audience and 
can possibly sway global actors to sympathize with the U.S. He also agreed with Mumtaz, 
among others,582 that both the Post and the New York Times are receptive outlets for U.S. 




quoted on the record; that way, they have plausible deniability and need not take full 
responsibility if a press reports sparks controversy.583  
An example of such “hand-in-hand” cooperation between the U.S. government and 
press was the 2010 Faisal Shahzad story, some journalists said. On May 1, 2010, Faisal 
Shahzad, a Pakistani-born, naturalized American citizen was arrested on an airplane 
bound for Dubai; from there he was ticketed for a connecting flight to Islamabad. 
Shahzad was accused of abandoning a sports utility vehicle packed with explosives near 
Times Square in New York City. The explosives failed to detonate. U.S. news agencies – 
such as the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and CNN – almost 
immediately linked the failed terrorism attempt back to Pakistan, where some had 
reported Shahzad received training by militants in the Pakistani tribal regions. On June 21, 
2010, Shahzad confessed in a federal court in Manhattan to training with the Pakistani 
Taliban in Pakistan, calling himself a “Muslim soldier.”584 But Shaid dismissed this story 
as a “gimmick,” saying that, “Pakistan was targeted in this story for no reason.” To the 
Pakistani journalists, Shahzad was an American and it was an internal, American issue.585 
He reasoned that the U.S. journalists must have been encouraged by U.S. government 
officials to blame Pakistan for this event, and that they obliged.  
On American domestic issues, Muhammed, an English-language print journalist, 
said, the U.S. press is independent of, and adversarial toward, the U.S. government. But 
on most issues, he explained, American journalists may begin with skepticism, but they 
eventually closely align their views with the U.S. government’s. With Pakistan, for 
instance, U.S. journalists often said in 2009 that Pakistan was betraying the trust of the 




according to Muhammed, “No, no, no, what the Pakistanis’ have done is very good and it 
has helped our war efforts in Afghanistan.” Then the U.S. press overall would soften their 
attack on Pakistan.586 Muhammed did not offer an example but he believed that the U.S. 
government sets the tone, the pace, and the language for U.S. news coverage.587  
It’s the norm of providing objective news stories, Salim, an Urdu-language journalist, 
said that links U.S. journalists so closely to the government when it comes to 
international issues. American journalists provide balanced reporting on the government 
instead of being critical of it. Objectivity, he said, is a tool that U.S. journalists use to 
play it safe and an excuse from going after tough stories, he said.588 U.S. reporting on 
foreign policy should be far more adversarial. Salim also said that he does not personally 
see the U.S. media as an automatic, unfettered reflection of U.S. policy thought. But he 
acknowledged that the New York Times usually says that Pakistan is being supportive 
when U.S. officials emphasize that Pakistan is being supportive to U.S. policy goals. 
However, the U.S. press will also print stories a couple days later that talk of Pakistani 
duplicity, showing that it has no problem being critical of Pakistan.589  
American journalists often get their best information on the government’s intentions 
through leaks from U.S. officials, but leaks are also what bind them to the government. 
U.S. officials want to leak information to sway the public and other policymakers toward 
their point of view, and reporters love a good scoop.590 U.S. journalists rely on U.S. 
officials for reports on Pakistan and Afghanistan – and on their interpretation of what is 
most salient about the two countries—because of their access to secret information. The 
Pakistani journalists interviewed almost uniformly said that U.S. government officials 




the Pakistani government. This is why, they reason, you will find U.S. news stories that 
echo U.S. government rhetoric, but then also see U.S. news stories that pressure Pakistan: 
because U.S. officials leak information to reporters. This is also why U.S. news reports 
are perceived to be a more authentic reflection of U.S. government thought than official, 
diplomatic statements are.  
U.S. government leaks to the press—whether about drones, aid funding, or Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons—are all “about keeping Pakistan under pressure,” said Rao. And 
because American journalists decide which leaks to publish, they are “siding with the 
American government’s view.”591 The widespread suspicion about leaking in Pakistan, 
Rao said, “rests on the timing of the stories.” Big revelations are normally indexed to U.S. 
government official’s announcements or visits to Pakistan, which signals to the Pakistani 
journalists that American journalists are complicit. “Whenever somebody’s coming over 
here, you get several stories in American papers…you can’t really ignore the fact that if 
Mullen is coming over, there is going to be a leak about drones. If it’s Gates, it’s going to 
be something else.” American journalists who work on the State or Defense Department 
beats are assigned to cover American officials travels overseas, but the news stories, he 
said, are predictable in the sense that they will abide by whatever U.S. foreign policy is--
and will rarely offer an original thought.592  
 U.S. government officials often leak news stories about Pakistan to U.S. 
newspapers, especially the New York Times, Vazir, an English-language journalist said, 
“to make Pakistan feel bad.”593 Vazir worked once for an American newspaper in 
Pakistan and, after his experience, learned first hand that the U.S. news media is not 




Pakistan, U.S. news – especially the Times or Post – is seen to be a reflection of the U.S. 
government. American journalists are only reporting from Pakistan to serve U.S. national 
interests.594 “The New York Times,” he said, “is seen as being part of America, by 
extension.”  
Vazir also offered at least two recent cases that, he claimed, proved that U.S. 
journalists often withhold information out of deference to the U.S. government, feeding 
into the perception that American reporters and officials were on the same team. One was 
the New York Times’s decision to not immediately report on the capture of the Taliban’s 
second in command, Mullah Baradar, in Karachi, Pakistan in a joint raid by Pakistan’s 
ISI and the CIA in February 2010. The Times reported on the capture on February 15, 
2010, but admitted in the news story that it knew about it on February 11, 2010.595 
Reporters Mark Mazzetti and Dexter Filkins explained in the February 15 article:  
The New York Times learned of the operation on Thursday, but delayed reporting 
it at the request of White House officials, who contended that making it public 
would end a hugely successful intelligence-gathering effort. The officials said that 
the group’s leaders had been unaware of Mullah Baradar’s capture and that if it 
became public they might cover their tracks and become more careful about 
communicating with each other.596  
 
They only reported the capture because U.S. government officials acknowledged that the 
news was becoming widely known in South Asia. Another was the case of Raymond 
Davis, a CIA contractor who shot and killed two Pakistanis in downtown Lahore on 
January 27, 2011. The ISI’s Chief, General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Vazir explained, knew 
Davis worked for the CIA and wanted that to go public. Pasha told many Pakistani 
reporters, who then reported Davis’s affiliation. They also told the New York Times. But 
the State Department’s spokesman, P.J. Crowley, called the Times’ executive editor, Bill 




was that the letters C-I-A in an article in the NYT, even as speculation, would be taken as 
authoritative and would be a red flag in Pakistan, Keller later explained to the Times’ 
Public Editor. Crowley was worried about Davis’s safety in a Pakistani prison. The 
Washington Post and Associated Press also agreed to comply with the U.S. government’s 
efforts to create “as constructive an atmosphere as possible” to defuse the diplomatic 
crisis. But Pasha, also confirmed Davis’s identity to the U.K.’s Guardian.597 On February 
20, 2011 Declan Walsh with The Guardian reported that Davis worked for the CIA but 
that U.S. news agencies “have kept it under wraps at the request of the Obama 
administration.” It was only then that the New York Times, Washington Post and AP 
linked Davis to the CIA.598   
Yet this perception of U.S. press-government complicity also derives from 
Pakistanis’ experiences at home, Vazir emphasized. In Pakistan, there is a perception that 
the Pakistani military has the most power in society and over the civilian government, 
and it is an open secret that Pakistani journalists work closely with Pakistan’s Inter 
Services International (ISI), the primary, and much-feared intelligence agency. This 
domestic experience, he explained, is what informs Pakistanis’ worldview. “So why 
would they expect things to work differently in the U.S.? Why wouldn’t they expect that 
American reporters are on the CIA’s payroll?”599 To the average Pakistani journalist, it is 
only natural that they would be.  
 
 So far, we have established five major themes with about the beliefs and practices 
of the 27 elite Pakistani journalists interviewed. First, Pakistani journalists are a young, 




largely influenced by the privatization of electronic media in 2002. Second, part of 
Pakistani journalism’s identity is to be adversarial—even hostile—to the Pakistani 
civilian government, and its alliance with the United States. Third, the U.S. plays a 
central role in Pakistani media. Fourth, a majority of Pakistani journalists—or their 
colleagues in their news agencies—monitor American news on Pakistan and its 
immediate region, especially the New York Times and the Washington Post. Fifth, those 
papers are regularly reviewed because they are perceived largely to be influential with the 
U.S. public and the U.S. government. Most of the journalists interviewed see them as 
working in lockstep with U.S. government officials; either because they rely on official 
statements for news, cannot resist the opportunity to expose leaks of classified 
information, or are naturally inclined to support U.S. foreign policy and protect American 
national interests. But, given all these factors, what do Pakistani journalists think about 
the way in which the U.S. depicts Pakistan to not just the primary American audience, but 
also to the global journalists and publics that similarly rely on American reporting for 
information?  
 
American News Frames about Pakistan  
 
Most Pakistanis put a high premium on their global image, and therefore are 
greatly concerned with how the U.S. explains Pakistan to the world.600  To understand 
how the U.S. sees Pakistan, they look to how U.S. journalists package Pakistan in certain 
frames, ready for relay by Pakistani, global and other American, media. For them, the 




neighboring countries, including India and Afghanistan. American news is a window into 
the U.S. public’s and government’s perceptions of Pakistan, and that perception is 
overwhelmingly negative.   
 
“U.S. News Blames Pakistan, and Islam”  
 
The first theme the Pakistani journalists saw in U.S. news coverage of Pakistan is 
that the U.S. is blaming Pakistan for not just violence in Afghanistan but global terrorism. 
Some journalists expanded the theme to another frame: That the U.S. is blaming Islam for 
calamities.   
The security news frame is one that the Pakistani journalists think U.S. journalists 
use as a crutch in their reportage, an easy way to report news. Blaming Pakistan is a 
routine theme in the New York Times, Jabar said, as it routinely spreads disinformation 
about Pakistan—and journalists at both U.S. and global news agencies follow their 
lead.601 The storyline that American reporters like the most, Imran, an English-language 
journalist, said is that Pakistan is a dangerous “center for terrorism” and that its leaders 
are always playing a “double game.”602 The case of Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad, 
is one example of U.S. reporters blaming Pakistan for global terrorism when they should 
be looking inward, he said. Shahzad was an American, Imran emphasized, not a Pakistani 
and blaming Pakistan for the May 2010 attempted terrorist attack attempt in Times 
Square was unfair. The U.S. press, he said, must “give a more positive image of Pakistan 




U.S. journalists often discuss how Pakistan is the U.S.’s most important ally in the 
war on terror, but the U.S. press consistently frames Pakistan negatively, Bahaar, an 
Urdu-language broadcaster, said.  The American media was “hostile” towards Pakistan: 
“None of the [9/11] terrorists were Pakistanis,” he said, “but the Pakistanis are blamed for 
everything.”604 As another example, Bahaar talked about the November 2008 attack in 
Mumbai, India, when Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists launched 11 different 
attacks at sites throughout the city that spanned four horrifying days. Within 10 minutes 
of news coverage about the attack on Nov. 26, 2008, he recalled, U.S. journalists were 
saying that the terrorists were from Pakistan. If there are any acts of terrorism like that 
worldwide, he said, “the first thing U.S. journalists will point out is that Pakistan has 
terrorist training camps.” The U.S. press also omits U.S. foreign policy history in their 
explanation of events, Bahaar said. “You will never hear that in the 1980s the Americans 
were supporting Pakistani jihadists in the fight against the Soviet Union” which, he said, 
directly created a culture of militarism in Pakistan. The insurgents in Afghanistan, he said, 
are all Afghans, but American media insists that they are crossing the border from 
Pakistan and this is false. But the U.S. press blames Pakistan “for each and every 
thing.”605  
It’s not just that the U.S. news media blames Pakistan, but American journalists 
also blame Islam for transnational terrorism. Yousaf gave the case of Shahzad, explaining 
that the Pakistani media and public believed he was an American with no ties to Pakistan. 
Shahzad was acting individually, Yousaf insisted, and U.S. news media “should not 
connect him with Pakistan and Islam.” He emphasized that when U.S. journalists explain 




American media is blaming the Pakistani people—not just the Pakistani government, 
Pakistani Taliban or the other extremist factions in the country. He said the Pakistani 
people believed the U.S. news media is not just “against Pakistan” but that it is “waging 
war against the Pakistani people, the Pakistani army and Pakistan itself.”606 But the 
Pakistani people, too, also believe that U.S. policies and the U.S. media are against the 
Islam religion as a whole because “The U.S. media makes a big story about anything 
Islam.”607 While Hali largely admires U.S. journalism for its investigative and analytical 
reporting, she also agreed that the “U.S. media makes a big story out of anything Islam” 
which includes most stories about Pakistan. She too gave the example of Shahzad, saying 
that U.S. journalists “correlated him to Islam and Pakistan…and blamed Pakistan.” I then 
asked her to clarify: Was it that the American media was directing suspicion on the 
extremist groups within Pakistan or the Pakistani public-at-large? She clarified, the 
“American media is blaming Pakistan as a country, not just non-state terrorist actors 
within Pakistan.”608 That her country was being labeled as a home to terrorism frustrated 
her immensely, and she did not think it was fair. Rao, too, lamented over how Pakistanis, 
instead of being seen as citizens of a democracy, are seen as Islamists. “Islam is just one 
part of our life, not the 80 percent part of our life,” he explained. 609  
 Aban, an Urdu-language print journalist, adamantly believed that the blame 
pointed at Pakistan by U.S. news, which derives mainly from U.S. government views, is 
detrimental to the U.S.-Pakistan alliance. “American media is not promoting good ties 
with the Pakistani people,” he said. In contrast, however, he believed that the Pakistani 
news media is trying to promote good ties with the U.S. as a proxy for the Pakistani 




advance U.S. policy goals, he said, and “is publishing stories against Pakistan” while 
unfairly favoring India.610 And Nabeel, a broadcaster, thought that American reporters, 
“don’t believe in Pakistan” and therefore do not put any story into context. Instead, they 
rush to blame Pakistan for global terrorism and violence in Afghanistan.611 
Some of the Pashto-language journalists presented a more curious finding than their 
English-language and Urdu-language counterparts. Mumtaz, a broadcaster, agreed that 
American journalists “always look for the bad story” with Pakistan, repeatedly framing 
Pakistan as America’s enemy.612 But Parvez, another broadcaster, believed that while the 
U.S. media finds stories that are “indirectly or directly connected with terrorism” he 
thought it was a fair representation of Pakistan.613 So did Omar, a Pashto-language 
broadcaster. He believed that during the last nine to 10 years that he has been following 
U.S. news media, it has been dealing with Pakistan, “very fairly whatever they write they 
write it fairly.” But, simultaneously, he thought that U.S. journalists should go deeper in 
their reportage on Pakistan and “not just write about what is of interest for the White 
House or Congress.” Omar suggested that U.S. journalists should write for the Pakistani 
people and show them a more accurate picture of a Pakistan that is an emerging 
democracy. U.S. journalists, he said, should write about the “democratic institutions” of 
Pakistan and help support their development. Omar believed the U.S. news coverage 
about Pakistan is mainly about violence and security, and does not touch enough on the 
Pakistani society and democratic governance issues of the country.614 U.S. elite news 
media was so pervasive in Pakistan that he thought that U.S. journalists should not just 
think of the Pakistani audience, but feel a responsibility to guide them along a 





“Pakistan is Chaos: Terrorists and Loose Nukes” 
 
The second theme that the Pakistani journalists interviewed see in American news 
about Pakistan (and Afghanistan) is employs another security frame: Pakistan is a chaotic 
place where militants run amok and the country’s most valuable asset, its nuclear weapon 
arsenal, lays vulnerable to them. All of the journalists interviewed agreed with this 
sentiment.615  
If you were to look at a U.S. newspaper, Jabar said, you would think that a small 
minority of Pakistani extremists are the most powerful, the most influential members of 
Pakistani society-at-large. U.S. journalists “give this minority a voice” and they do not 
care, he said, about “the majority of Pakistanis who are not a threat.” Instead, western 
journalists, especially American ones, prefer “to project an image of paranoia.”616 He 
gave an example of a June 2010 report from the Crisis States Research Center at the 
London School of Economics, which stated that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was not secure 
and was therefore vulnerable to Pakistani jihadists, and that it was official policy of the 
ISI to support the Taliban.617 The American press, he said, had covered that report widely. 
This practice of using Western sources to confirm Western media suspicions of Pakistan 
instead of speaking with the Pakistani people was tiresome.  
The U.S. media’s version of Pakistan’s reality is inconceivable to anyone who 
lives in Pakistan, Salim, a print journalist agreed. “At times, frankly it’s difficult for me 
to recognize the Pakistan they talk about,” he said. American journalists talk about 




repeated storylines in U.S. news about Pakistan, Bahaar, an Urdu language broadcaster 
said, were about “terrorist training camps, or how Osama Bin Laden is in Pakistan.” He 
continued, “Nowadays you'll only hear about Osama being in Pakistan; the Generals in 
Afghanistan are saying that” and this reflects negatively on Pakistan.619 (Note: 11 months 
after this interview took place, Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on 
May 1, 2011). Sharif, a print journalist, believed that U.S. media portrays Pakistan as 
“backward and full of extremists” and that commentators and editorialists absolutely 
simplified Pakistan to be a violent, failed state. This assumed need to attack Pakistan and 
claim it to be evil, he said, was simply “childish.”620 
 U.S. journalists, in Yousaf’s opinion, rarely discuss how “Pakistan is also victim 
of the terrorist groups” it just focuses on the impact it has on U.S. troops in Afghanistan. 
Muhammed, a print journalist, likewise summarized U.S. news storylines about Pakistan 
as being America-centric: “you need Pakistan to fight al Qaeda, but you cannot trust it” 
and “Pakistan’s nuclear weapons can be used against the U.S.” Muhammed is frustrated 
with what he saw as a double standard over how U.S. journalists talk about India’s 
nuclear arsenal versus Pakistan’s. This is especially annoying, he said, since Pakistan 
aligned with the U.S. during the Cold War when India aligned with the Soviet Union. 
“Even when India was in the Russian camp nobody said that the Indian weapons can be 
used against America” but now, Pakistan is America’s ally and the U.S. news media 
discusses how the weapons could be used on America. What is the reason for this double 
standard? The reason, Muhammed offered, is not because India is the world’s largest 
democracy, but because Pakistanis are mostly Muslim and Indians are not (Muslims 




‘among us’ [because there is not a Muslim majority in India] and therefore, India’s 
nuclear weapons that cannot be used against the U.S..” America is simply afraid of a 
Muslim state having nuclear weapons, no matter what system of governance it has. 
Mainly, U.S. news stories regarding Pakistan are about how nuclear weapons can fall into 
the hands of terrorists inside Pakistan, Rao agreed. Rarely, he said, do U.S. journalists 
clarify that Pakistan’s nuclear system has elaborate structures to keep the arsenal safe – 
structures that many international inspectors have confirmed are strong.621 This feeds into 
the perception that Pakistan is a chaotic, even failed state.  
Each time a news story about Pakistan appears in the U.S. mainstream media, Ibrahim 
said, “It is either about a suicide bomber or a mullah or someone being raped or 
something like that.” But his frustration was that U.S. journalists not only were 
determined to portray Pakistan as a violent country, but also as a poor country. Ibrahim 
continued, “I mean people drive Porsches and stuff in Pakistan. We make homes not of 
wood, but of stone. There are pretty well off people...pretty intelligent people.” Instead, 
he said to me, “You keep thinking everyone in Pakistan is bad.”622 This statement  
defining those who are materially well off as good, virtuous people was a curious point. 
But Ibrahim clarified that the U.S. government and news media think of Pakistan as being 
mainly tribal, with no educated class to steer it in a positive direction of strong 
governance and economic prosperity.   
The fragility of Pakistan is also a common theme, Salim said: “Suicide attacks, 
terrorists safe haven, rogue state, rogue state that is about to give nuclear weapons to 
terrorists, and more suicide attacks” fills American news about his country. Americans 




different pieces” that will cause endless bedlam. Add to this, he said, the imagery of 
“people wearing towels on their heads – or sand negroes, or whatever you want to call 
them –who have long beards and they want to go out and blow themselves up.” He 
concluded, “Chaos. That’s it. As far as the average American is concerned” chaos is 
Pakistan.623 If it is not a story that depicts chaos and terror, then U.S. journalists project 
an attitude of “indifference, indifference, and indifference” toward Pakistan. This leads 
him to believe that U.S. journalists do not cover Pakistan, they cover how it affects 
America’s war next door in Afghanistan. U.S. journalists have no interest in accurately 
representing his country.  
 
“America Only Cares about America” 
 
The last major theme that the Pakistani journalists interviewed saw in American news 
was ethnocentrism. They see U.S. policymakers and the media alike narrowly pursuing 
U.S. interests in the region. For some of the Pakistanis, this is frustrating as they perceive 
the U.S. as having power over Pakistan. They hold an irreconcilable feeling that the 
United States does not care about Pakistan nearly as much as Pakistan cares about the 
United States.  
The U.S. news media isn’t famous for its coverage of foreign news, Malik explained, 
but it tends to make foreign news into “American national security stories.” Despite many 
cuts in foreign news bureaus, Pakistan and Afghanistan have maintained consistent 
coverage in U.S. news since Sept. 11, 2001 because the countries were directly tied to 




before covering any news story is: “How is this going to affect American policy or what 
kind of impact will it have?” Asking that question automatically restricts the scope of the 
story and, in part, allows for journalists to choose the story’s frame before reporting it; 
the news story will likely be one-dimensional and focused on the national security of the 
U.S.624 Malik saw this coverage as being detrimental to U.S.-Pakistan relations, and 
frustrating for the Pakistani public. “If it is only related to the national security of the 
United States, then you also try to see everything from that prism. That's where things go 
wrong.”  
Because an oft-repeated storyline about Pakistan in U.S. news is that “Pakistan is 
playing a double game,” U.S. journalists are also implying, Malik said, that Pakistanis 
should just blindly follow American interests. Pakistanis then see the U.S. pursuing its 
own interests in Pakistan without respecting Pakistan’s interests as “a betrayal.” They feel 
as if America owes Pakistan more consideration. A U.S. news reports that speaks of 
duplicitous Pakistani official behavior toward the United States, “has had a very negative 
impact [in Pakistan] because… it fuels this conspiracy theory that Americans are not 
actually Pakistan’s friends but want Pakistan to serve their narrow, national interests.” 
Why not consider fairly the position the Pakistani official is in? This can create twin 
resentments among the Pakistani journalists toward both the United States and the 
Pakistani civilian government. U.S. journalists based in Pakistan may cover the Pakistani 
public “burning the American flag, or effigies of the President of America.” Malik said to 
me, “This hurts you. And it should.” Most of the Pakistani public, however, doesn’t see 
what the Pakistani government is doing to make their lives better, either.625 Therefore, 




future from their own government or from the U.S. government—as reflected in the U.S. 
press—they lash out at both.  
Mahmood, a print journalist, too believed that American media “is not concerned 
about the common people of the country.” This is unfortunate, he said, and also a 
disservice to U.S. policymakers. This is because foreign policy toward a country cannot 
be effective if policymakers and foreign policy experts do not understand the intricacies 
of the country – and journalists should help shape that understanding.626 By not 
explaining the realities of everyday people, the U.S. news media was sustaining the U.S. 
government’s security-oriented, narrow policy toward Pakistan.  
U.S. foreign news, overall, said Bahaar, is too U.S.-centric, too sheltered from the 
realities of international relations—and it never honestly confronts how the United States 
is perceived globally. Bahaar believed that the U.S. public does not receive a sufficient 
overview of the countries affected by U.S. foreign policy. He gave an example of the 
U.S.-led Iraq war: U.S. news coverage was not about events inside Iraq, but on the death 
toll of American soldiers. American news reportage about all wars the U.S. is involved in, 
he said, focus on a local, domestic connection inside the U.S. For instance, if an 
American soldier in Iraq were killed, American news would cover a parade that honored 
him, but not the Iraqi civilians who were also killed alongside the soldier. In U.S. news, 
“There is no international news. News should be significant, something affecting all 
people” but American news agencies focus just on the American people. 627 Ibrahim, a 
broadcaster, too, saw in American papers a frustrating imbalance on the focus on U.S. 
casualties versus Afghan or Pakistani casualties. He explained:  
Say there is an article in the Washington Post about, let’s say, a Marine. And you 




[Afghan] translator who got shot because he saved a Marine’s life? How about his 
story? How about his family, his mother, sister, daughter, nephews, nieces? What 
about their point of view? What about them? What about the guard? What about the 
chef? At the base in Kandahar, the chef who served beans everyday to the Marines, 
and one night he was riding his bike home and made two bucks a day, and he was 
riding his motorcycle back home and got brutally shot and beheaded? No one did a 
story on that poor guy. But imagine if someone in the U.S. had done a story on that?   
 
Ibrahim’s point, he later elaborated, was that American readers might not have cared 
about what happened to the Afghans who were also killed alongside the Marine, but that 
reporting for U.S. news is essentially “an international gig.” He continued, “there are no 
borders here anymore. U.S. journalists need to think global” and their allegiance should 
not be to an American audience, but to a worldwide audience.628 
In the pages of America’s newspapers, Salim said, Pakistan is a “one-dimensional 
country, it’s all about terrorism.”629  But he also seemed to understand that the main 
driver of U.S. news frames about Pakistan is the simple fact that there is little space—and 
demand—for news on Pakistan in the United States. He asked, “how much does Pakistan 
really matter to the Americans? Pakistan will always be a distant reality, because the 
focus isn’t broad enough for the Americans.” This, however, is paradoxical to how the 
Pakistani public thinks about the United States, he pointed out: “for Pakistan the reality 
of the Americans is prevalent.”630 It is that gross imbalance between news narratives 
about the other country that can be frustrating for the Pakistani public: Do Americans 
really not care about or know about Pakistanis the way they know about Americans? 
Sharif, a print journalist, agreed about how distant America’s reality if from 
Pakistan’s, lamenting that United States journalists and policymakers are disconnected 
from the human impact, the toll, American power has overseas. He thought that U.S. 




Instead, U.S. journalists, when it’s a matter of conflict, take the U.S.’s side and adhere to 
a nationalistic news frame. This has been the case especially since September 11, 2001. 
“Because people from Afghanistan attacked America,” Sharif said, the U.S. has fair 
stakes in the South Asia region and that its interest has helped Pakistan “ get rid of those 
people who snuck into the Pakistani mountains from Afghanistan.” But that by repeatedly 
employing a limited news frame of security to news stories about Pakistan, the U.S. was 
unaware of the larger effects of U.S. policy within the country.632  
Since the United States is such a big part of Pakistani peoples’ daily lives, there 
are high expectations that the U.S. media should represent Pakistanis’ interests too. 
“Often the people of Pakistan,” he said, “at least the people who are involved with the 
U.S. and the War on Terror, expect Pakistan and the U.S. media to serve them…they 
expect the U.S. government and media to bring them success stories.”633 Mahmood 
agreed that not just journalists, but Pakistani officials and politicians read U.S. news 
directly and they “take it personally” despite knowing that it is written for an American 
audience.634 News stories that are American-centric and security oriented are taken 
personally.  
 
Why do American Journalists See Pakistan this Way? 
 
When it comes to U.S. media frames about Pakistan, there is widespread frustration 
that the U.S. is blaming Pakistan for instability in Afghanistan and global terrorism, but 
Vazir was an outlier in the sense that he believed that the U.S. media is illuminating 




dramatic, security terms, Vazir sympathized, is necessary because there is much violence 
in Pakistan at the moment. But in Pakistan, that news is read and relayed, and sparks 
frustration: The Pakistani public sees such news as a sort of betrayal to the sacrifices they 
believe they have made for the U.S.636  
These U.S. news narratives also, Mahmood said, “undermine the good efforts” of 
the American government because it shows Pakistanis that the U.S. thinks poorly of them 
as a people. Despite $20 billion in U.S. aid given to Pakistan since September 11, the U.S. 
press never focuses on development issues, Rao pointed out, but is obsessed with 
“terrorism, nuclear proliferation, Afghanistan related, Taliban and al Qaeda.” 637 This can 
make Pakistani journalists think that U.S. development aid to Pakistan is not out of its 
concern for the welfare of the Pakistani people, but to manipulate them. 
 Because the United States holds such a powerful place in Pakistani society, the 
stereotype of Pakistan being a fragile, violent and failed state worthy of great blame 
matters to Pakistanis a great deal; they resent how they are projected into a global media 
landscape. Mohammed, an English-language print journalist, summarized it when he said 
that American journalists “go for the easiest option and stereotype” Pakistanis.638 At least 
half of the sample of Pakistani journalists, though, seemed to understand the constraints 
U.S. journalists face in reporting Pakistan due to security, Pakistan’s inherent complexity, 
or the deadline pressure journalists face in reporting. 
Urdu-language, Pashto-language and especially English-language journalists 
acknowledged that Pakistan is an incredibly complex country. Not only is reporting it 
fully immensely difficult for small teams of American reporters, but national security 




news cycle that makes American journalists misrepresent Pakistan to Americans and the 
world, many of the journalists said.639 To survive as journalists, they must meet deadlines 
but the image they present of Pakistan is very different from the Pakistan he experiences 
everyday as a citizen.640 
The U.S. – and western – journalists who spend a considerable amount of time in 
Pakistan “have a much, much clearer perspective” than those who travel there on short 
reporting trips, and are better at representing the country more fully.641 Rao 
acknowledged that the New York Times, Washington Post and the Associated Press—
which serves many newspapers—have full-time representatives in Pakistan even though 
their bureaus often consist of a single reporter. Recently though, some of the bureaus had 
expanded to two-three reporters, which is an improvement.642 But they still do not have 
access to regions in Pakistan where the biggest stories are unfolding, especially the tribal 
areas where drone strikes and clashes against militants are ongoing.643 
These reporters, however, are exceptional. The norm is “parachute journalism”: U.S. 
journalists who come to Pakistan for two days and need a front-page story. These 
reporters lack any perspective beyond the American one, Malik stated. He offered an 
example that took place immediately after the September 11th attacks, when Pakistan 
became central to American reportage again and western journalists who had been absent 
from Pakistan for a decade flooded the country once again.644 A problem for both 
parachute journalists and those who stay longer in Pakistan, however, is sourcing. They 
often rely on U.S. government officials for information -- whether for public knowledge 
or the leaking of secret knowledge—in addition to their general adherence to the U.S. 




American journalists also seem to rely on American analysts who do not live in Pakistan 
and rarely with a feel for the real country.646 They’re just “armchair experts,” Nabeel said, 
who are fairly clueless to Pakistani dynamics and sometimes do not even travel to 
Pakistan.647 There’s no excuse, Malik emphasized, for depending on American official 
sources when reporting from Pakistan; “it is really strange when journalists come here 
and speak to their own diplomats.”648 
They do so, however, because it reflects their internal, pro-American biases, many 
of the journalists said. Of course U.S. journalists have to look to their government for 
information, Danish, a Pashto-language broadcaster, explained, because information 
about Pakistan and Afghanistan is often secret.649 Muhammed also offered that it is 
normal for journalists to sympathize with their own country when reporting on a foreign 
issue. 650 It is natural, he said, that U.S. journalists would subconsciously advance U.S. 
national interests and, with that shared goal, moves closer to the U.S. government line. 
“Particularly on national security issues,” he admitted, “we in Pakistan, too, follow that 
pattern of thought.”651 And it’s not just American journalists who want leaks from their 
government, Sharif, an Urdu-language reporter, said. This sort of press-state dynamic is 
the case in every country, including Pakistan.652 Every reporter around the globe wants 
access to information. He asked: If it were given to them, why wouldn’t a journalist run 
it?   
This is universal, not just an American reporting phenomenon. It is also normal for a 
national newspaper to protect their country’s interests, Imran said. But, since U.S. tax 
dollars are at stake, why aren’t U.S. journalists better watchdogs when it came to U.S. 




of how U.S. dollars – amounting to $20 billion between 2001 and 2010– are being spent 
on aid to Pakistan, he emphasized. 653  
The American media’s tendency to report about Pakistan with an American-centric 
angle has more to do with the American public’s apathy toward the world, Salim believed. 
The American public, he said, doesn’t really care about U.S. policy that does not affect 
them at home; so American journalists, when it comes to foreign policy, are largely 
writing for their government. The American people, Salim explained, are focused on 
domestic issues, like taxes, and not thinking how their foreign policies were affecting 
people overseas, especially those in the Muslim world.654 Because Americans don’t care, 
U.S. correspondents can be “completely distant from the reality of what is happening in 
foreign countries.”655 Nabeel, a Pashto-language broadcaster, too, saw it normal that 
American media would be American-centric. He explained, “everything is about home” 
and U.S. journalists are likely to think about the American audiences first.656  
American news is not Pakistani news. U.S. journalists report on “terrorism, nuclear 
proliferation and religious extremism” in Pakistan and overlook the wide diversity in 
culture and beauty in the country, but they are not writing for a Pakistani audience, Rao 
said. 657 So why should an average Pakistani demand respect from the American media? 
The frustration, Rao explained, is that the cumulative effect of this negative coverage 
shapes U.S. government policy and global opinion of Pakistan. Many in Pakistan feel as 
if they are being stereotyped. However, he also admitted that the Pakistanis are, 





Pakistani Journalists Relay U.S. News When It Fits Their Worldview 
 
 U.S. elite news narratives about Pakistan are often relayed in Pakistani news. How 
Pakistani journalists relay U.S. news reflects which news reports they think are credible, 
and which ones are unfair. The New York Times, Washington Post and other elite U.S. 
news agencies can be revered or infamous, depending on the stories they print. While 
liberal, English-language newspapers tend to relay most U.S. news about Pakistan, the 
Urdu and Pashto-language outlets only use stories that resonate with the Pakistani 
journalists to buttress their own arguments. When this is the case, Pakistani journalists 
will refer to it as “the gold standard in global journalism.”659 However, if they do not like 
the story, then they will dismiss it as being the result of U.S. government manipulation 
and say that American journalists are agents of the their government.  
Normally, Pakistani journalists use the Times and Post the most to relay 
information about U.S.-Pakistan relations, and whatever other news they report on 
Pakistan. The English-language media almost always relay the reports, and while the 
Urdu-language papers will not consistently do so, the Urdu language television stations 
will.660 
For the English-language press, Malik explained that most everything that is in 
the New York Times or Washington Post has a “huge impact [in Pakistan]…a huge 
influence in molding public opinion, everything is picked up, interpreted, re-interpreted, 
and distorted.” Both the facts in American news stories and the ways in which the stories 
are framed, are picked up by the elite Pakistani press. “People here do pick up on 




but how they talk about it, the way they frame Pakistan. That is received here.”661 This is 
in part, Raheem, another English-language print journalist, explained because U.S. news 
is a window into American media perceptions about Pakistan. “We talk a lot about how 
they [Americans] are looking at us [Pakistanis].”  
Other English language journalists confirmed that they use U.S. news to set the 
agenda for their reporting, and then utilize the reports to support their story on the same 
topic.662 Jabbar, a young broadcaster said succinctly: “Pakistani journalists look to 
American news on Pakistan as a habit.”663 The practice is so pervasive, explained Abida, 
a print journalist, that U.S. news on Pakistan made up most of the content of Pakistani 
news on the U.S. – and Afghanistan.664 Mahmood said that this emphasis on American 
news sources gives his paper an edge because “there’s so many things you might not be 
able to find if you weren’t looking” at U.S. news.665 News coming from U.S. agencies 
gives him external analysis on Pakistan’s international impact, which his readership—a 
largely liberal elite group —has an affinity for.666 
The Pashto-language journalists also rely on U.S. news for their reporting. One 
broadcaster not only incorporates American news throughout his reporting, but also 
dedicates a whole program to just what is in American papers. But it’s mainly limited to 
what is in the New York Times and Washington Post.667 Omar, a broadcaster, followed a 
similar routine. “If the New York Times said it,” he said,” then we have to report it.”668  
Parvez agreed, saying, “Particularly from the New York Times, we get some of the best 
stories.”669  
The Urdu-language broadcast stations select quotes and sound bytes from U.S. 




rally a sense of nationalism.670 Pakistani journalists are selective in their reporting and 
only use the U.S. news that meets their agenda. “If it is critical of the military, for 
instance,” Vazir said, “Geo would not pick it up.”671 Local, Urdu-language newspapers, 
including those that have a jihadi point of view, will take American news and reprint it – 
if it fits their worldview. Vazir gave an example of a video of the Pakistani military being 
responsible for extra-judicial killings, or the killing of innocent civilians. The New York 
Times broke the story, and other Western news agencies reported on it as well. But it was 
not picked up and recycled by the Pakistani press because it portrayed the Pakistani 
military negatively. Pakistanis inherently do not like anything about the United States – 
and they will especially not like anything that is critical of the Pakistani military.672   
If U.S. news is negatively depicting the Pakistani military, it is either not picked 
up at all, or it used as the basis for editorializing in an opinion piece or talk show. The 
talk shows especially use U.S. news as a launch point for conversation and America-
bashing, Raheem said.673 The normal refrain, Vazir said, is that “The Americans again are 
being critical of Pakistan and not recognizing their contribution to America’s goals.”674  
When broadcasters and pundits say what they read in American news, they do not 
differentiate between the media and the government, so the U.S. news represents the U.S. 
government and U.S. interests.675 
Protecting the Pakistani national interest is a fierce goal of the Pakistani media. 
But the national interest has an ever-changing definition: “It is normally pro-military, but 
not always. It is never pro-government, even though that government was elected by the 
people.”676 Still, while Pakistani journalists believe they should look out for Pakistan’s 




out for American interests. 
*** 
Pakistani journalists often abide by certain rules to narrow their challenge of 
representing Pakistani society: Criticize the Pakistani civilian government, revere the 
Pakistani military, and bash America for not respecting Pakistan’s sovereignty. But the 
Pakistani journalists feel as if, when it comes to international affairs reportage, American 
journalists also narrow their worldview: Revere the American civilian government, 
revere the American military, and bash Pakistan for not revering either. Pakistani’s brand 
of nationalism is not America’s. If there is one, consistent resentment it is that America 
has not just the power to make Pakistan feel small militarily, but it can also make 
Pakistan feel small in the global media landscape. American journalists willfully choose 
to be nationalistic in their news coverage of Pakistan rather than reflect Pakistan 
accurately. Pakistanis’ react to this viscerally, especially since they think American 
media has hegemonic control in shaping global perceptions. Just as the American military 





III. The Afghans 
 
30 Afghan Journalists: 
 
Aalem   Print; Dari-language.  
Abdullah  Television; Dari-language.  
Atash   Print; Dari & English-language. 
Babur   Television; Dari-language. 
Badi   Print; Dari & English-language.  
Behnam  Print; Dari & English-language. 
Delewar  Radio & Television; Dari & English-language.  
Faisal   Print, Dari & English-language. 
Farhang  Television; Dari & Pashto-language.  
Farzin   Radio & Print; Dari, Pashto & English-language. 
Fazia   Television; Dari-language. 
Feda   Print & Radio; Dari, Pashto & English-language. 
Ghazanfar  Radio, Dari & English-language. 
Hakim    Print; Dari & English-language.  
Houshmand  Radio, Dari, Pashto & English-language. 
Jabar   Radio, Dari, Pashto & English-language.  
Jahandar  Print & Radio; Dari, Pashto & English-language. 
Jamshid  Television; Dari-language.  
Jawid   Radio & Print, Dari, Pashto & English-language. 
Kambas  Radio & Print; Dari-language.  
Khaleeq  Radio, Dari, Pashto & English-language. 
Mansoor  Print, Dari & English-language.  
Matteen  Print, Dari & English-language. 
Mitra   Radio & Print; Dari, Pashto & English-language. 
Morad   Radio, Dari-language. 
Nasir   Television; Dari-language. 
Omaid   Radio, Dari & English-language. 
Parsa   Television; Pashto-language.  
Sarwar   Radio; Dari, Pashto & English-language. 




CHAPTER 7. A Shaky Start: Afghan News Media, Past and Present 
 
 
On October 8, 2001, the day after the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, the Taliban-
controlled radio station, Radio Shari’ah, stopped broadcasting in Kabul.677  However, 
Radio Shari’ah broadcasts from Mazar-e-Sharif, the largest city in the north, continued. 
That day, local residents heard recitations of the Holy Koran and an interview with the 
Taliban commander of Balkh who had said about the attacks, “We are not afraid of 
America.”678  For one month, despite increasingly poor broadcast quality, Radio Shari’ah 
continued the same routine as it had since 1996: recitations of the Koran and statements 
from the Taliban.679	  
Then, on November 10, 2001, broadcasts switched from Pashto, the preferred 
language of the Taliban, to Dari, the preferred language of the Northern Alliance, the 
main opposition group to the Taliban.  The new announcer re-branded the station “Radio 
Balkh” and stated that the Taliban had fallen from Mazar-e-Sharif: "Dear pious and 
Muslim compatriots, peace be with you. We congratulate you from the bottom of our 
hearts on the victory of the Islamic State of Afghanistan."680 The next day, Afghan and 
Indian music, banned under Taliban rule, filled the airwaves. Then, at one point, Abdul 
Rashid Dostum – the former Soviet general, infamously brutal Uzbek warlord, and 
original creator of the Northern Alliance – interrupted the music to announce his 
triumphant return to the country he had fled in 1997. The United States had asked him to 
leave Turkey, where he was living in exile, and help guide U.S. Special Forces in 
eliminating the Taliban from the north.681 He proudly announced that he and the U.S. 




Three days later, on November 13, 2001, Kabul residents said they heard music 
on the radio for the first time in five years. Kabul had been liberated and “Radio 
Afghanistan” was back on the air, via a mobile transmitter. Agence France Press 
reported: “Shrieks of joy erupted when Radio Afghanistan began broadcasting…offering 
verses from the Koran, music that had been banned under the Taliban, and a woman 
newscaster.”682 The female announcer, Jamila Mujahid, told her audience: “You can 
celebrate this great victory…We have to thank God for giving us this opportunity for 
Afghanistan to move toward unity….I don't believe this. I never thought that a time 
would come when I would be reading the news again. As I read the news this morning 
it’s like a dream."683 
Afghanistan’s media was freed from Taliban controls. But the work to create a 
viable news system within a new democratic government had just begun.  
Afghanistan had no blueprint for how to build a strong, professional press that 
informed the Afghan public and held a new democratic government accountable. In a 
country where opportunity had been suppressed by a decade of Soviet rule, six years of 
civil war, and five years of Taliban brutality, the idea of freedom of speech was an 
exciting prospect. Few Afghans, however, knew how to implement a liberal, democratic 
order and Afghanistan had no history of professional journalism by Western standards – 
only the authoritarian style of reportage that each of Afghanistan’s 20th century rulers 





Afghanistan’s Media Origins 
 
 The country’s first newspaper, Saraj-al-Akhbar (“Lamp of the News”), only 
produced one edition in 1906. Five years lapsed before Mahmud Ber Tarzi, considered 
the father of the Afghan press, revived it after returning to Afghanistan from exile in 
Europe. He made Saraj into a bi-weekly paper with the dual purpose of uniting the 
country under the banner of Islam against British colonial rule and creating an 
enlightened Afghan public that could reform the country.685 He seemed to recognize 
media as a tool to link modernity with nationhood and show the British that Afghanistan 
was strong enough to survive in the international system without a Western patron.686  
In 1919, when Afghanistan gained its independence from the United Kingdom, 
King Amanullah (1919-1929) used media for his own state-sponsored modernization 
projects. The King created a new newspaper, Aman-i-Afghan ("Afghan Peace"), to 
replace Saraj-al-Akhbar and serve his administration.687  Later, in 1923, the King allowed 
the principle of free speech to be part of the 1923 constitution, and various newspapers 
and magazines began to circulate in Kabul and the provinces. Amanullah’s progressive 
wife, Queen Soraya – who had shocked Afghans by appearing unveiled in public – even 
sanctioned a magazine, Instructions for Women, that encouraged a more liberal, reformist 
path for Afghan women.688 But despite the reforms, the media was largely under the 
control of the monarchy. This included radio, which arrived in Afghanistan in the late 
1920s after Germany provided King Nadir Shah (1929-1933) with equipment for a 




Under the reign of King Zahir Shah (1933-1973), Afghanistan’s last King, 
Afghan media became more robust, but remained under strong government control until 
the last few years of his rule. By 1940, Radio Afghanistan was available nationwide and 
broadcast mainly government announcements and policy statements to serve the narrow 
purposes of particular officials.689 The Media Law of 1950 allowed for private media, but 
King Shah banned it just two years later. His administration, however, established the 
state-run newswire, Bakhtar News Agency that the Ministry of Information and Culture 
managed.690 Bakhtar allowed Afghan news to transcend borders and create relationships 
with the global newswires AFP, Reuters, AP, Deutsche Presse Agentur, the Soviet 
Union’s TASS and New China News Agency in an effort to exchange information with 
the world. Still, however, Afghan news media remained limited and mostly a vehicle for 
the government.691 
In 1966, a new Media Law allowed for more private news media and between 
1966 and 1973, 24 private newspapers – and various radio stations – surfaced.692 But 
those agencies, while independent from the government, largely depended on government 
officials’ tolerance for them.693 Many of the private newspapers were politically charged, 
and some advocated strongly for a communist rule of Afghanistan. The emerging 
Communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), especially, used the 
newspapers to espouse their views through the papers, Khalq, or “Masses,” and Parcham, 
or “Banner.”694 In 1967, the Communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan split 
into two factions and organized their diverging ideologies around the two newspapers, 
the factions becoming popularly known as Khalq and Parcham. This was an early signal 





1973-1989: Communism & The Soviet Takeover  
 
King Shah’s 40-year rule dramatically ended in 1973. Former Prime Minister 
Daoud Khan, his cousin, overthrew the King, who then left Afghanistan and began an 
almost 30-year exile in Rome. Daoud reconstituted Afghanistan as a republic instead of a 
monarchy, made himself president, and banned most private news media.695 Radio and 
Television Afghanistan (RTA) continued as the country’s primary broadcast outlet; by 
the late 1970s, 16 newspapers and magazines remained, catering to an elite, literate and 
urban group.696 Yet Daoud’s reign lasted just five years as the Communist forces gained 
power. On April 27, 1978, Nur Muhammed Taraki’s Khalq faction, the pro-Soviet one of 
the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), overthrew Daoud in a bloody 
coup and quickly established the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.697  
Afghanistan was now a Communist state, run by President Taraki. But his rule 
lasted just 17 months. Large-scale land reforms and the introduction of Marxist policies 
challenged traditional customs and values, infuriating the rural population and igniting 
mass protests in the countryside. Seeing his rule as a failure, Taraki’s prime minister, 
Hazifullah Amin, directed that Taraki be killed by suffocation, and seized power on 
September 14, 1979.698 But two months later, on December 24, 1979, the Soviets, 
concerned about this instability of the Afghan Communist regime, took control and 





During Soviet rule, the trend of authoritarian-style journalism in Afghanistan 
solidified; freedom of speech was further constricted and media pivoted around the 
Afghan Communist Party and Soviet interests in the region and the world. Afghan 
journalists were forced to embrace and maintain a mechanical style of reportage. The 
faculty of journalism at Kabul University taught students to report mainly on government 
events with little analysis or investigation. Any traces of independence that had survived 
the bouts of government crackdown through the decades disappeared.  
However, an opposition media re-surfaced with the purpose of resisting Soviet 
rule and the “puppet” Afghan government of Babrak Karmal, who answered to Moscow. 
Seeing Afghanistan as an opportunity to weaken Soviet power, the United States began to 
covertly aid the mujahedeen, or freedom fighters, who had been forming a resistance 
since Taraki’s 1978 coup. In addition to providing the mujahedeen with weapons and 
finances, the U.S. supported an information campaign to galvanize anti-Soviet sentiment. 
This included helping to create newspapers and radio broadcasts in certain pockets of the 
country and in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan that favored the rebels.699  
 
1989-2001: The Civil War & Taliban Takeover 
 
The combination of U.S. military, economic and humanitarian aid to the 
mujahedeen and the Afghan people worked. On February 15, 1989, the last Soviet 
soldiers departed Afghanistan, leaving behind roughly 200 diplomats in the severely 
weakened Soviet embassy in Kabul.700 But two weeks before, the U.S., citing concerns 




diplomatic mission. The U.S. stopped all but the smallest amount of humanitarian aid to 
Afghanistan. The Soviets left behind a communist government ran by Mohammed 
Najibullah. He held onto power until April 16, 1992, when the Soviet Union had begun to 
dissolve and Russia stopped providing him with financial support. Najibullah took refuge 
in the United Nations compound in Kabul as the now-fractured mujahedeen plunged the 
country into a devastating civil war. Burhanuddin Rabbani, seen as the leader of the 
mujahedeen, became the country’s internationally recognized president, but the fighting 
continued. The official Afghan press that had been under Communist Party control for a 
decade, most notably Radio Television Afghanistan, transferred to Rabbani’s control. 
Simultaneously, the opposition, political media proliferated as militia leaders, popularly 
known as warlords, used newspapers to advance their individual agendas for 
Afghanistan.701  
 The civil war lasted for roughly four years, destroying Kabul city and turning the 
countryside into battlegrounds for warlords. In 1994, a movement of young scholars, 
known as Talibs, began to take on the warlords, in the Pashtun-dominated south. At first, 
the Afghan people welcomed their peaceful ways and their ability to control the warlods. 
The Taliban moved into the West and North and took control of most of the country. In 
late September 1996, Kabul fell to the Taliban.702 One of their first acts in Kabul was to 
find the last communist leader, Najibullah, at the United Nations compound downtown, 
and to hang him. President Rabbani, however, survived. He moved to Badakhshan, the 
remote northeast province, and went on to fight the Taliban for five years through the 
Northern Alliance: a collection of warlords and militia leaders, all former mujahedeen, 





The Taliban incorporated an extremely harsh style of governance. It completely 
transformed the media space to cater to its goal of imposing a theocracy that strictly 
adhered to Shari’ah law. Since they outlawed images of the human form, television 
broadcasting from Radio Television Afghanistan halted completely.703 Taliban religious 
police smashed privately owned television sets and strung film from videocassettes in 
trees. Anyone found to harbor a television set could receive the punishment of flogging 
and a six-month incarceration.704 Radio Afghanistan was re-named Radio Shari’ah and it 
broadcast mainly prayers, official announcements, news of military victories against the 
Northern Alliance, and criticism of any foreign or Afghan opposition to Taliban rule. The 
Taliban Ministry of Information and Culture, which maintained Radio Shari’ah, also 
produced approximately one dozen state-owned print publications, but their circulation 
rate was limited to 1 percent – and because there were no newsstands and literacy was at 
less than 25 percent, the papers were mainly distributed to political and religious 
institutions.705  
Afghans did have alternatives, however, to Taliban-controlled media. Foreign 
stations like the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the U.S.-sponsored Voice 
of America (VOA) continued their broadcasts in the Dari and Pashto languages, which 
accessed a majority of Afghans.706 The main opposition group to the Taliban, the 
Northern Alliance, also financed a television station in President Rabbani’s province of 
Badakhshan that broadcast news and old movies for three hours each evening. However, 
there were only about 5,000 viewers who were safe from the Taliban’s reach, and owned 




Taliban society where communication would be less restricted and Afghanistan was 
connected to the outside world.707  
 
2001-2008: Democracy and Western Intervention  
 
 The world re-connected with Afghans on November 13, 2001, when the Taliban 
fell from Kabul. Dramatic change began to take place in Afghanistan yet again. During 
life under the Taliban, women were not permitted to work, let alone leave their homes. 
This is why Jamila Mujahid’s broadcast on Radio Afghanistan (re-branded overnight 
from Radio Shar’iah) was a powerful symbol of liberty: The Taliban no longer controlled 
the airwaves, or the country. But Mujahid was able to broadcast music and deliver news 
unfettered by authorities only because there was no Afghan government to stop it. Since 
1906, the monarchy, the Soviets, the warlords and the Talliban had managed Afghan 
media. Nearly a century later, news media had acquired a new platform. But it was shaky.  
The Afghan government had to be entirely reconstructed as well. In late 
November, the United Nations convened a discussion between four Afghan opposition 
groups in Bonn, Germany to decide what Afghanistan’s post-Taliban government should 
be. They included representatives of the Northern Alliance; the “Cypress Group,” 
Afghans who lived in exile in Iran; the “Rome Group,” Afghans loyal to former King 
Zahir Shah, who was still living in Rome; and the “Peshawar Group,” Afghans who had 
been living in Pakistan.708 They made two consequential decisions that would shape 
Afghanistan’s current society and government apparatus. First, they agreed that the UN 
should create a multinational peacekeeping force to stabilize the country. The 




the auspices of the United Nations but would soon be led by the United States and 
member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).709 They also agreed to 
make Afghanistan into a constitutional democracy. It would begin with an interim 
administration for three-six months until a loya jirga, or a grand council of tribal leaders, 
could agree to – and legitimize – a transitional administration.  
Who would lead this interim administration, though, was a point of contention. At 
first, it looked as if the former King would resume his role.710 But Burhanuddin Rabbani, 
the last internationally-recognized Afghan president and representative of the Northern 
Alliance faction, opposed him. The U.S. wanted Hamid Karzai, a cousin of the King and, 
more importantly, a Pashtun – the dominant ethnicity in Afghanistan, of which most 
Taliban also were. Originally from Kandahar, the center of Taliban rule, Karzai had been 
living in exile in Quetta, Pakistan since the mid-1990s. He had served as Rabbani’s 
deputy foreign minister from 1992 to 1994, but began to recognize the Taliban as a 
legitimate force that could quell the violence from the civil war. In 1999, however, the 
Taliban assassinated Karzai’s father and he began to support the Northern Alliance.  The 
Bonn conference representatives—most reluctantly, Rabbani – ultimately agreed that all 
ethnic groups in Afghanistan would accept Karzai and he was selected to lead a 29-
member interim administration.711 
The Bonn Agreement – also known as the Agreement on Provisional 
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government	  
Institutions – was established on December 5, 2001. That day, Karzai, who was still 
living in Quetta, Pakistan and hadn’t attended the conference in Germany, received a 




U.S. Special Forces for the first time in nearly seven years. And two weeks after that, he 
was sworn in as the leader of the interim government of Afghanistan. David Rohde of the 
New York Times wrote of the ceremony:  
Appealing for help from God, his fellow citizens and the outside world to unify 
and rebuild his war-ravaged nation, Hamid Karzai, an Afghan tribal leader with a 
regal bearing and an aristocratic lineage, was sworn in today as chairman of an 
interim government that replaces the defeated Taliban.712   
 
The challenge ahead was staggering. Civilization in Afghanistan was depleted. There 
were few institutions, schools, health clinics; little physical infrastructure and electricity; 
and an economy that relied exclusively on weak agriculture and an illicit narcotics 
industry. After such a devastating 30 years, however, Afghanistan was full of hope. And 
its new media system seemed to be its most visible example of how a population could 
embrace democracy and modernity, just as it had a century before with its first newspaper, 
Lamp of the News.   
However, tradition runs deep in Afghanistan. An authoritarian style of news 
continued. The state-run media arms, Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA) and Bakhtar 
News Agency (BNA), were revived with U.S. assistance and returned to the control of 
the Ministry of Information and Culture. In 2002, RTA resumed television broadcasting 
in the major cities of Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazaar-I-Sharif and Faizabad – but it did not 
provide entertainment, despite the population’s demand for it.713 Radio Kabul was the 
lead station in RTA’s network, which reached at least 17 out of 32 provinces in the 
country. But it was mostly Afghanistan’s urban residents who had access to 
Afghanistan’s young news media; only 24 percent of the rural population could access it 
early on.714 In addition to BNA resuming its role as a government information newswire, 




with its past of authoritarian style of journalism, reporters and broadcasters working for 
these agencies rarely criticized officials and remained loyal to the transitional 
government under Karzai.716 
At first, there was confusion over whether the interim government even permitted 
independent media. In February 2002, Karzai signed a new Media Law that closely 
resembled the last Media Law of 1966 in the sense that it allowed for a private news 
media, though it no longer made a reference to a monarchy.717 The law required that news 
agencies obtain a license from the Ministry of Information and Culture that cost $500,000, 
but established no firm criteria by which officials would decide who gets a license. The 
law did not guarantee public access to information, and it did not ensure the 
independence of the public media. It also included a ban on “subjects that could offend 
Islam and subjects that could dishonor the people or weaken the Army” and warned 
newsmen that if they did offend Islam or the Army, their news agencies would be 
suspended.718  
The Ministry of Information and Culture granted one of its first media licenses to 
Saad Mohseni, an Afghan-Australian businessman who, along with his four siblings, 
would go on to transform the Afghan media space over the next decade. 719 Initially, the 
Mohseni family only had $300,000 to pay for the license. 720 But Andrew Natsios, the 
head of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), heard about Mohseni 
and wanted to help him start a radio station. The U.S. embassy in Kabul, along with the 
diplomatic and aid missions of other Western governments that pledged to help 
Afghanistan rebuild, saw the news media as a vital component to a transitional 




that had been muffled for too long.721 Natsios gave Mohseni $280,000 to contribute 
toward the license and as seed money to launch Radio Arman, a radio station that mixed 
music and news and targeted Afghanistan’s youth. Radio Arman went on the air in April 
2003 with a team of just 20 people. In a symbolic move, Mohseni hired Massood Sanjer, 
the English news broadcaster for the Taliban’s Radio Shari’ah, to be the voice for a new, 
more open generation of Afghans.722  With Radio Arman’s early success, Mohseni went 
on to establish the Moby Media Group and launched Tolo TV (in Dari) in 2004 and 
Lemar TV (in Pashto) TV in 2006.  Tolo quickly became Afghanistan’s most popular 
television station.  
U.S. support for Afghan media was mainly focused on broadcast news, but it also 
funded the launch of Pajhwok, Afghanistan’s first, independent newswire, in 2004. 
Pajhwok means “echo” in both Dari and Pashto and the media development NGO, the 
Institute for War and Peace Reporting, guided its development.723 But the U.S. was not 
the only patron for Afghanistan’s transformed media space. With a new enthusiasm for it 
and a new democracy that encouraged wide citizen participation, partisan media began to 
make a comeback. Authoritarian habits also re-surfaced as most provincial governors 
took control of local radio stations. Iran and Pakistan, too, seized the opportunity to 
influence the young democracy and began to finance Afghan news agencies.724 All of this 
has contributed to an Afghan media market that is maintained by benefactors: the Afghan 





Afghan Media Today  
 
The Afghan news media’s development since 2002 has been breathtakingly rapid. 
Between 2005 and 2010, it grew an average of 20 percent each year. Today, Afghanistan 
has more than 75 television stations, 175 radio stations and more than 200 urban-based 
print publications.725 Due to more than 60 percent illiteracy, especially in rural areas, 
broadcast media is preferred to newspapers and magazines.726 How Afghans consume 
media, though, depends on where they live. Seventy percent of the population lives in the 
countryside and 85 percent of those Afghans listen to radio, while less than one-third 
watch television.727 
Radio remains the dominant news medium for all Afghans, although no single 
radio station is heard nationwide. In 2003, only 37 percent of the Afghan population had 
access to local radio broadcasts but, by 2010, 88 percent of Afghans did.728 More than 90 
radio stations are privately owned stations and roughly 35 are state-owned, and run by 
RTA. Afghan stations are supplemented by international broadcasts sponsored by the 
West, particularly the British Broadcasting Corporation and U.S. government’s Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, known as Radio Azadi (“Azadi” means “Liberty”) in Dari.729 
Afghan audiences also, according to a BBC survey, listen to broadcasts of neighboring 
countries, such as Iran, Pakistan and Turkmenistan.730  
In the urban areas though, where 30 percent of the population lives, radio is 
steadily losing ground to television.731 Somehow, in a country where there is less 
electricity than anywhere else in the world, television is proliferating. Television reaches 
80 percent of the urbanized public, where electricity sources are concentrated, but it is 




television regularly, families tended to abandon radio once they acquired a television.732 
The most dramatic growth took place between 2006 and 2010, when 50 new television 





Afghans turn to broadcast media for news on local and national issues, music, and 
religious and educational programming on topics such as literacy, cookery and family 
life.734 Of their myriad choices, one media agency dominates the others as the source for 
both news and entertainment: Saad Mohseni’s Moby Media Group – the parent company 
to Radio Arman, Tolo TV, Lemar TV, and Afghanistan’s first 24-hour news station, Tolo 
News.735 Radio Arman, is known to be the most popular commercial radio station in the 
country and is particularly popular with youth in and around Kabul.736 Moby Media 
Group captured roughly 51 percent of the Afghan audience and 45 percent of the market 
share in 2010. And Tolo attracts more advertising funds than any other news station in 
the country; its advertising spots time run up to US$500 per minute throughout the 
day.737 In addition to news, Tolo has created original entertainment programming and re-
broadcasts Indian soap operas that appeal to the public. Its content, however, is focused 
toward those living in the five major urban areas of Afghanistan: Kabul, Herat (west), 
Mazar-e-Sharif (north), Kandahar (south) and Jalalabad (east).738  
When it comes to television, Tolo TV is the most popular, followed by the 




radio, however, RTA and its associated regional stations command the largest nationwide 
audience; coming in second is the U.S.-sponsored Radio Azadi.740 There is no known 
ranking for print media, as its audience is deemed to be too marginal to matter for a 
national poll. But new media began to become more accessible in 2010 as mobile phone 
penetration reached 61 percent of the country, whereas the Internet only reached 6 
percent of the population, mostly in urban areas.741  
 
Media Controlled by Warlords, Iranians, Pakistanis, the West and the Government  
 
The desire for information in 21st century Afghanistan has grown much more 
quickly than its economy. Afghanistan is the third-poorest country in the world and more 
than 90 percent of its economy is dependent on international community donations.742 
The private market for media therefore is small. Commercial advertising generates 
approximately $50 million a year in revenue; but most of the dramatic growth in radio 
and television is due to direct and indirect support from donors. There is no 
comprehensive information about which news agencies belong to which owners. But this 
generalization is possible:  As with so many other facets of Afghanistan’s government, 
civil society and economy, journalism is largely dependent on patrons.  
There are four main categories of Afghan media sponsors: Western countries, 
mainly the U.S. and U.K.; Afghanistan’s neighbors, specifically Iran and Pakistan; 
Afghan warlords; and the Afghan government.743 Western government donors, 
particularly from the United States, have wanted to counteract insurgents and to promote 




targeted toward building, independent media through “technical support, equipment 
upgrades, hands-on training, business development, and strengthening of media industry 
institutions, networks and associations to increase media professionalism and standards 
of practice.”745 As previously mentioned, the U.S. was the first and primary sponsor of 
Afghan media development with funds to Moby Media Group’s broadcast stations and 
Pajhwok News, the country’s principal newswire. More recently, according to USAID, it 
has focused on supporting the media non-governmental organization Nai to provide 
training for journalists and promote media literacy. It has also established media centers 
throughout the country to help strengthen local stations through the Internews network.746 
While the U.S. government asserts that its goal is to create an independent media to help 
build a strong civil society to counter extremism, many Afghans suspect that the U.S. 
agenda is to use media to create a country that is friendly to the U.S.. They are correct in 
this perception. The U.S. government wants the Afghan public to bend more towards 
America’s objectives for the region than toward Iran’s or Pakistan’s. 
The Afghan elite who have benefitted from U.S. aid see their neighbors, Iran and 
Pakistan, as inciting divisiveness in their society. There is more evidence that Iran has 
funded Afghan stations since 2006 than Pakistan has. Iran – a country that shares a 
similar culture, language (Dari is a dialect of Persian), history, and Islam (although Iran is 
predominantly Shi’ite) – backs nearly one-third of Afghan news outlets. Iran has become 
increasingly aggressive in injecting its views.747  In March 2012, the National Directorate 
of Security (the Afghan equivalent of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) 
submitted a rare public report alleging that the weekly newspaper Ensaf and the 




by Afghanistan's most prominent Shi'ite cleric, Ayatollah Mohammed Asef Mohseni. The 
chief editor of Tamadon, Mohammad Rahmati, rejected the idea that he received money 
from Iran, telling Reuters it was an “insult.”749 The chief editor of Ensaf, on the other 
hand, has acknowledged that he regularly receives money from Iran.750 Iran spends a total 
of roughly $100 million a year on not just Afghan media, but also on civil society 
projects and Shi’ite religious schools, the Afghan Foreign Ministry said.751 Many 
Afghans think the Iranians definitely fund Afghan media to try to counter American 
influence in the country. For instance, after the U.S. and Afghanistan signed the U.S. 
Strategic Partnership Agreement in May 2012 that indicates a long-term partnership 
between the two countries,752 Iran-backed media began to criticize the pact. The 
messages from Iran-sponsored media include reporting on Israel, a country of little 
interest to Afghans, and refers to it as "the Zionist regime," a term Afghan officials 
avoid.753 
There are also stations that Afghan warlords have launched to advance their 
individual political or religious interests. The original was Aina TV (“Mirror”), which 
Abdul Rashid Dostum – the Uzbek and former Soviet general – launched in 2003. He 
began a trend among his former Northern Alliance/mujahedeen comrades. Roughly six 
warlord stations exist today: In addition to Dostum’s Aina TV, there is the Hazara 
warlord Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq's Rah-e-Farda TV (“Future Path”); Vice President 
Karim Khalili’s Negah TV (“Watch”); Northern Alliance commander Amanullah 
Guzar’s Sepehr TV; Tajik warlord Atta Muhammad Noor’s Arzo TV; and Tajik political 
leaders Haji Arif and Yunus Qannoni’s Noorin TV (“Lights).754 The stations are mostly 




broadcast mainly in pockets of Afghanistan where their influence looms large, their overt 
political agendas encourage political, ethnic and religious fragmentation and are 
perceived as threats to independent media.755  
The fourth category of Afghan news media is the Afghan government stations that 
support the policies and strategies of the Karzai administration as they have earlier 
administrations: RTA, Bakhtar News Agency, and the dozen of papers in Dari, Pashto 
and English. State-owned media tend to focus on reports of leading Afghan figures, 
including President Karzai, and often ignore coverage from private television stations.756 
Their main purpose is to keep Afghanistan united under the national state. The Afghan 
government also monitors the other media channels through the Ministry of Information 
and Culture and regularly enforces the Media Law.   
 
Reporting in a Climate of Fear, Constraint 
 
Afghanistan’s 2009 Media Law, its most recent, is vague. It permits anyone who 
can afford a license to establish media agencies and puts freedom of speech up for wild 
interpretation.757 The law prohibits journalists from publishing “matters contrary to the 
principles of Islam and offensive to other religions and sects.”758 The ambiguity of this 
rule has allowed the Ministry of Information and Culture to order the detention of Afghan 
journalists, the shuttering of several privately owned media outlets, and the banning of 
radio and television programs.759 This includes the government shut down of Emroz TV, 
a privately owned Dari-language station based in the western city of Herat that was well 




banned the Pashto-language news website Benawa.com after it erroneously reported that 
Vice-President Mohammad Qasim Fahim had died.761  
In early fall 2012, a new version of the Media Law was sent to parliament after a 
struggle between conservative elements in the government and more progressive 
journalists and civil society leaders. One version, drafted internally within the 
government, wanted to further increase government control over the media through a 
complicated set of regulatory bodies that would diminish free speech and ban foreign 
programming. 762 In response, a group of concerned journalists and civil society 
representatives drafted an alternate version that allows for greater transparency, more 
legal protection, and better libel laws. Remarkably, government officials accepted that 
version with some changes; it is expected to pass through parliament sometime in 
2013.763 But much of the media’s ability to operate will continue to depend on the 
personalities within the Ministry of Information and Culture and the High Council, on the 
cooperation of the Afghan government, and on the overall security situation.  
The Afghan government has not imposed explicit bans on Afghan reporters 
because Western governments, who donate millions of dollars, have warned them against 
it.764 But both the Media Law and the West have failed to prevent heavy-handed 
government controls on radio, television and newspapers. Afghan politicians and officials, 
warlords and the Taliban regularly harass and intimidate journalists. There are 
kidnappings and murders.765 In the course of 2009, violence against journalists rose by 70 
percent, according to the non-governmental organization, Nai, and government security 
personnel committed most of the attacks.766 In 2010, Afghanistan ranked 147th out of 178 




Afghan media was in its worst state since 2004.767 Freedom House ranked Afghanistan as 
165 out of 196 counties, decisively calling it “not free.”768 Afghanistan also ranks seventh 
on the Committee to Protect Journalists' Impunity Index, a listing of countries where 
journalists are killed regularly and governments fail to solve the crimes.769  
The Afghan journalists work within a climate of fear and restraint: They 
frequently resort to self-censorship to stay in the good graces of powerful Afghan figures. 
As security has deteriorated in Afghanistan, reporting news has become generally more 
difficult, with the constraints varying by geographical region. The Institute for War and 
Peace Reporting (IWPR) found that in the north, warlords control Afghan reporters, who 
are divided by ethnic, linguistic and political lines. In the south and east, where security is 
deteriorating, journalists complain that local government officials openly intimidate them 
into reporting what the officials want to see. Therefore, news reports on sensitive issues – 
such as religious and ethnic rivalries, human rights abuses, corruption, or narcotics – are 
often described in general terms and journalists often opt not to pursue investigative 
reports that could get them jailed or killed.770  
Finding facts in Afghanistan, where dishonesty on issues of security and 
governance is pervasive, is also a challenge. During decades of conflict, general lying 
became necessary for one’s survival. It is now routine.771 Afghan journalists must find 
credible sources who tell the truth and don’t seek to manipulate them to advance their 
agendas. But since such sources are rare, many Afghan journalists rely on practices that 
would not be condoned in the West. For instance, it is near impossible to verify Taliban 
spokespeople or leaders, or those of other extremist factions such as the Haqqani network. 




but hold guns and claim to be Taliban.772 The journalists usually know Taliban 
representatives only by their phone numbers, which means that they reach groups of 
spokespeople instead of consistent individuals.  
The complicated worlds of the Taliban, warlords, and other militant factions, 
which are all involved in some kind of organized crime, can be opaque and dizzyingly 
complicated to determine.773 So can the goals and actions of the Western (particularly the 
U.S.) and Afghan governments. Afghan journalists are often poorly informed about the 
development activities they lead. This can create “misguided, unmanageable, and 
ultimately frustrated public expectations,” according to the U.S. Institute for Peace, 
because Afghans want to see development goals created instantaneously and do not 
understand them as long-term processes.774 The Afghan news media, therefore, can foster 
expectations that the Afghan government and international community in Afghanistan 
cannot possibly meet. This creates conflict and erodes confidence.775 
The Afghan journalists also have high expectations of themselves, which they 
often have difficulty in meeting. Many of them have received enough journalism training 
and education from Western organizations to know what a professional press is, and that 
theirs is not one. However, they find it difficult to stick to professional principles in a 
complicated environment and to reverse the habits of their colleagues who do not know 
better. The Afghan journalists believe that their colleagues are not “yet fully adept at 
using pictures or applying sufficiently high journalistic standards in reporting a story,” 
according to a BBC media survey—yet the fact that they share this criticism implies that 
they share a certain professional standard.776 Because of the lack of analysis and 




the “he said, she said” type.  This is also because they think giving equal credence to both 
sides in the conflict with the Taliban is professional, objective reporting. For instance, 
after a clash between NATO and Taliban forces, the respective spokespeople often give 
conflicting reports over who and how many people were killed and injured. Rarely can 
Afghan journalists properly investigate the incident; they have to rely on the 
spokespeople for news copy.777 They do not have the skills or resources to follow up on 
stories – or, they fear to try. Yet they know what they’re missing.   
Despite the threats, Afghans are attracted to journalism because they see it as a 
pathway to both justice within, and the world beyond, Afghanistan.778 To them, 
storytelling comes naturally, and journalism, along with the media in general, continues 
to be seen as a pathway to modernity.779  
 
Afghan Public Hopeful for the Press 
 
Afghan journalists have made an impressive impact on the public, with more than 
65 percent placing faith in the news media for credible information.780 According to three 
recent polls, the Afghan people enjoy their access to media and turn to Afghan news 
sources repeatedly, seeing them as a reliable source of information.781 But, in 2010, 
Afghans told the BBC that they do not entirely depend on one news source for 
information; they still seek confirmation of news they watch or hear through other press 
sources and from members of their community.782 The U.S. Institute for Peace confirmed 
this in their 2010 survey, finding that Afghans put a high premium on the source of the 




taken as truth, without question.783 This is partly why most of Afghanistan’s media 
landscape is fragmented along ethno-linguistic lines. Afghans can feel manipulated by the 
Taliban, the international community, the government, nonprofit organizations, or by 
various others, which is why they trust media sources that they identify with.784 Those 
with a Pashtun identity are more likely to trust Pashto-language media; those with other 
ethnic identities—Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara, etc. – are more likely to trust the Dari-language 
press. At the same time, however, Afghans want to be part of an Afghan nation and know 
about people outside of their immediate communities. In this way, they see the state-
owned Radio Television Afghanistan, while being known as biased toward the 
government, as contributing to national unity because it has national reach.785  
The Afghan public knows that the government controls Radio Television 
Afghanistan, but they deem the Iranian, Pakistani and warlord-controlled media also as 
independent because they are not RTA outlets.786 While the Kabul elite largely sees 
Iranian, Pakistani and warlord-controlled media as divisive, many also see the U.S. 
government as imposing its own bias in the news agencies it supports, however popular 
they may be with the public.787 Overall though, Afghans want all of the news media to 
monitor the government, promote a national identity, provide education, and give them 





 Afghan News Media is Weak, Future Uncertain  
  
The future of the independent, Western-backed media in Afghanistan is uncertain 
because much of it relies on funds that are expected to leave the country with the majority 
U.S. and NATO troops in 2014. Until 2012, few Western-sponsored news organizations 
have tried to become financially sustainable.789 Already, many of them have cut personnel, 
cancelled programs and reduced news coverage. The organizations that will remain 
strong, some experts believe, are the stations the Afghan government, warlords and Iran 
backs.790 Those channels have more reliable funding since Afghans and Iran are more 
likely to stay invested in Afghanistan than the West will.  
The profound weakness of Afghanistan’s economy severely affects the media’s 
long-term prospects. For instance, Pajhwok, which was originally supported by USAID, 
had planned to become financially independent by charging subscriber fees. But people 
found ways to acquire Pajhwok news content without subscribing and, by the summer of 
2012, Pajhwok was forced to reduce its staff by 38 percent. Pajhwok’s owners expect 
even less revenue as Western subscribers lose interest in Afghanistan after NATO troops 
leave and the economy falters with less international support. The highly respected 
newspaper, Hashti Sobh (8am), which focuses on investigative reporting for elite, urban 
audiences, is losing Western grant money. Shah Hussain Murtazawi, the paper’s deputy 
chief editor, told the Christian Science Monitor, “Now we have climbed all the way to 
the peak and if we fall from here it won’t help. I think the international community 




Moby Media Group to continue receiving revenue, since it partnered with Rupert 
Murdoch’s NewsCorp in 2012, but they are also beginning to downsize.791 
The staggering growth of Afghanistan’s media has been one of the more tangible 
signs of progress in an otherwise frustrating decade. It has modernized the Afghan people 
in the same way that is first newspaper, Saraj-al-Akhbar, tried to do in 1906. But the 
news media is not detached from politics. This is a patron-based media system that 
heavily depends on powerful people who want to bend the country in their direction. In 
this way, it vividly reflects the underlying power structures of the country and how 
fragile Afghanistan’s democracy is.   
Positively, the media has begun to transform how the Afghan public relates to 
information. The media makes information accessible to anyone, and no longer just a 
privileged few. But there are thick cultural norms about who deserves knowledge and 
information and who do not. Afghan’s most powerful officials, businessmen, drug lords 
and warlords largely do not respect Afghan journalists and expect them to be deferential 
to their varying objectives. Afghan journalists therefore have difficulty accessing them 
for interviews and are hesitant to investigate them for fear of shaming their honor, or, 







CHAPTER 8. Optimistic, But Uncertain: The Afghan Journalist Experience 
 
 
During the summers of 2010 and 2012, I interviewed 30 journalists in Kabul, the 
majority of whom work for elite Afghan news organizations that are perceived as 
“independent” or “free” and either had, or aspired to have, U.S. funding. Their consensus 
on many issues – even over the course of two years – was strong, almost uniform. They 
believe in the principles of a free press in a democratic society and are proud of what they 
have accomplished. Yet they are not operating in an open society. They face many 
barriers in reporting and investigating the news, and often feel powerless in doing so 
without support from Western governments and news organizations.   
The lack of variance between these print and broadcast reporters is not that 
surprising, however, as the elite news media community in Afghanistan is small and 
generally progressive. I chose to speak with them, however, because the Afghan public 
places a large amount of trust in their news organizations and they are more popular the 
warlord, Iran-sponsored or Afghan government channels. Their attitudes towards 
reportage and editorializing therefore have a considerable impact on Afghan public 
perceptions.  
When I asked them about the growth of Afghan media since 2002, they 
consistently replied that they were proud of their collective contribution to Afghanistan’s 
democracy and civil society. However, they were critical of their faults. These included a 
lack of skill among young and uneducated journalists; a weak media market that 
discouraged independent journalism; and frequent self-censorship due to threats of 
violence from Afghan officials, warlords, the Taliban or other extremists. While they felt 




they admitted that they depend on the West, especially America, for material support.792 
They also depend greatly on U.S. news organizations for content, and moral support.  
They take their cues on news from American elite newspapers on what to report about the 
U.S.-led war and the Afghan government. Parsa, a television broadcaster explained: 
“Generally, if the international community wants Afghanistan to have free media and free 
speech after 2014 then their aid to Afghan media must continue. Otherwise, it will be 
very difficult to survive…And American journalists should stay to report this news 
Afghan journalists cannot.”793 
 
Afghanistan Has ‘Too Much Media’  
 
The growth of news media in Afghanistan the past decade has been stunning, the 
journalists agreed, especially for a society long denied access to information.794 Many 
journalists marveled at how Afghan news organizations were now competitive with 
international broadcast stations like the BBC’s Persian and Pashto services and Voice of 
America, both of which were the only alternative to Afghan government or 
warlord/mujahadeen news for decades.795  There are now roughly 10,000 journalists in 
Afghanistan who report for Afghan audiences, broadcasters Sina and said.796  Technically, 
the public no longer needs Western channels for information, but the Afghan journalists 
made clear that they still need the West to fortify their work.  
While they agreed that a viable, professional, free news media is unprecedented, 
some journalists said that there was too much media right now in Afghanistan. The 




and radio stations were born from various non-governmental organizations and aid 
agencies’ short-term projects. The dozens of television and hundreds of radio stations 
creates an unruly media system that fragments Afghan audiences into different political 
allegiances, they concurred. Yet Farzin, a print journalist, pointed out that Afghanistan’s 
media is likely the single most important indicator that there is democracy in the country:   
I don’t see democracy anywhere else. I don’t see it on the streets, but I see it the 
TV. When some jerk Taliban talking on the TV and calling Mullah Omar His 
Excellency, to me that is democracy. On one hand I hate that guy and that he is 




In this way, the broad news media reflects Afghanistan’s complex society and the various 
factions, including the Taliban, that are vying for its control. Afghanistan’s extreme 
politics surface in the media as many journalists, producers and owners try to present 
what they see reality as to the public.   
 
The Agenda Setters: U.S.-Sponsored Channels The Most Popular  
 
 
Within this crowded media environment, there are two news organizations that 
the journalists widely perceived to be agenda-setters. Both are broadcast stations either 
subsidized or directly funded by the U.S. government. The first is Moby Media Group’s 
Tolo TV, which the journalists perceived to be the most-watched and most-influential 
television station. The second is Radio Azadi (“Radio Liberty”), the Dari-language 
branch of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, funded completely by the U.S. Broadcasting 




comparably large impact on the local Afghan news agenda, more so than the BBC, which 
was previously the most listened-to radio station during the Taliban years.798  
Tolo TV’s launch in 2004 began the “golden time” for Afghan media, Jawid, a 
print journalist, said. “That’s when all the media changed – everything changed.” Until 
then, the only other private station was Dostum’s Aina TV in the north, which had been 
the first warlord station. But with Tolo, Jawid continued, “people could trust journalism” 
because it was reported by Afghans, not foreigners. The broadcasters weren’t afraid to 
talk, he said, and they inspired Afghans to speak up and express their minds.799 Farzin, a 
print journalist, agreed, saying that Tolo has “institutionalized free media here in a 
professional way.”800 Tolo is known as “the BBC of Afghanistan, as the CNN of 
Afghanistan, as the New York Times of Afghanistan,” agreed Aalem. “It is the leading 
agenda setter in the country.”801  
The journalists also deem Radio Azadi to be an agenda-setter for Afghan national 
news because so much of its content is picked up and relayed through other news 
organizations.802 The fact that it is a U.S. government sponsored news station is lost on 
many Afghans, since its name is Dari-sounding. Many of the journalists also emphasized 
that the U.S. funded the other most popular news agencies, such as Channel One, 
Shamshad TV and the Pajhwok newswire, which had a subscription base that catered to a 
third of the Afghan media (93 radio stations, 13 television stations, and 15 daily 
newspapers).803  Because of this competition, the journalists did not believe that Tolo TV 
would endure as Afghanistan’s most-popular station. The above stations, they said, were 
bound to grow in popularity, as would the independently funded Ariana TV and other 




the assumption that Western support for these news organizations, and for Afghanistan’s 
civil society, would continue after 2014. This is far from certain.  
 
Media Ownership: Government, Political and Free Media All Have Agendas  
 
While there is no decisive account of who owns which news organization, the 
journalists had strong opinions on what news outlets were in business to advance truth 
and which ones were advancing the interests of political and foreign actors. Like most 
surveys on Afghan public opinion, the journalists believed that the Western donors 
contributed to free media, while Iran, Pakistan and warlords had more subversive 
intentions for an Afghan, democratic society.  
The Afghan journalists largely agreed that there were three types of media in 
Afghanistan: governmental, political and free (or independent).805  Governmental 
includes Radio Television Afghanistan, Bakhtar News Agency and government-
sponsored newspapers; political media is funded by warlords, Iran and Pakistan; and free 
is media backed by the West, or other countries that have “common democratic values” 
like Korea and Japan, and “is transparent about their intentions” (Note: When Afghan 
journalists discussed “the west” they often clarified that they meant the United States, 
because the United States leads the NATO coalition of western countries).806 The general 
sense with these journalists was that the U.S. is supporting Afghanistan’s democracy, 
while Pakistan and India were trying to manipulate it.807  The U.S. and U.K., while they 
were sponsoring less news outlets than Iran and Pakistan, were also sponsoring the most 




The journalists were most worried about Iran-sponsored media, which they said 
increased sharply in 2009.809 “Iranians are culturally invading Afghanistan,” Sina, a 
broadcaster, said, and others estimated that Iran affects at least 50 percent of the Afghan 
media.810 The cultural section of the Iranian embassy in Kabul frequently reaches out to 
Afghan journalists either to pay them for positive coverage or to buy Afghan media 
organizations.811 It is easy to detect if a newspaper or broadcast station is backed by Iran, 
some pointed out, because it discusses Israel and Palestine; celebrates Iranian figures like 
Ayatollah Khomeini; and often repeats verbatim coverage in the Iranian state-sponsored 
newswire, Fars.812 They also espouse anti-American conspiracy theories about U.S. 
intentions to steal Afghanistan’s mineral wealth and criticize the 2012 U.S.-Afghan 
Strategic Partnership Framework that commits the U.S. to a long-term presence in 
Afghanistan.813 Iran is encroaching the Afghan public space with the Persian language (of 
which Dari is a dialect), culture, and the Shi’ite doctrine so that it can have more control 
in South Asia than the United States.   
Houshmand, a radio broadcaster, called Iranian-backed stations “rented buses”: 
They move along news stories that promote the kind of weak, pro-Iranian Afghanistan 
that Iran wants.814 Yet Khaleeq, a broadcaster, countered that Iran-supported stations were 
not such a big problem. Tolo, which is U.S.-supported, dominates half the media’s 
market share, he explained. “There are pockets of people who watch those stations, but 
their influence is not pervasive. And, as long as they remain this way, they will not be 
able to grow or expand their influence.”815  Iran’s efforts to bend the Afghan public its 




The majority of the journalists were also concerned about the impact warlord 
media on the Afghan public.816  In 2008, they said that warlord-funded stations began to 
proliferate, as they saw having their own television station as a certain status symbol.817 
The warlords had profited from the U.S.-led war and could afford to wield their influence 
through a free media system. Sarwar explained, “You can’t be a self respecting warlord 
these days in Afghanistan without owning a TV station.”818 The sense among the 
warlords, many agreed, was that if you didn’t have your own TV channel, you didn’t 
have a future in Afghan politics and television was a new tool to maintain power.819  
Warlord media is merely an extension of the influence warlords waged for decades 
through brutal force. They are either transparently running the stations, or are supporting 
them from behind the scenes.820 Like he did with Iran-sponsored media, Khaleeq said that 
warlord media was not that alarming. In fact, it’s almost encouraging: “The fact that they 
shifted from an attitude of launching rockets and bombs to criticizing each other within a 
democratic framework – that’s a big change.”821  
The majority of the journalists agreed, however, that the Iranians and warlords 
were taking advantage of the free media landscape and promoting toxic ideas that would 
keep the Afghan public suppressed and manipulated instead of empowered. They were 
concerned that the Afghan public would ultimately lose trust in the media all together 
because of this, including the independent, albeit Western-backed, journalism they were 
promoting. The journalists have real reason to be concerned since U.S. money in 
Afghanistan is subject to fickle politics and an exhausted American public that does not 





 Majority of Journalists Ambivalent About Professional Norms 
 
 
While the Afghan journalists want Western support for their work, they largely see 
their peers as being ambivalent about professional journalistic norms. 822 Yet their 
awareness of this lack of professionalism reflects the fact that they aspire to be more 
professional and know the kind of serious journalism they should be delivering. They 
want to emulate a Western-style press that is open, objective and socially responsible. 
They realize, however, that independent journalism wasn’t a profession until 2002. They 
and their peers still have a great deal to learn and new habits to form to nullify the ones 
they accumulated from decades of authoritarianism. These habits were mainly to not 
question authority, and don’t disrespect elders or the powerful.   
At least half of the journalists I interviewed claimed to have received professional 
training either during time they spent as refugees in Iran or Pakistan or working as 
journalists in Afghanistan before 1996, and they believed they were qualified to be critics 
of their colleagues. They emphasized that while they have dramatically improved since 
2002, most journalists are immature, under-educated and ill equipped to investigate and 
report information in a complex and dangerous environment. Behnam said bluntly that 
Afghan journalism does not include analysis and is devoid of “professionalism, curiosity, 
critical thinking, love and passion for reporting truth.”823 The journalists also, however, 
admitted that they hold their own biases and are influenced by the donors who sponsor 
them (in this case, Western), their ethnic groups, their political culture and the security 
situation. They often compare themselves to their Western peers and feel somewhat 




Afghan journalism is largely imbalanced, partial and inaccurate, the journalists 
told me. They are mainly competing with each other to break news and often offer wrong 
information. If Afghan journalists do first report something erroneous they will not 
acknowledge or apologize for it, they said.824 Much of their incorrect news coverage is 
because they accept much information at face value. Plus, in Afghan society, Mansoor 
emphasized, the sources journalists turn to for information can be dubious; they use 
journalists to settle scores. Afghan journalists do not have enough training, or time, to 
investigate the reality of the situation. Often journalists think that to be fair, they need to 
give equal time to insurgents and government officials and provide a “he said, she said” 
frame.825 Delewar complained that this was not socially responsible, as it showed the 
public that the Taliban was just as important as the Afghan government.  
Many agreed that Afghan news was becoming more objective, and therefore 
professional, than it had in the past decade. But neither print nor broadcast mediums were 
doing a good job at distinguishing between news and opinion, they said. 826 For instance, 
with print publications, an editorial will often be on the front page of the paper, mixed in 
with news and not sequestered in its own separate section.827 Television stations, too, 
were not clearly discriminating between news and opinion, the journalists agreed.828   
What makes an issue or an event newsworthy, too, is often elusive for Afghan 
journalists. This is clearly an effect of their authoritarian past, in which only the 
government’s actions and words made news. Today, the Afghan journalists agreed, will 
often cover whatever officials or politicians tell them to during press conferences and 
official events.829 This is a habit from decades of a closed society, explained Mansoor, a 




government line as news. 830 There is no curiosity, either, Khaleeq emphasized. 
Journalists often stay long enough at press conferences to get one quote from an official, 
and then leave.831 Sometimes, Badi, Hakim and Ghazanfar, explained, Afghan journalists 
will show up to official events to show their peers that they were there, but then steal 
their peers’ content.832 Hakim, a print journalist, said his colleagues often attend a press 
conference, only to return and say that they did not know what happened at it. Unless 
they are told exactly what to report, they cannot identify what is interesting or 
newsworthy.  
The lack of original or investigative reporting means that Afghan journalism is “very 
soft,” Sarwar, a broadcaster, explained. But some journalists are optimistic that this is 
changing.833 For instance, Channel One is shifting from event-based reporting to 
investigative reporting, Farhand explained. One recent story revealed that the Karzai 
administration keeps 110 advisors on its payroll who get full salaries and benefits like 
cars and bodyguards. But only 10 of them met with Karzai anytime in 2011.834 Another 
news agency that’s been focused on investigating reporting is the newspaper Hashti Sobh 
(8am) that targets Afghanistan’s elites – Ministers of Parliament, government officials, 
students and teachers, civil society leaders, NGO workers – hoping to bring change.835 
They have reported on corruption within Kabul city.  
 
Afghan Journalists are Young, Uneducated, and Desensitized 
 
There are several reasons why the Afghan news system is lacking in 




superficial media training, and they care more about the paycheck than the act of public 
service. They are also just beginning to learn about the modern standards for a 
democratic society and journalism ethics, and to identify what news is beyond what the 
Afghan government says it is. They are caught between the habits of an authoritarian 
society that does not hold their government officials and other powerful figures 
accountable, and a modern democratic society where they should. Therefore, the majority 
of Afghan journalists are ambivalent toward the responsibilities of their profession.     
Many of those interviewed said that most Afghan journalists were in their early 
20s and have very little professional experience.836 At Tolo, for instance, the majority of 
the presenters and staff are 25 years old or younger. “Kids are running it,” Babur, a 
television broadcaster, said bluntly. But it’s not just Tolo and its sister stations, other 
broadcast networks just as Channel One, Ariana, Radio Azadi and Shamshad attract 
young talent.837 While this generation can pour energy into their work, they often have 
short attention spans when it comes to following and developing news stories.838 Like in 
Pakistan, some also question if the young journalists are attracted to media for paychecks 
and celebrity more than for producing quality information.839 Behnam, a print journalist, 
offered: “For Afghan youth, it’s more about having a job than a passion and love for 
journalism. The ones who work for television just want to be on TV and be famous.”840 
As a result, the journalists agreed, the majority of the news media is very shallow as the 
younger journalists do not try to deepen their knowledge on a topic through reading 
books or outside sources.841  
A majority of Afghan journalists also do not have much education to guide them. 




equivalent of a twelfth-grade education, Sina, a broadcast journalist emphasized.842 This 
is understandable, said Abdullah, since 90 percent of the Afghan population has access 
only to very primary level education.843 But even for those who receive a higher 
education, the university system has not been able to sufficiently train a new generation 
of journalists to think critically. Kabul University, the premier higher education facility in 
the country, has a faculty of journalism that has certainly expanded in size, but it focuses 
on technical training.  Its curriculum is more than 60 years old, many of the journalists 
stressed.844  Students learn from Soviet and Iranian journalism textbooks, which do not 
prepare students for a modern, open media system in a democratic society. As a result, 
many young journalists learn to adhere to authoritarian-style reporting, automatically 
giving credence to whatever official voices tell them.845 
The best training happens on the job, the journalists said. But that’s not always 
enough.846  Some of Afghanistan’s reporters learned the craft by working with Western 
journalists. For instance, Houshmand originally thought that being a journalist meant 
serving as a government mouthpiece. But in 2003, he began working for a Western news 
organization in Kabul and said he learned to be a skeptic, to not write any story without 
three sources, and to not fear challenging power.847 Even if Afghan journalists do not 
work directly with Western news agencies as he did, many get the opportunity to receive 
long and short-term training on global journalism standards by Western news institutions 
in France, Germany, Hong Kong and the United States.848 
There is no shortage of journalism training programs open to Afghan journalists. 
Even inside the country, international media development organizations, such as 




problem. The problem is that they are often short-term and ad hoc. As a result, Afghan 
journalists can collect dozens of certificates from one-day, two-day or weeklong training 
sessions and still fail to learn the fundamentals of journalism. Yet these trainings inflate 
journalists’ sense that they are already professional while simultaneously rewarding them 
for failing to focus on long-term stories or to develop specialized knowledge. 849 
Journalists normally leave these programs knowing that, to be professional, they must be 
objective and balanced, but they have no real understanding of what that means and can 
be ambivalent about them in practice. 
Another reason why journalists cannot identify news stories beyond the 
government is because they have become desensitized to their surroundings. Matteen, 
another print journalist, explained: “War has made Afghan journalists numb about 
tragedy and incompetence,” he said, and they often cannot recognize a news story until a 
Western agency introduces it. For instance, 2012 was a Summer Olympics year and the 
stadium in Kabul where Afghan athletes, including women, trained was once the location 
for Taliban public executions. But they did not see this remarkable fact as news. It was 
only when Reuters reported the December 15, 2011 article “Taliban Death Stadium 
Reborn as Afghan Sporting Hope” that Afghan journalists saw the space as a story.850 As 
will be explored in the next chapter, the majority of Afghan journalists follow the news 





Afghan News is About Security and Their Government, But With Some Hope 
 
Afghan news is dominated by the volatile security situation in parts of the country, 
the journalists agreed, and revolves around the Afghan government’s words and 
actions.851 But even though fighting and attacks are regularly part of the news, the Afghan 
journalists insisted that they frame it differently, more positively, than Western media.  
Afghan journalists are more likely to highlight Afghan bravery and resilience in the 
face of bloodshed than the violent act itself. For instance, in June 2010, a significant news 
story was the Peace Jirga, an attempt by the Karzai administration to begin negotiations 
with the Taliban.852  The jirga, or grand assembly, attracted hundreds of tribal 
representatives to Kabul to discuss reconciliation, but the Taliban leadership did not 
attend. On the jirga’s first day, two Taliban fighters dressed as women in burkas and 
detonated suicide bombs at the entrance, located half a mile away from the main tent 
where 2000 Afghan delegates were already gathered. Rockets were also fired 
haphazardly near the tent. No one except the suicide bombers, however, were killed. 
Mansoor, a print journalist, said that his news agency ran over 30 news stories in the 
course of three days about the jirga. One of them was about the 400 young Afghans who 
were involved in making the event possible and how not one jirga representative fled 
from the event after the Taliban attack.853 “When each rocket attack came, there was 
nobody scared from the jirga. What it showed was the strength of our people; they did not 
care that their lives were in danger,” Mansoor said.854  This enabled them to focus on the 
positive: young Afghans at work, trying to have a constructive impact on Afghan politics, 




Stories of hope matter deeply to the Afghan journalists interviewed, as they felt that 
too much reportage on politics and security could discourage the Afghan public. Many of 
those interviewed felt it was their responsibility to instill in Afghans some optimism and 
confidence that their country was improving and to educate them on their rights as 
citizens.855  “Afghanistan’s not a good place to live,” Sina explained. “But if you live here, 
you have to do something positive.” Journalists, he said, especially have a responsibility 
to bring about constructive change in Afghanistan.856 Sina’s broadcast news agency was 
created in part to advocate for Afghan human rights in the Pashtun areas that are the most 
afflicted with violence.857  He has brought influential figures from the Pashtun 
countryside to advocate for children and women’s rights in their communities, which he 
said had long been ignored on both the Afghan and Pakistani sides of the border.858 
Delawar, too, felt that his news agency’s mission was “to serve the interests of the people” 
and focus on human rights, a key component of democracy. 859  
Sports news reportage has also energized the public. In 2012, Tolo TV began the 
Afghan Premier League, with eight teams representing historically important places in 
Afghanistan, such as Kabul city, the Hindu Kush mountain range, and Maiwand – a town 
north of Kandahar where Afghans beat the British in the Second Anglo-Afghan War in 
1880.860 The teams are supposed to ignite a sense of Afghan modernity while also stirring 
pride in the nation. Also, in 2010, the Afghan cricket team began to have exceptional 
success, moving from number 130 in the world to number 10 in a matter of two years. 
Reporting on their journey from Afghanistan to worldly cities as it fought for the World 
Cup has helped broadcast stations tap into the Afghan public’s passion for sports; to 




ethnically and politically fragmented society.861 Sarwar said that when his broadcast 
station covered a cricket game, they received a voracious response from Afghan listeners. 
“Literally thousands of people called us to say how they were amazed by what they heard 
and to thank us for doing that.”862 It was, he said, when he realized that independent 
media, and not just Afghan government media, could unify the country.   
 
Afghan Independent Media’s Future is Good, If U.S. Stays Involved   
 
Despite overwhelming uncertainty, a majority of the Afghan journalists are cautiously 
optimistic that the media is moving in the right direction, as they predict more 
professional journalists and fewer – but higher-quality – news organizations will 
surface.863 However, this will take time. Afghanistan is a country in the midst of a 
transition from fundamentalist to democratic rule and is still at war. It is still deeply 
dependent on the West, especially the U.S., for money and security. In this way, what the 
U.S. government decides in terms of security assistance and funding for the media will 
strongly affect the course of the young Afghan press corps.   
If the U.S. government gave the Afghan news media the opportunity and space to 
grow, many of the journalists agreed that it would gradually become more streamlined 
and professional. Increased competition will eventually eliminate the most impartial, 
unprofessional news sources, many journalists argued,864 as Afghanistan doesn’t need 75 
television stations. It just needs five or six that resemble the Western-backed, yet more 
independent, Tolo or Channel One, or Ariana. Many trusted that the public would 




both broadcast journalists, thought it would likely take 10 to 15 more years before a 
professional, objective press corps emerged, and that this development would depend 
significantly on the trajectory of the democratic governance in the country – and on 
economic growth to enlarge the advertising market beyond its present $20 million a 
year.866  
A majority of the Afghan journalists interviewed, however, believe that the 
warlord, Afghan government, Iranian and Pakistani-sponsored media are much more 
likely to continue than the Western-sponsored press that they prefer and largely work 
for.867 Some thought that these news stations would increase in the immediate future – 
especially as the 2014 Afghan presidential election approaches.868  The election will be a 
harbinger for Afghanistan’s future. In anticipation of it, the political situation and Afghan 
government will likely fragment and multiple actors will work feverishly to promote their 
individual agendas on television, more so than they are today, some concurred.869 Unity is 
Afghanistan is fragile, Houshmand stated, and Iran, Pakistan and warlords may use the 
elections, a time of political contestation and divisiveness, to ignite hate.870 A minority of 
the journalists, however, thought that the partisan stations would not survive.871 Among 
them were Khaleeq and Mansoor, who saw the audience for warlord stations limited to 
their main supporters, unable to attract advertising dollars, and inconsequential to 
national public opinion.872  
The principle question is how much donor support – especially from the U.S. – 
will subside after 2014. The Afghan news media’s future hinges on the amount of 
financial support the U.S. provides for journalism training and subsidizing operational 




develop the market to support independent media for decades, and only if it does not 
collapse into civil war or fundamentalist rule. Currently, its economy is dependent on 
foreign assistance that injects direct aid and supports commerce, in addition to illegal 
drugs and agriculture. The latter two industries will endure without Western support, but 
they are unlikely to advertise their goods on radio or television.  
Among all the foreign benefactors, the U.S. and its Western allies’ support is 
because they do not tell news professionals what to report. It allows them to be free and 
independent. The West also provides this money transparently, unlike the Iranians and 
Pakistanis, Farhand emphasized.873 After 2014, when the U.S. mission considerably 
downsizes, the media will have less investment, less advertising, and there will be fewer 
training and education programs for journalists.874 Many journalists lamented that the U.S. 
was already decreasing media assistance after helping to convince Afghan society how 
important media was for the country’s overall, democratic development.875 It’s the West 
that “created this environment for us,” Babur said, “but they are not working actively to 
help sustain that environment.”876 U.S. support for the press was its strongest between 
2002 and 2006, but then it created a void for warlords and Iran to begin funding media, 
Delewar and Omaid believed.877 Even in 2012, the journalists were seeing the effects of 
the future drawdown.878 Tolo TV and Pajhwok, for instance, have already had to lay off 
many employees.879 
Afghan media freedoms depend mostly on whether or not there is adequate 
security and a stable environment within which they can report. Mitra, Jamshid and 
Houshmand agreed that if security improved, then the quality of Afghan news would 




of the West.880 If the Taliban return or a civil war erupts again, then the media will 
collapse. Yet not all Afghan journalists thought the independent media would cease once 
the U.S. disengaged from Afghanistan.881 Some of the journalists countered that Afghan 
journalists’ skills were already there, since many of the best ones were already working 
for Western news agencies as fixers and would remain in country. These journalists will 
work to strengthen Afghan journalism. Social media could also provide a channel for 
news and to connect Afghanistan to the international news arena. American news 
agencies may not have bureaus in Afghanistan anymore, but American journalists can be 
fed information through Twitter and Facebook, an optimistic Kambas said.882 While 
being a journalist in Afghanistan is difficult, he said, “It is up to us to take opportunities 
and rise to challenges. It is not easy, but we can do it.”883  
 
Afghan Public Sees News Media as Form of Justice  
 
Despite concerns about professionalism, news content, control by foreign and 
Afghan power brokers, and a declining U.S. presence, the Afghan journalists interviewed 
were adamant that news has great value for Afghan society—and that if the free news 
media continues to exist, then the demand for it will likely increase. Media have 
empowered the Afghan people. The principle of free speech in Afghanistan means that 
now people can know information about their government, their economy and their 
nation; it’s the media’s job to help them make sense of it. Many of the journalists said 




news system. Still, a multi-vocal media landscape, strongly influenced by power brokers, 
confuses matters.   
Most of the journalists pointed to The Asia Foundation’s 2011 survey of Afghan 
public opinion that said roughly 70 percent of the Afghan public trusts the Afghan 
media.884  In particular, they believe, television has democratized news in Afghanistan, 
making information accessible to most Afghan citizens. You no longer need to have a 
formal education to access news and information, Jabar pointed out, as one did before 
2002. With the press, he explained, the Afghan public, for the first time, can create their 
own philosophies of what it meant to be citizens, to form their own opinions and to share 
them. And now that the press extends beyond Kabul, that opportunity reaches millions of 
Afghans.885 Media, Sarwar said, “is crucial to democracy and teaching the public about its 
basic democratic values and human rights.” These issues are part of the national, public 
dialogue because of the media. 886 The Afghan people now know they deserve better and 
this has been a remarkable improvement. 
Afghanistan’s news media has also become a forum for justice for everyday 
Afghans, some of the journalists explained.887 Abdullah said his news organization 
regularly receives phone calls from citizens asking for help with their problems, or trying 
to show evidence of government corruption. The Afghan people, he said, believe that the 
press can “raise their voices and then media can put pressure on government” which is 
why they offer evidence of corruption at the district and provincial level to local and 
national journalists. This means government officials then have to take measures, and the 




reliable justice system, Abdullah explained, the media “has become a voice of the 
people.”888  
The journalists question, however, how much the free press can help their 
representative government progress, especially when it comes to the increasingly habitual 
practice of corruption. Journalists can steer the country in the right direction, Sarwar said, 
by reminding the Afghan public that they deserve competent, elected representatives, an 
independent judiciary and their human rights.889  But on corruption, Delewar said, “there 
are few places where the press can make a big impact.” 890  For now, Abdullah 
emphasized, the best way to work around a difficult relationship with the government 
was to maintain the trust of the people and to “prove to the people that our responsibility 
is to provide people with information without fearing anyone, or without biases.”891 If the 
press did not serve as watchdogs, Delewar said, Afghanistan would descend into chaos 
and anarchy.892  
This is true: The Afghan news media is providing a remarkable public service given 
the closed society Afghanistan a short decade ago. The news media has democratized 
information and shown everyday Afghans that they have a voice in their government. The 
problem, however, is that the democratically elected government does not care much for 
its press corps and pays them only minimal attention.  
 
Afghan Government Promotes Free Media, But Doesn’t Respect It 
 
President Hamid Karzai is the government’s most vocal supporter of free speech 




accomplishment.893  Many of the journalists agreed that they have much more freedom 
than journalists in neighboring Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, and China and that 
Karzai deserved credit for the absence of official censorship.894 The constitution and 
media law grants the journalists some protection when they criticize the Afghan 
government, and indeed some of those interviewed said they were free to criticize the 
government as they’d like.895 Yet Afghan media freedom is “not a very idealistic 
freedom,” Atash emphasized. “It’s not based on the same standards in Western societies. 
We have freedom based on our standards.”896  
Although freedom of speech is enshrined in the constitution and the Afghan 
president claims bragging rights for that, many of the journalists felt that Afghan 
government support was simply nominal: When it came to protecting journalists’ 
physical security and their rights, the government did not care.897 Journalists like 
Abdullah, Houshmand, Jamshid and Faisal all described occasions when they and their 
reporters were intimidated or arrested by government officials.898 By contrast, as 
Abdullah pointed out, American journalists feel safe with their government sources, and 
government officials feel safe with the journalists because they know they have a judicial 
system they can trust.899 In Afghanistan, government officials cannot protect journalists 
from warlords and the Taliban, which makes the journalists hesitate to investigate 
anything.900 “If you are an Afghan journalist and you do investigative work, you come 
back in a coffin,” Houshmand, a radio broadcaster, said.901 Despite the death of 22 
journalists in Afghanistan the past decade, no one has properly investigated how they 




As a result, investigative reports by the two leading – and free – television 
stations, Tolo and Channel One, will tread likely. Behnam, a print journalist, said, “No 
one investigates the education system in Afghanistan or how the mafia works here. No 
one looks at the financial system or our customs.” Channel One has increased its 
investigative news reporting, but it is “very safe,” Behnam said, and does not go after 
warlords, drug lords, corrupt businessmen or powerful Afghan officials.903 This is 
because investigative reporting can cause not just security problems for the reporters, but 
business problems for the owners. There is much reportage on security incidents, Babur 
emphasized, and Afghan journalists show much bravery in trying to cover them. But 
when it comes to reporting on corruption cases, the journalists feel more threatened 
because the Afghans who are targeted take it personally.904   
Afghan officials do not believe it is their job to communicate consistently with 
Afghan reporters. The Afghan government, with the U.S. government’s support, has 
invested in building architecture for press-state relations with dozens of press offices and 
spokespeople for various Afghan government ministries.905 The problem, many of the 
journalists concurred, is that the offices serve more as symbols than as forums for 
substantive discourse. 906 The Afghan Government Media and Information Center 
(GMIC), for instance, which was created with substantial U.S. support in 2007, was 
designed to make the officials more accessible to the media.907 But, over time, the 
officials working there have become less responsive.908  Even though they hold press 
conferences, these often consist of nothing more than the delivery of statements; officials 
rarely answer questions.909 Farhang gave the example of the 2012 Chicago NATO 




preparation for it, the Afghan government did not share their agenda with Afghan 
reporters, or brief them on it.910 And the fact that there are so many spokespeople actually 
limits journalists’ access to government information, Feda, a broadcast journalist, 
lamented. It makes reporting more difficult.911 Government officials, especially the 
President’s spokesman, largely have very little to say and do not explain much to Afghan 
journalists.912  This is frustrating, many journalists agreed, because Afghan journalists 
have improved their capacity during the past decade and deserve to be treated with 
respect.913  
There was broad consensus among the journalists interviewed that Afghan 
government officials, especially President Karzai and members of his cabinet, simply 
don’t respect the press. Afghan officials and reporters have yet to settle into a 
constructive dynamic where information from the government is routinely purveyed, and 
the journalists routinely question it. For instance, when there is breaking news, the 
presidential palace press office is the last place you turn to, Houshmand said, because 
they offer no enlightening information.914 Abdullah and Ghazanfar explained that they 
often feel lied to and because government officials need a job, they are not likely to 
disclose the truth or make themselves readily available to the Afghan media.915 Fazia 
agreed that the Afghan government is not listening at all to the Afghan press and often 
sees journalists as their enemy.916  Kambas, a broadcaster, concurred: “The Afghan 
government allows you to criticize as much as you want, but they ignore it. There is even 
a saying popular with journalists that the government says, ‘Say what you want, we do 




Afghan officials also rarely participate in Afghan television or radio talk shows. 
When they are asked to participate in roundtables, they often insist on granting exclusive, 
one on one interviews.918  Access to Karzai is especially tight: In the past decade, the 
president has only given three or four interviews to Afghan news stations.919  In 2004, 
when Tolo originally launched and did not yet have a reputation, Karzai granted them an 
interview, but he has not done so since as he believes them to be against this 
administration.920 The few interviews Karzai has granted to Afghan news stations include 
one with Barhanuddin Rabbani’s Noor TV, after Rabbani was assassinated in September 
2011, and a 2012 roundtable interview with reporters from RTA, Ariana, Kabul News 
and Shamshad TV.921  
The Afghan government officials who do engage the press speak with news outlets 
that are either the most popular or the most deferential to government. Most journalists 
receive simple statements from government officials, and are not offered the opportunity 
to ask questions outside of press conferences.922 Much of the interaction, though, depends 
on the personality of the journalists and the officials and whether or not they trust each 
other.923  “If you are a journalist with good ties to an Afghan official, then you get better 
stories. And if you don’t, you’re treated like shit,” Farzin, a print journalist, said.924 
Morad, a radio broadcaster, agreed, “There is a bad habit in the Afghan government 
[outside of the presidential palace] with media, in that they only think of the famous 
media like Tolo or Channel One.” And sometimes, Mitra explained, the officials feel as if 
they are owed favorable coverage when they take the time to speak with journalists. 




Some of the Afghan journalists acknowledged that this limited interaction also 
has to do with the lack of professionalism in the news media. Afghan officials often do 
not trust Afghan journalists with information, believing that the latter do not have the 
skills to report accurately.926 Journalists often do not know how to conduct an interview 
professionally; instead, they use their time with official to vent their own views: When 
Afghan journalists ask officials a list of questions, half are complaints, or statements, 
according to Morad, a radio broadcaster.927 Even during press conferences, Ghazanfar 
agreed, journalists will stand up to complain, not question.928  
Yet this frustration with the government is in part an emotional reaction, an anger 
that they do not feel as if the government recognizes their value to society. The 
journalists operate in a dangerous reporting environment, and the government is reluctant 
to protect them.  
Journalists in Afghanistan have many powerful people to contend with: officials 
in the Afghan government; parliamentarians; warlords; the Taliban and other extremist 
factions; and the United States and other international state and non-state actors. At worst, 
they will threaten them physically; at best, they will cut off their access. As a result of 
security, economic or political reasons, there is a high degree of self-censorship. As the 
Afghan journalists see it, the practice protects lives and sustains the news agency as a 
business.929 But self-censorship is also rooted in Afghan culture, Atash explained. Afghan 
journalists are used to working within the boundaries of authoritarian societies. “There is 
a general belief [in the family and the tribe] that just a very select group of people should 
be informed, as too much freedom of information will interfere with security and 




technology, “but we still need time for getting to a point where we can stop self-
censorship.”931  
Despite this, journalists are keeping Afghan officials, politicians and warlords 
accountable, some insisted. Atash and Khaleeq have seen positive results when Afghan 
journalists reporting on corruption issues that arise within the Afghan parliament.932 
Ministers of Parliament are now more wary of the Afghan press, Khaleeq agreed, because 
corruption is rampant among them and the journalists can easily uncover it.933 The level 
of corruption in the government would be much higher if the press did not exist, he thinks. 
If it weren’t for the media and freedom of expression, there would not just be 10 times 
more corruption, he maintains, but also more warlordism; the Taliban would be more 
likely to return.934 Khaleeq, a radio broadcaster, agreed that the media has acted as an 
“agent of change to the extent that the government is afraid of media, warlords are afraid 
of media, Taliban are afraid of media, drug lords are afraid of media. The fact that this 
fear has come to their minds has made them more careful. The fact that they feel that fear 
– that in itself is a positive change.” 935 In this way, the Afghan news media is trying to 
consolidate the democratic achievements of freedom of expression and civil society.936  
Yet the group that is most savvy with the Afghan press is the group that is eager 
to take these freedoms away. The Taliban spokespeople are so sophisticated when it 
comes to breaking news, the journalists largely agreed, that the Afghan government 
should be embarrassed.937 The Taliban is in closer contact with the media than Afghan 
government officials are. 938 When an attack takes place, journalists often get phone calls 
from the Taliban to take credit for it, but “From the government’s side you have to wait 




spokesman to talk,” Mitra, a print journalist, said. 939 While it’s difficult to get the 
Defense Minister or Interior Minister to talk about casualties, the Taliban spokesman are 
eager to give their versions of the story because they want to get as much news credit as 
possible for their violent acts.940 It is unfortunate, he said, that the Taliban values the 
Afghan media more than ISAF/NATO, the Western embassies and the Afghan 
government do.941 
 But Mitra and other journalist recognize that the Taliban communicate with the 
media on their own terms. Afghan journalists feel threatened to manipulate news in the 
Taliban’s favor.942  The Taliban regularly harass Afghan journalists and pressure them to 
run their side of the story. “They will release a statement, and then call to ask why we are 
not releasing it right away. They do not understand that we are not their mouthpieces, that 
we need to have some balance,” Morad, a radio broadcast journalist said.943  But the 
capacity of Taliban spokespeople to appear as polished media professionals, Ghazanfar 
said, is still chilling. “The Taliban have very professional media people who are much, 
much better than the government in terms of their efficiency, in terms of their hard 
work.”944 They are polite; they use perfect English in press releases; their website has a 
complete summary of news for the week, a summary that they also e-mail to journalists; 
and they refer to the journalists as “sir” and ask them about their families. The Afghan 
government, on the other hand, cannot convey their messages with such efficiency.945  
 
*** 




The journalists who work for “free” news organizations know they must hold 
power accountable, yet feel consistently vulnerable to power not just from the Afghan 
government but the militia leaders and powerbrokers that remain. The media landscape 
also reflects the balance of power in the country. Power comes in many forms: 
Americans and Westerners; Pakistanis; Iranians; Afghan government officials; unofficial 
warlords and their militias; Taliban members; other extremists. All of them want the 
media to reflect their agendas for Afghanistan and shape it through funding; withholding 
or granting access; and/or making threats. If they work for an Afghan government, 
warlord or Iran-sponsored news organization, then they may know that that the funding 
will continue. Yet if they work for a broadcast station that is considered “free,” then they 
are concerned about the flow of funding for their news organization and whether or not 
they will keep their job.  
Afghans feel powerless in making choices that will meaningfully change their 
lives.946 They operate within a new, post-9/11 normal of warlord television, Taliban 
public relations professionals, pay offs from the Iranian government, the disdain of 
Afghan officials and the flickering hope from Western governments who wanted to build 




 CHAPTER 9. ‘We Can’t Do This Alone’: Afghan Journalists and America 
 
 
 To sum up:  Since Afghan news media have a long history of authoritarian control, 
since their independence is in its infancy, since U.S. troops are fighting a Taliban 
insurgency, and since the Afghan government is deeply dependent on the United States 
for funding. Yet Afghan journalists also steadily rely on U.S. news about Afghanistan for 
both content and moral support. They look to it because the Afghan government deems it 
to be important, and they study it closely. For these journalists, U.S. news also provides a 
window on a U.S. government that – because more than 100,000 U.S. troops are 
stationed in the country and billions of U.S. dollars flood the Afghan economy – affects 
Afghans’ daily lives. As we have seen, they have a generally weak relationship with 
Afghan government officials. But Afghan journalists also have little, if any, relationship 
with U.S. government officials.  They see American news as primary source material for 
relaying facts. But they also, however, look to it for insight on their government through 
investigative reports and analysis.  
A majority of the journalists told me that they turn to American news agencies to 
understand the war and the larger diplomatic game surrounding it: What's going on in 
Washington, and what is the relationship between President Hamid Karzai and the U.S. 
administration. Given that there are no Afghan journalists reporting from Washington, 
understanding what the U.S. government is deciding on the Afghan people’s behalf is an 
immense challenge. The most ready source of information, and inference, is news articles 




But Afghan journalists also rely on U.S. news for investigative reporting and 
analysis on the Afghan government and various power brokers in the country. American 
journalists have much greater access to Afghan government officials than Afghan 
journalists do. And U.S. elite news about Afghanistan is often relayed in Afghan news: 
The U.S. press sets the agenda for Afghan news on issues about the war, the United 
States, the region – and often the Afghan government. Therefore, American reporters are 
not just informing Americans, but speaking to a second, unintended audience: the Afghan 
people.  
 
American News is a Lifeline for Afghan Journalists 
 
Elite Afghan journalists develop their perceptions of the United States from 
American newspapers and television agencies, mostly through the Internet. The Afghan 
journalists’ newsgathering routines differed, but they generally included looking daily to 
U.S. news online for information directly related to Afghanistan. But while U.S. news is 
valuable source material, the Afghan journalists repeatedly emphasized that they only 
used U.S. news about Afghanistan, Pakistan or the larger South Asia region. Afghan 
journalists are not normally looking to cover America as a country, and therefore do not 
pay much attention to U.S. domestic news. Because the New York Times and Washington 
Post reported on South Asia more than other U.S.-based news organizations, the 





 The Afghan media professionals have looked to elite U.S. news since 2002, but 
they especially found the influx of U.S. news in 2009, indexed to President Obama’s 
decision to increase the troop level and funding for the war, helpful in making sense of 
the U.S. government’s intentions.947 However, for news on local issues and Afghan 
culture—which the U.S. press, they said, do not care about—then Afghan journalists 
provide more through and accurate reportage. It’s not just U.S. news, however, that 
Afghan journalists look to for source material. They also closely monitor reports from 
U.S. think tanks such as Brookings, the Council on Foreign Relations and the 
International Crisis Group.948  
Afghan journalists are accustomed to reading the New York Times, mostly, 
because of its consistent presence in Afghanistan since the September 11th attacks, 
followed by the Washington Post. The Wall Street Journal and Los Angeles Times come 
in a distant third and fourth.949 Other journalists also said that they rely on the Associated 
Press, and magazines like Time and Newsweek.950 But if you want to know what U.S. 
government attitudes are toward Afghanistan, they said, you go to the Post or Times. This 
is because U.S. government officials leak information to them and protect them. They can 
say what Afghan reporters are afraid to say.951 
Some of the Afghan journalists also look to U.S. broadcast news for information. 
They include the online websites for CNN, NBC, CBS and ABC.952 Several of the 
journalists mentioned that they occasionally follow Fox News to get a sense of 
conservative voices in the United States, and the opposition view to President Obama’s 
administration. They uniformly feel, however, that Fox News gives poor and narrow 




While ordinary Afghans do not directly seek out U.S. news sources on their own, 
Delewar said, the U.S. elite news is cited so regularly by Afghan news that they “get to 
know the New York Times and Washington Post,” that way.954 Directly and indirectly, it 
is from American media that the Afghan public learns about the war, regional diplomacy, 
and their own Afghan government and warlords. When it comes to minor issues, the 
Afghan media sets the news agenda; but for larger issues at the national or regional level, 
the western – mainly, the American – press sets the agenda.955 Even news reports on 
debates about Afghanistan and Pakistan within Washington, think tank reports and 
opinion articles that matter only to the wonky policy community in the U.S. make their 
way back to Afghanistan.956 Both the independent, elite Afghan press and the Afghan 
government are fixated on American news about them.  
 
U.S. News Matters to Afghans Because It Matters to the Afghan Government 
 
 President Hamid Karzai is much more concerned with what elite Wesrern news 
media, especially the New York Times and Washington Post, thinks about him, than what 
the Afghan media does.957 Officials in his palace, and his administration at large, also 
focus their attention on American and Western news about Afghanistan.958 They are 
likely to respond quickly to requests from American (or British) reporters, but will let 
Afghan reporters’ requests lapse. The U.S. elite news media offers them international 
prestige, which they cannot acquire with the Afghan news media, many journalists 
agreed.959 “Nobody here takes the Afghan media seriously,” Faisel said, and he and his 




Post, New York Times or Wall Street Journal, Babur explained, “then all the world is 
reading about them.” If they just want to speak to Afghans, they go to Afghan news – if 
they want to speak with both Afghans and the world, then they go to American news.961 
Afghan officials trust that American reporters are more professional than Afghan 
reporters and therefore trust them to represent them responsibly, the journalists 
conceded.962 According to Aalem, Afghan officials go to journalists from the Times and 
Post because they keep off-the-record interviews as off-the-record and they do not 
fabricate or modify quotes.963 The complexity of the political situation and the patron-
based media means the most neutral medium for Afghan ministers is the international 
media, because they know their biases are blatantly toward their respective countries and 
not to a particular Afghan faction.  
This is also tied to the belief that the U.S. news media is closely aligned with the 
U.S. government. The Afghan journalists strongly agreed that Karzai sees the U.S. press 
as a proxy for American government officials. Afghan officials therefore want to speak 
directly to President Obama and American politicians through the media. This is a 
reasonable strategy. If the Afghan government wants action, then they need the support 
of the U.S. government, and the U.S. press is an effective conduit. In sum, Jamshid 
argued, the “Afghan government criticizes western media and western media criticizes 
the Afghan government…The Afghan government criticizes the western media because it 
thinks the western media has great influence on the US government.”964 It is true that 
American officials and the public read the news, but its influence on government policy 




Nevertheless, since Afghan officials receive money and a sense of legitimacy 
from the United States, they are keenly sensitive to negative U.S. news.965 Afghan 
officials and President Karzai are becoming more annoyed with elite U.S. news coverage 
of Afghanistan, especially the New York Times.966  As American news organizations 
publish more investigative stories on the Afghan government and President Karzai’s 
family, Afghan officials restrict their access.967 The Karzai administration also blames the 
American media for projecting a hopeless image of Afghanistan, and for doing so with 
the U.S. government’s encouragement.968 The same is true for the U.K. government and 
British news. In fall 2009, at the height of accusations of election fraud, Karzai told a 
gathering that the New York Times, the BBC, The Times of London and CNN “know the 
election was right, but on a daily basis they are call me a fraudulent president in order to 
pressure me.”969 And, more recently, in October and November 2012, Karzai told press 
conferences that the American media was waging a “psychological war” against 
Afghanistan, one in which it was fixing the minds of the global public that Afghanistan’s 
economy would collapse, and civil war and the Taliban would return once U.S. troops 
leave.970 They were doing so, he hinted, because the American press and government 
together wanted to pressure him publicly.  
As long as the U.S. government is heavily involved in Afghanistan, the Afghan 
government will be fixated with U.S. news media attitudes towards them. One value of 
the U.S. news media for Afghan journalists is that it provides the most plausible evidence 
of the American government’s intentions toward Afghanistan. They share in the idea that 




American Journalists Give an Insider Look at U.S. Government 
 
The American news media has significant sway over the U.S. government and 
public, the journalists agreed, and U.S. reporters and officials regularly work together to 
press-gang the Afghan government to change their behavior.971 According to them, 
American journalists are credible purveyors of information on what U.S. government 
officials think and say, though not necessarily credible watchdogs. Like in Pakistan, most 
of the journalists admire the adversarial role American journalists play in the U.S. when it 
comes to domestic issues, but think they do not challenge the U.S. government on 
international issues, and certainly not Afghanistan.972  When it comes to covering U.S. 
foreign policy in Afghanistan, as Houshmand put it, “American journalists are more 
American than they are journalists” and they want the U.S. government to succeed.973  
While American journalists might challenge their government slightly on its 
policy toward Afghanistan, they don’t go far enough. Farzin, for example, thought that 
the U.S. press was an outright extension of the U.S. government: “CNN is run by the CIA 
and the New York Times is run by the White House,” he said.974 The other journalists had 
less extreme ideas of U.S. media and government collusion, but agreed that U.S. 
journalists normally support U.S. foreign policy goals.975 For instance, the U.S. press, 
Sarwar said, “reflects conventional wisdom in Washington” and largely serves as the 
voice of the U.S. government on the Afghanistan war.976 Jamshid agreed that most 
Afghans assume that the U.S. media and government make up one unit. You can tell their 
closeness, especially, when U.S. government officials come to Afghanistan and only 




Jamshid asked? “Why would they come all the way to Afghanistan to speak with other 
Americans?” American journalists also reserve their harshest criticism for President 
Karzai, Delawar echoed.978 As an example, Houshmand talked about one of the U.S.’s 
most colorful diplomats, the late Richard Holbrooke, who was the U.S. Special Envoy to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2009 until his death in December 2010: “U.S. journalists 
often call Karzai emotional but, they would call Richard Holbrooke a hero,” he said.979 
When it comes to foreign policy, the American news media had only one stance—
and that was the U.S. government’s stance, Aalem insisted.980 Some journalists might 
align themselves with the State Department and others with the Defense Department, but 
both government agencies give them instruction – not only guidance – on what to report 
and how to report it in order to advance the U.S. agenda.981 What makes U.S. news 
“credible,” and the reason why Afghan journalists use it, is that it affords an authentic, 
intimate look at the United States government.982  
U.S. government officials have especially controlled the American news agenda 
on international affairs since the September 11th attacks and the launch of the 2003 Iraq 
War, Atash and Jabar insisted.983 The U.S. news media, like the U.S. government, ignored 
Afghanistan once the Iraq War started in 2003. The U.S. government had determined 
Afghanistan to be a success story, but fighting continued and the Taliban re-emerged in 
several parts of the country. The lack of media attention to Afghanistan, Jabar argued, 
contributed to Afghanistan’s deteriorating state. This did not mean that the security 
situation in Afghanistan worsened in 2009, once Obama was elected president, but that 
the American media finally started paying attention to the country: “Things hadn’t been 




coverage. You’ve seen fighting increase, but that’s because there was less coverage of it 
before.”984 Americans, in Jabar and Atash’s view, suddenly know more about 
Afghanistan because the U.S. president cared about the country, and the American media 
followed the U.S. government’s lead.985 This U.S. government is the agenda-setter for 
U.S. foreign news. 
As in Pakistan, U.S. news articles about Afghanistan can often provoke suspicion 
among the Afghan journalists. Many agree with Karzai that American reporters want to 
work with U.S. officials to damage his reputation, especially when stories about Ahmed 
Wali Karzai, the president’s now-decreased brother, and his alleged corruption began to 
appear in the New York Times in 2008. “When they talk about corruption,” Atash, a print 
journalist argued, “there is a belief that they are trying to weaken the legitimacy of the 
Afghan government.”986 While the majority of the Afghan journalists did not dispute the 
accuracy of U.S. news reports on Ahmed Wali Karzai, they agreed with this notion.  
Roughly one third of the Afghan journalists interviewed, however, thought that 
while American journalists may share the goals of the American government to some 
extent, they are largely independent and critical of it.987 There are plenty of examples of 
scandals and investigation in the American media that challenge the U.S. government’s 
policy on Afghanistan, they said. One example cited was a 2011 article in the Wall Street 
Journal by Maria Abi-Habib about the gross neglect of the Dawood Military Hospital, 
which was under the control of American Lieutenant General William Caldwell.988 The 
neglect led to wounded Afghan soldiers dying of starvation and living with maggots in 
their wounds. Abi-Habib’s investigation had led to a Congressional inquiry on Caldwell’s 




can be valuable watchdogs. It is only when U.S. government officials leak information 
that serves as the journalist’s primary source material that officials can direct U.S. 
journalists what to say and when to say it.989 American journalists are not completely in 
step with U.S. foreign policy objectives, he maintains, although they [may] agree on the 
general direction of that policy and want to aid its progress with news reports.990 
The largest consensus is that even while the U.S. journalists may not always serve 
the U.S. government, they serve American society’s interests, and therefore the interests 
of the American nation.991 The American press is free, but it writes for Americans and 
naturally gravitates toward protecting U.S. economic and security interests around the 
world.992 Therefore, U.S. journalists are not necessarily trying to protect the U.S. 
government, but they are trying to protect U.S. national interests.993  
Afghanistan especially is in U.S. national interests, Kambas said, because of what 
happened on September 11th. Those attacks and the great loss of life that day is why so 
many U.S. journalists supported the Afghan war. But protecting American societal 
interests does not necessarily mean supporting the American government’s vision on how 
those societal interests should be protected.994 The Afghan journalists emphasized that 
American journalists report narrowly on U.S. actions in Afghanistan because their 
readership is primarily American, and American citizens have invested in the war 
through taxes and a volunteer military.995 “American journalists are on the side of 
American society; and they should be,” Jawid, a print journalist, stated.996 But there is “a 
very strong sense of nationalism in American reporting,” Khaleeq said, which can be 




Afghan journalists are also nationalistic. They see American news as largely pro-
American mostly because they are pro-Afghanistan. They react to American nationalism 
strongly because it triggers their pride in their nation, and their desire to see it perceived 
more positively. Yet there is a difference between having a certain worldview, and 
promoting a certain government agenda. The Afghan journalists were correct when they 
said that American journalists promote American national interests, but the two thirds 
who thought that U.S. journalists were actively advancing the U.S. agenda were not 
correct. The U.S. government agenda is to show events and issues in Afghanistan 
positively, and to prove that U.S. foreign policy there is succeeding. American journalists 
rarely do that. To the contrary, in the Afghan journalists’ own words, U.S. journalists 
frame Afghanistan as a violent, failed and corrupt nation.  
 
News Frames: Afghanistan is a Violent, Corrupt Country 
 
 
 American journalists are very selective when it comes to portraying Afghanistan 
and therefore do not represent the country accurately, the journalists largely agreed.998 
They see their American peers as packaging Afghanistan as an inherently violent, failed 
state that is consistently afflicted by war, corruption and overall poor governance.999 The 
picture that American journalists paint of Afghanistan, Faisel agreed, is “a dark one, 
which is not real.”1000 And Jamshid said that when he reads U.S. news and analysis on 
Afghanistan, he simply thinks, “The U.S. journalists need to learn more about 
Afghanistan.’”1001 Khaleeq agreed that U.S. news about Afghanistan can be “very 




This rests on what they see as two, recurring frames in U.S. news about 
Afghanistan. First, the security frame, which encompasses Afghan, U.S. and other 
international troops, in addition to warlords, the Taliban and other extremist factions 
operating in the country. Second, the corruption frame that looks specifically at 
inefficiency in the Karzai administration, and in local government departments. The 
security frame is more dominant in American news, the Afghan journalists said, because 
so much U.S. news coverage is about the U.S.-led war and is meant to support American 
troops. 1003 The journalists resent the first frame, but actually appreciate the latter.  
  
“American see Afghanistan through the prism of war, and Afghans don’t.” 
Afghanistan is a complicated place, but they insisted that it is simply not as 
violent or dangerous as it is made out to be. They think that the U.S. press gives 
Americans, and the world, a distorted view of Afghanistan. “The war is not the real 
picture. The war is being exaggerated in U.S. news,” Kambas, a radio broadcaster, 
said.1004 This is because, Khaleeq explained, U.S. journalists are in Afghanistan “to cover 
the war in Afghanistan and not Afghanistan as a country.”1005 They focus much more on 
the lives of U.S. soldiers instead of Afghan civilians, which creates mainly negative and 
sensationalist news stories that are overwhelmingly American-centric.1006 Some of this is 
because Afghans’ worldview is inherently different since they have dealt with war for 
decades. Houshmand offered: “American see Afghanistan through the prism of war, and 
Afghans don’t.”1007 In a sense, Afghans are numb to the episodic violence that Americans 




certain rural areas, American journalists, they said, make it seem as if the violence 
consumes the entire country.  
However, violence in Afghanistan has increased considerably, many of the 
journalists remarked, since the U.S. troop surge in 2009 and 2010.1008 With more 
American news organizations setting up – or expanding – Afghanistan bureaus, the U.S. 
public knew more about Afghanistan than since the war began in 2001. This increase in 
U.S. news has multiplied the number of news stories that stereotype Afghanistan as a 
violent and backwards country.1009 By disproportionally reporting on the violence instead 
of the character of the Afghan people, the U.S. journalists are making Afghans seem 
inhuman, some argued. The focus, Behnam, a print journalist said, on “suicide bombings, 
the Taliban, and the U.S. military” distracts from who the Afghan people are:1010  
We are people, we are normal human beings. War and suicide bombings and 
explosions is not all that we do – we are so many other things. Yes, we are poor 
and we are illiterate but we are a people – normal human beings – and there are so 
many other things that need to be covered about Afghans, our traditions, our 
families and out social structures.1011   
 
Several of the journalists emphasized that Afghanistan is “more” than the war, and more 
than “bombs, suicide attacks, explosions, and the stoning of women.” By focusing on a 
war fought by U.S. soldiers, U.S. journalists are making Afghanistan into a one-
dimensional country.1012 
For instance, roughly a quarter of the Afghan journalists were frustrated with the 
July 9 New Yorker article, “Will civil war hit Afghanistan when the U.S. leaves?” by 
Dexter Filkins, which painted a bleak picture of Afghanistan. Filkins is a former reporter 
for the New York Times in Afghanistan and is well known in the Afghan journalism 




civil war after the bulk of U.S. and NATO troops withdraw from the country in 2014, and 
returning to the confusing haze of civil war after Soviet troops withdrew in the 1990s. 
While a couple of Afghan journalists interviewed agreed with the prospect, others 
thought the article detrimental to Afghanistan’s long-term prospects for peace. This is 
because, by focusing on a likelihood of increased violence, the article could indicate to 
the American public and government that Afghanistan was not worth their time, sacrifice 
and investment. Mitra, a print journalist, said this kind of reporting “encourages people to 
incite civil war.” And because Filkins is no longer based in Afghanistan full time, he 
acted like a parachute journalist, and “spoke only with specific people he had time to 
speak with and amplified their voices.”1014 The problem was that the story did not stay in 
America. The Afghan news media picked it up and repeated it, which damaged the 
Afghan people’s confidence that their lives would continue to improve after the U.S. 
left.1015  
While the Afghan journalists agreed that the security frame fuels a 
misunderstanding in the West that the country is all consumed by a violent conflict, they 
have more complicated feelings about the frame of Afghan government inefficiency and 
corruption.  
 
“Afghanistan is an Extremely Corrupt Country”  
 American journalists frequently frame Afghanistan as a corrupt and weakly 
governed country. Some agreed that corruption is the most important story in 
Afghanistan and that it matters more than the insurgency, or terrorism.1016 Many 




corruption, that is the country I experience. When they are talking about insurgency, 
that’s not the country I experience.”1017 These stories are less frustrating to the Afghan 
journalists and more valuable for their reportage.  
Corruption became a major theme in U.S. news reporting on Afghanistan during 
the 2009 Afghan presidential elections, a process the U.S. media found fraudulent.1018 The 
Afghan government fought back, saying the U.S. news media was wrong, but did not 
offer any evidence to refute it.1019 As mentioned earlier, this also led to another related 
story in U.S. news: The contentious relationship between President Obama and President 
Karzai.1020 U.S. reporters, many believed, were being encouraged to report negatively 
about Karzai so that his legitimacy in Afghanistan would dissipate. Between corruption 
and government inefficiency, the U.S. press provides more critical coverage of the 
Afghan government than the Afghan press does. They have the right to criticize how 
Karzai’s administration manages the country, some Afghan reporters said, because the 
American public is paying taxes to help Afghanistan and wants to see progress. But 
corruption stories in the New York Times have made that paper particularly unpopular 
with the Afghan government.1021 In addition to the 2009 presidential election, the 
journalists pointed to examples from the Times’ analytical stories of the Karzai family, 
especially the late Ahmed Wali Karzai, and their alleged involvement in corruption and 
the opium trade.1022 Atash lamented that corruption in the Karzai family does not mean 
that all Afghans are corrupt:  
It’s not fair. If they are focusing on corruption, they should also give positive 
examples. Where is the balance? With the New York Times’ stories on Karzai, I 
agree with the substance on corruption, but the people who have never been here 
to Afghanistan or do not have direct contact, they feel that everyone in 
Afghanistan is corrupt. That everyone is involved in this mafia war. So there 





The majority of the Afghan journalists, however, thought this was fair news and analysis 
and is partly what made American news so valuable to them: U.S. journalists were much 
more free and safe in reporting these stories than Afghan journalists were. Farzin, a print 
journalist, explained: “It’s a negative view. But we are, we’re corrupt. We suck. We do 
have drugs. Yes, it does give a negative view of Afghanistan but it’s reality.”1024 For the 
past two years, the U.S. news media has been fixated on how some of Kabul’s elites have 
taken advantage of tens of billions of U.S. aid money. One of the most well known ones 
is the Kabul Bank story.  
The Washington Post first broke news that Kabul’s most rich and powerful were 
using Kabul Bank, the country’s first private one, as their personal piggy bank. Nine-
hundred million U.S. dollars left the country, lining the bank accounts of Afghanistan’s 
elites who ensured its safety in places like Dubai. The Times, Post and Wall Street 
Journal covered the story consistently, ensuring that it was repeated in Afghan news as 
well. Yet some of those accused of taking the money saw the bank’s demise of the result 
of U.S. reportage on the issue. In March 2012, a partner in the Kabul Bank, Khalillah 
Frozi, shooed away a New York Times reporter who approached him as he was having 
lunch at an upscale restaurant in Kabul. The American press, he said, not had “destroyed 
the bank” and not the Afghans who had drained it.1025 
 If there is a problem with the New York Times and Washington Post’s coverage 
on corruption in Afghanistan, Jabar and Morad said, is that they were not covering the 
full extent of it and are mainly focusing on the national level.1026 “When they talk about 




corruption everywhere.” 1027 Parsa, too, appreciated U.S. news that challenges the Afghan 
government since Afghan journalists feel so powerless in doing so.1028 The only time U.S. 
news is truthful about Afghanistan, Mitra said, is when there is a negative story about 
Karzai.1029 Babur, a television broadcaster, thought U.S. news about poor governance 
issues in general was fair, which is exactly why it’s so painful: “It’s so sad for me: Why 
is Afghanistan always a controversial country?”1030 Farzin agreed:  
I’m not frustrated about American media’s view of the country; I’m frustrated that 
these things exist in my country. I’m embarrassed. When I hear about corruption I 
curse the officials. When I hear about drugs, I am sad that they exist. Afghanistan 
does supply 90 percent of the world’s drugs. That’s what frustrates me.1031  
 
 
Afghan Journalists See American Journalists Limited by Deadline Constraints, 
Security 
 
 Many of the Afghan journalists understand that U.S. news content on Afghanistan 
is focused on American “enduring values” and ethnocentrism, and that it is focused on an 
American audience. But it is bizarre for them to read about their country through those 
frames.  
The reasons why Afghanistan matters to Americans is because there is a U.S.-led 
war underway that lends itself to dramatic news, Ghazanfar explained, and the war has 
become a domestic issue since it affects the U.S.’s security and economy.1032 Atash 
understood that it’s difficult to provide broad analysis of Afghanistan for people who do 
not live there and that U.S. journalists want to keep the American public’s attention on 
the country. If they do not provide a story on security, he rightly observed, “then no one 




or normal issues when they are not news? 1034 Abdullah agreed that Americans don’t care 
about what’s happening in the world unless it involves the U.S., and unless it is bad.1035 
Faisel concurred that negative reportage is universal; society almost demands drama. If 
Americans were reading about the Afghanistan these Afghan journalists knew, “then the 
American public may not take the news seriously.”1036  
American journalists reduce Afghanistan to a violent, failed state because of the 
sheer complexity of the country, the majority of the journalists believed. “Afghanistan is 
a big puzzle for American news,” Babur said.1037  Khaleeq and Faisel, too, emphasized 
that understanding Afghanistan takes a long time.1038 And sometimes being from 
Afghanistan is not enough, Delewar explained: “I mean we’re a very complex society. 
It’s even difficult for us to be able to tell all issues and facts as Afghans.” 1039 While more 
American journalists have been living in Afghanistan since 2009, they are still 
constrained by deadlines. Filing corruption and security stories is easier than looking for 
one about Afghan culture or societal progress.1040  
It’s not just deadline constraints, however. Afghanistan’s instability makes 
American journalists highly immobile and normally stuck in Kabul, many of the 
journalists pointed out.1041  The U.S. reporters who do venture into rural areas, where 
there is regular combat, are often embedded with U.S. troops.1042 The military embed, 
Sarwar said, offers a “filtered version of reality” for the journalists, but he also 
sympathized with them: “how else do they get the coverage? It’s better than nothing.”1043 
American journalists can’t speak with a wide variety of Afghans throughout the country, 
Mansoor concurred, because “It is dangerous for them to go to the villages and really find 




killed.” The journalists also rarely speak Dari and Pashto and therefore rely on translators, 
who add distance between the journalist and the Afghan they are trying to build trust 
with.1044  
The “ground realities” of Afghanistan are therefore elusive and U.S., and other 
Western journalists, make quick calculations and analyses of the small slice of Afghan 
life they experience. Most of their flaws are due to security and time constraints that are 
outside of American journalists’ control. But what is disappointing, Delewar, Jabar and 
Atash emphasized, is who U.S. journalists choose to speak with when they come to 
Afghanistan.1045 The norm is that they seek out other American sources instead of 
speaking with Afghans; the Afghan intellectual community is routinely ignored. These 
American experts can deliver quotes to U.S. journalists, Atash said, “but they are not 
valuable in explaining Afghan society…they cannot explain the ordinary Afghan.”1046 
The need for U.S. journalists to index news coverage to the U.S. government and 
maintain their sources is largely why they focus on the U.S. government’s policy in 
Afghanistan, some journalists agreed. 1047 U.S. journalists have no problem taking on the 
Afghan government, Behnam said, but they are more cautious when it comes to the U.S. 
government because they need to maintain strong relationships. Without those, they can’t 
break stories.1048 Therefore, American journalists socialize with U.S. officials in 
Afghanistan to gain their trust to appropriately handle information. Yet that close 
alignment with the government is part of what makes American journalism look 
suspiciously pro-American government.  
The majority of the Afghan journalists empathize with their American 




frustrated with American news frames about security is because they want to see their 
country depicted positively in the world.1049  Farzin admitted, “I’m interested in 
everything in my country because I am an Afghan” but why would Americans be 
interested in everything about Afghanistan?1050 It is likely that Afghans reporting from 
foreign countries would be just as Afghanistan-centric, Jawid said. “If Afghanistan sent 
Afghan troops to Syria, then the Afghan people would want to know that their media was 
recognizing the sacrifice of Afghan troops.”1051 A national press corps is national, and it 
therefore wants to advance their nation’s interests; it’s not a phenomenon that is 
exclusive to the U.S. media and the U.S. government, Mansoor emphasized.1052 
Houshmand concurred that national identity comes before professions: “I am more 
Afghan than I am a journalist.” For this reason, his honor is injured when Americans 
come to Afghanistan and don’t experience the country he experiences. What makes it 
worse is that American journalists have authority in a global news system in which they 
define and project Afghanistan as a hopeless, violent place.1053  
  Not every American journalist in Afghanistan, however, fundamentally 
misunderstands the country and is out to protect U.S. interests, the Afghan journalists 
said. It largely depends on the reporter and how much time they spend in the country.1054 
What mainly frustrated the Afghan journalists were parachute journalists who drop into 
the country episodically, or national security beat reporters who write from New York or 
Washington. Those reporters, the Afghan journalists interviewed agreed, have the 





But no matter how long the U.S. journalists are in Afghanistan, the Afghan 
journalists – like the Afghan government – deem U.S. news to have a large impact on 
U.S. public opinion and U.S. foreign policy, and for U.S. foreign policy to largely impact 
the scope of U.S. reportage.1056 The negative view that U.S. journalists espouse has a 
cumulative effect on the American public. Many of these Afghan journalists who were 
interviewed work for elite news agencies that have benefitted from U.S. funding and 
were concerned about the impact this news would have on the public and the U.S. 
government. With so many negative stories, U.S. journalists were “fixing the minds” of 
Americans with a resoundingly negative view that Afghanistan is only about war.1057  
This creates a perception that the U.S. government and military cannot make progress in 
Afghanistan.1058  “We have lost this war in your living rooms, in your pubs and bars,” 
Houshmand said. 1059 Abdullah sympathized with the American public: “If I was an 
American reading this news, I wouldn’t support U.S. involvement in Afghanistan either.”  
Even though the Afghan reporters understand the factors that drive American 
news they, like U.S. government officials, are frustrated and baffled that the Americans 
do not focus more on positive developments within the country.1060  This is especially 
since the U.S. has funded and supported an expansion of education and health initiatives, 
in addition to the dramatic increase of women’s participation in government and society. 
It’s not true that U.S. efforts in Afghanistan have been for nothing, Houshmand, a 
broadcaster, said.1061  Khaleeq, another broadcaster, agreed: “We’ve had a lot of 
achievements in Afghanistan. They are historic. Never before have we had so much 
electricity, or paved roads, or telephones, or universities, or boys and girls going to 




By not looking at the “commitment, morality, capacity, initiative, and potential that exists 
in Afghanistan” the U.S. press affects perceptions of the Afghan government’s credibility, 
but also the credibility of the western governments who are supporting Afghanistan, 
Farhang and Faisal agreed.1063  
This perception that the American journalists do not support the U.S. 
government’s positive actions directly refutes the earlier claim some Afghan journalists 
made that American journalists want to advance the U.S. government agenda. It is in the 
U.S. government’s interest for the press to highlight reconstruction success, yet the press 
overlooks it. This is a collision of the concepts of government hegemony over media and 
that news tends to be bad.1064  This indicates that the Afghan journalists expect American 
news media to be deferential to the American government because that has been their 
experience with decades of authoritarian media. However, they are also becoming 
professional and recognize that news is often negative and cannot always copy how the 
government frames events and issues. But the compromise in this thought seems to be 
that when the U.S. government has bad news to share about the Afghan government, the 
U.S. press obeys. When it is positive, the U.S. press does not. These journalists in 
particular appreciate the opportunity to be watchdogs on their government through the 
American press, but their own ethnocentrism causes them to resent that Afghanistan’s 
triumphs often are not highlighted in U.S. news.   
Losing interest in Afghanistan is not in the U.S.’s interest, as what happens in 
Afghanistan will have long-term security ramifications for the U.S., some of the 
journalists stated.1065 A more accurate picture of events in Afghanistan would help create 




should continue to support Afghans.1066 Khaleeq, a broadcast journalist, who has put 
much faith in the United States’s investment in Afghanistan put his concern in stark 
terms:  
Yes, I know that the Americans have spent million of dollars here but also keep in 
mind what will happen to Afghans and to Afghanistan. If we have chaos again, I 
will be the first person to be slaughtered. The American journalists are not 
incorporating this side of the story; their news coverage has a selfish tone. Why 
did America come to Afghanistan in the first place?1067   
 
 
The Afghan journalists are conflicted. They have benefited significantly from the 
U.S. military, diplomatic and aid presence in the country and do not want the U.S. 
government to withdraw altogether. But they are frustrated with U.S. news frames that 
depict Afghanistan negatively and in violent terms, while America remains the central 
character in the drama. This is even though the war is the principal reason why the U.S. is 
in Afghanistan. But if American news about Afghanistan is too negative, than it will 
shake the confidence of the American people of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. They 
rely significantly on U.S. support to do they work that they do. Since U.S. news frames 
are relayed through Afghan news, this reporting can also shake the confidence of the 
Afghan people. According to the Afghan journalists, American journalists have a 
responsibility to tell the American people that there will be negative security implications 
if the U.S. leaves Afghanistan; a responsibility to encourage the world to look at 
Afghanistan positively; and a responsibility to build the confidence of the Afghan people. 
   
Afghan Journalists Need U.S. News 
 
The Afghan journalists interviewed have a complicated relationship with U.S. 




because they accord U.S. news with prestige; their lack of professionalism; their lack of 
access to U.S. and Afghan officials; and a high degree of self-censorship, American news 
is constantly relayed in Afghan media. Therefore, whatever makes it to Afghan news is 
already yesterday’s news in the U.S.1068 It depends, however, on the story.1069 Stories 
about the Afghan government, Karzai family, drug lords and warlords, and U.S. 
government decisions and politics about Afghanistan and Pakistan are all indispensible. 
Sometimes news about NATO military offensives is, too. However, stories focused 
narrowly about U.S. troops are not.1070  
Afghan journalists tend to think on a very local level, Farzin, a print journalist, 
explained, which is why they need the U.S. to identify important national stories.1071 But 
they particularly need investigative stories and analysis.1072 Afghan news agencies set the 
agenda for minor issues.1073 The lack of resources and skills for long-term, in-depth 
investigative reporting among Afghan journalists—compounded by the threats of 
intimidation they receive from their own officials—means that they turn to American 
reporters for guidance.1074 The “Afghan media does not have the authority or clout that 
American media has,” Jahandar explained. “Talking about the warlords, for instance, is 
essentially a job for the American journalists; the Afghan journalists can then translate 
the story and relay it.”1075 Afghan journalists use American news to protect themselves. 
U.S. news provides a mechanism for them to repeat information that is originally 
disclosed by Americans, not Afghans.1076 This includes much of the New York Times’s 
coverage on corruption and the Karzai family and, just as one example, the Washington 




stories well before the American journalists do, but they are unable to report it 
themselves.1078  
The Afghan reporters I interviewed admit to frequently relinquishing their stories 
on powerful Afghan officials, extremist groups and warlords to western reporters, due to 
the possible violence inflicted on them if they report it themselves.1079 “Afghan news 
media relies on American media because they do the stories on drugs and corruption that 
Afghan journalists cannot do,” Houshmand, a radio broadcaster, said.1080 The American 
government, and the democratic system behind it, also protects American journalists. 
This enables U.S. journalists to acquire information: They are off-limits to various 
Afghan power brokers who are dependent on the U.S. for assistance, or who could be 
attacked by the U.S. military if they hurt an American citizen.1081 Once the news is 
reported, however, they can repeat it and cite the U.S. news as the source, allowing them 
to spread the news under the cover of the U.S. news agency. That way, should an Afghan 
strongman complain to an Afghan journalist about the story, they can take cover behind 
the American news agency.1082 
Various power brokers in Afghanistan have killed more than 33 Afghan 
journalists since 2002, Parsa, a broadcaster, said. “So I am not able to tell all the truths, 
but the New York Times and Washington Post can report it. Then we can repeat it.” 1083 
Ghazanfar concurred with his colleagues that U.S. journalists are essential to Afghan 
reporting because they have more freedom, strength and influence: “They have more 
freedom because there is no warlord in America to intimidate them. They are strong 
because they have more money, more resources. They have more influence because they 




Like	  in	  Pakistan,	  some Afghan journalists also insisted that they cite American 
reportage on Afghanistan because it makes their own reportage more credible.1085  
American news is perceived to be legitimate and authoritative, and therefore adds 
credibility to the journalists’ reportage. “When the New York Times says something, it 
means something and the Afghan officials and powerbrokers react strongly,” Delewar 
said.1086 The newness of Afghan media, he explained, makes Afghans interested in what 
Afghan journalists have to say, but the public trusts U.S. news more because it is more 
mature, more informed and reported with attention to detail. “Afghan journalists look to 
U.S. media and see Americans talking about their rights, their civil rights and how things 
should be. How somebody should perform in government.”1087 Sarwar agreed that the 
perception is that American media and other western press are more credible, more 
trustworthy, than local media.1088 	  
 Most of American news’ legitimacy, however, follows from the U.S. journalists’ 
access to U.S. officials. Afghan journalists do not have correspondents based in the U.S. 
and need to know what U.S. government officials are saying.1089 How else, Abdullah 
asked, would they know the U.S. government’s thoughts on Afghanistan or Pakistan?1090 
Khaleeq agreed that American journalists don’t just benefit from leaked information, but 
they also have resources to stay with a story for many months, “and, when they run it, it 
makes noise.”1091 Plus, Atash emphasized, U.S. and NATO officials do not trust Afghan 
journalists as much as American journalists.1092   
 When Afghan journalists do relay U.S. news, it is mostly repeated verbatim.1093  
Sarwar, a Dari-language broadcaster, estimated that 40-70 percent of the content in local 




reprinted from the New York Times and the Washington Post, and other major American 
newspapers.1094 Ghazanfar and Parsa admitted that they directly translate U.S. news 
articles from the Times, Post and Christian Science Monitor for their radio broadcasts on 
either daily or weekly bases.1095 Several of the journalists emphasized that Tolo TV, 
Afghanistan’s most popular news station, regularly translates and broadcasts U.S. 
news.1096  “Half of the leading news on Afghanistan’s most watched stations is from 
Western media. Like, ‘Karzai spoke with the New York Times and he said this,’” Morad, a 
radio broadcaster, explained.1097  This is especially the case when it is about the Karzai 
administration.1098 But U.S. news is also of value because it indicates how U.S. foreign 
policy will affect them in the future.1099  
But it’s not just the words of Western news agencies that influence the Afghan 
public. Afghan television will also receive raw imagery from U.S. broadcast agencies like 
Associated Press Television, and then rebroadcast it. “We literally get our picture of the 
war from Western media outlets, because Afghan journalists don’t go--or don’t dare--
visit battlefields,” Sarwar emphasized.1100 Imagery created for an American audience is 
recycled for an Afghan one with little adaptation. With APTV, “some of the footage 
shows patriotic images of American soldiers in combat.” Some is re-shown legally, 
through subscriptions; some is pirated. As a result, he said, “the picture of the war that 
the American media want the American public to see ends up being shown to the Afghan 
public. We have no alternative view of the war because we don’t generate our own 
images.”1101  Yet it continues to be shown because it is deemed to be credible.  
 Other journalists insisted that they do not repeat U.S. news verbatim, but rely on 




used the New York Times’ June 2010 story on Afghanistan’s trillion dollars of mine 
reserves and then interviewed officials in Afghanistan’s Ministry of Mines to find more 
details.1103 Many Afghan journalists look to American media for story ideas, and then 
assign their own journalists to follow-up on stories that they feel safe reporting. Mansoor, 
for instance, used the Times reportage on Ahmed Wali Karzai, and then used his wide 
network within Afghanistan to dispatch reporters to ask Karzai for his reaction to the 
Times reports.1104  If Sarwar, Sina and Jamshid’s news agencies see a big story broken by 
the Post or the Times, they will reference it, but will also try to verify the news with their 
local sources. They then highlight the facts, delete the U.S. news frame or perspective 
from the news story, and frame it with their own perspectives.1105  They are increasingly 
succeeding in doing so.  
Sometimes, U.S. news can be used to launch editorials or, more common, become 
fodder for the talk shows. Like in Pakistan, political commentary programs are becoming 
increasingly popular on Afghanistan many television stations. Aalem explained that if 
there is a negative story in the New York Times about President Karzai or another Afghan 
official, then a roundtable on a major channel will collect experts to talk about the story; 
“They are quoting the New York Times, saying the New York Times said so,” he said, 
which is a very reliable source for Afghan journalists and producers.1106 The Afghan 
journalists also pay attention to U.S. news agencies’ editorials, columns and op-eds to 
gauge U.S. public sentiment, and then tell the Afghan public what “America” is thinking. 
The waning U.S. support for the war in Afghanistan, Abdullah explained, is evident in 
these articles and he broadcasts them.1107 The public, he added, is frustrated when they 




Taliban, yet their government has failed to provide them with security. They are 
dependent on the U.S. to feel safe, Abdullah said, and then hear that the U.S. public 
wants the troops to leave. “So,” Abdullah asked, “what should they do?1108  
 
Value of U.S. News: American Investigative Reporting on Afghanistan Central 
  
There is also the question of what Afghan journalists will do once the U.S. news 
bureaus shutter in Afghanistan since they do not have the proper resources or security to 
do far-reaching, long-term reporting independently.1109 They relay on their American 
counterparts for agenda-setting, content and moral support. Many said that without 
sustained Western media attention on the country, journalism would slip back under 
authoritarian controls.  Power brokers would feel emboldened to intimidate journalists.1110  
Afghan journalists Jahandar, Jawid, and Farzin all believed that they and their 
peers got “courage” from U.S. journalists. Once U.S. news bureaus leave with the U.S. 
troops, though, censorship will increase and Afghans will be less likely to break news.1111 
“The Afghan media is an easy target so we will lose momentum if we don’t have the 
American media by our side,” Jahandar explained.1112 Many of the sensitive stories the 
Afghan press does run about tribal affiliations, language, and Islam – topics that were 
once off limits – are inspired by the international media.1113 In addition, U.S. journalists 
have taught Afghan journalists “the rules and regulations of journalism. They taught us 
how to be precise and tell the story,” Houshmand said. He continued, “Media will die 
after 2014, it’s like a suckling baby. I am very confident of this.”1114  Behnam, a print 









 Unlike the Pakistanis, Afghan journalists are too weak, too dependent, on 
American journalism about Afghanistan to outright resent it. They appreciate it because 
U.S. journalists can get the information they cannot access, both within the U.S. and 
Afghan governments. They want to expose malfeasances but the politicians and officials 
they want to take on have atrocious pasts. In a country like Afghanistan, with more than 
30 years of conflict, few leaders are innocent of human rights violations and corruption. 
Afghan journalists have been unleashed from authoritarian controls nominally, yet they 
still operate within a norm of oppression. It’s this reality that American journalists focus 
on. They see Afghanistan through a prism of war, which they resent partly because they 
do not see their country as being so violent – despite the threat of that violence stopping 
them from reporting and investigating the news. 
 Despite the frustrations with negative framing, the suspicions of U.S. government 
hegemony over journalism, and a general ethnocentric bias, the Afghan independent 
journalists are willing to accept it because America gives them the space they need to 
contribute to a liberal society. Without U.S. funding and American news bureaus, Afghan 
journalism and the free press may limp along, but insights and revelations about 






Part IV: The Americans 
 
Seven American Journalists 
 
James  Print; Afghanistan & Pakistan.   
Jason  Print; Afghanistan. 
Maya  Print; Afghanistan.   
Nathan  Broadcast; Afghanistan & Pakistan. 
Nikki  Print; Afghanistan.    
Roger   Print; Afghanistan.   




CHAPTER 10. ‘We Write for Us’: American Journalists in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan 
 
The American journalists who work in Afghanistan and Pakistan today are a small 
but powerful community of storytellers. While they create narratives to appeal to 
American audiences, they are hegemonic in Afghanistan and Pakistan as they also set and 
shape news coverage there. While the U.S. foreign correspondents may work to explain 
the Afghan and Pakistani contexts for Americans, they rarely adjust to that context.    
Eight of these journalists agreed to speak with me during the summer of 2012 in 
Kabul after I had completed the bulk of interviews with the Afghan and Pakistani 
journalists. Some of them reported on Pakistan as well, but the majority worked 
exclusively in Afghanistan. I wanted to discover their opinions about their Afghan and 
Pakistani peers, to explore their working relationships with the three countries’ 
government officials, and to give them a chance to respond to Afghan and Pakistani 
journalists’ criticisms about their reportage. Those criticisms included the charges that 
they narrowly rely on security frames, are ethnocentrically biased, and are complicit with 
the U.S. government agenda in the region.  
The American journalists were aware that their reportage is received and relayed 
in the countries, but they were not concerned about its impact on Afghan and Pakistani 
perceptions. They primarily consider and feel responsibility toward their American 
audiences. The U.S. foreign correspondents regard themselves as watchdogs, but as 
national watchdogs: They track how U.S. tax dollars are spent, monitor the efficiency of 
American diplomatic efforts, and highlight the welfare and achievements (and their 
absence) of American soldiers fighting in Afghanistan. In this way, the journalists 




criticize them when criticism is merited. Yet they do so with American national interests 
in mind.  
 
The American Public Comes First  
 
When the journalists report and write from Afghanistan and Pakistan, they are 
thinking about what the American people need to know but cannot determine 
independently.1116  The Internet has transformed the audience base for their reporting, 
Nikki and James acknowledged, but Americans who are generally educated and curious 
about international affairs and the war make up their core audience.1117 It’s imperative, 
Maya emphasized, that American citizens know what their officials are doing and saying 
on their behalf; she and her peers, she said, are conduits for Americans who have to 
“make decisions on who they are going to vote for.” Maya continued, “my job is to come 
here and ask questions and get the information that they can’t get because they aren’t 
here.”1118 Only Tom and Jason felt as if they were writing first for policymakers in 
Washington.1119  In keeping the average American citizen in mind, U.S. journalists often 
want to provide them with streamlined news stories, and not provide the complicated 
dispatches that policymakers and analysts of the region would prefer.  
Reporting and writing about Afghanistan and Pakistan’s complexity can be 
painstakingly difficult—for Americans as for others. The constraints on American 
journalists are formidable, and efforts to overcome them would require resources, skills 
and time that these journalists often do not have. Their news bureaus include no more 




by a staff of local reporters or fixers. The New York Times bureau in Afghanistan is the 
largest, containing three foreign correspondents. The Wall Street Journal and Associated 
Press each contain two. The Washington Post, NPR and Los Angeles Times only have 
one. Similarly, in Pakistan, the news bureaus are normally one-person operations. All 
journalists who report for U.S. news organizations rely heavily on local reporters who 
help them gather and interpret news stories throughout the countries. The local journalists 
translate information, arrange travel, coordinate interviews and also, at times, draft copy. 
While the American correspondents determine with their U.S.-based editors the news 
agendas and frames, they are extremely limited by language, deadlines and security 
constraints.  
 The news that matters to Americans, the U.S. journalists interviewed agreed, 
consists of security stories that indicate how the war is going. Tom explained:  
Part of our charge is that there are more than 75,000 American troops on the 
ground right now. When our readers think of Afghanistan they are thinking of the 
soldiers who are here. So I feel like we have a responsibility to write what those 
80,000 guys are doing and what their lives look like. And given that those men 
and women are disproportionally drawn to the south and the east [of Afghanistan], 
I’m drawn to those places. When you’re writing about military strategy, those are 
the places where it’s being put to the test.  
 
But these news stories often unfold in Afghanistan’s countryside, which is  nearly 
impossible to access. Jason emphasized that he traveled frequently around Afghanistan in 
2009, but is able to do less so in 2012 – especially in the volatile south and east -- 
because of fear of getting injured or killed. Leaving the relative safety of Afghanistan’s 
major cities demands meticulous and time-consuming planning.  
As a result, American journalists focus on U.S. and Afghan government officials 




readers.1120 U.S. journalists often have to file a news story about a part of the country they 
have never visited, and they do so with Kabul or Islamabad datelines; they often conduct 
their reporting over the phone.1121 For instance, on March 11, 2012, Army Staff Sergeant 
Robert Bales killed 17 Afghans in their sleep in Panjwai, a dangerous district in 
Kandahar province.1122 The massacre made global news, yet no U.S. correspondents 
traveled to Panjwai to get a first-hand perspective of its aftermath. “I don’t blame anyone 
for not going to the place,” Tom said. It was already too precarious to visit, and it would 
have especially been so for an American at the time. Tom lamented, “It was good that 
American readers had a rough idea of what was happening, but the great stories that 
could’ve been done if they went to Panjwai just weren’t done. No one could write the 
human stories of the families and people who were affected.”1123   
The American journalists agreed, however, that their U.S.-based editors do not 
limit their reporting’s content.1124  If there are debates, they are focused on the salience of 
a news story and what should merit front-page attention. Nikki, a print journalist, 
explained that her editors normally discuss how to frame a news story:   
Our conversations are more… What are we really trying to tell? Is this a 
corruption story, or a favoritism story? If it is corruption to what extent is the U.S. 
complicit? It’s a fairly sophisticated conversation over how to tell the story. It is 
rare that a story is ordered up. It happens once in a while, [the editors] will say, 
for instance, that we need an analysis on why Karzai is going after Pakistan. But 
it’s mostly a topic, and not what the story should say. There is a distinction there. 
 
While U.S.-based editors and publishers may not direct their journalists in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan to write specific stories, the journalists admitted that security issues and 





The Security Frame  
 
 Security is the meta-frame for American news coverage on Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, many of the journalists agreed, because U.S. troops are there. Nikki explained, 
“We put high stock in stories about the American military, and they go on the front page 
often because they have a clear connection to the American reader.”1125 Americans want 
to know about U.S. troops, not Afghans or Europeans. The fact that Afghan and Pakistani 
journalists think American news about the region is too narrowly focused on security is 
an important and legitimate criticism, the journalists largely agreed.1126 Nonetheless, 
reporting on the region within a security framework is a fixed part of their mission, as 
they understand it, as foreign correspondents for U.S. news organizations. Jason, a print 
journalist, explained, “I’m not here to write a portrait of the nation of Afghanistan. I am 
here to write about the war. So the ebb and flow of security is definitely a guiding, major 
frame of how I look at this place.” It is only natural, Nathan and James concurred, that 
Afghanistan is explained through a security framework in U.S. news because the war 
began with an attack on the United States. “The U.S. government didn’t come here 
because they decided they needed to provide water for people,” Nathan said.  
The Afghanistan war is different from other modern wars in the sense that it is a 
low-intensity, chronic conflict, Jason and Nikki explained. And it can be maddening for 
the journalists to decipher, independent of the U.S. military, who is winning and who is 
losing, and when U.S. troops will be able to leave.  A majority of the Kabul-based U.S. 
journalists said they wanted to give as much depth to Afghanistan as they could.1127 The 




and to hear about women and children living in conditions of war and poverty, appealing 
to Americans’ humanitarianism. Jason, Roger and Tom conceded that one of the faults of 
U.S. reportage on Afghanistan is that they have not written enough from the Afghan 
perspective and have not shown the U.S. public the toll the war has taken on the Afghan 
public.1128  The more interesting news stories, Tom emphasized, are about Afghanistan as 
a country – the culture, and the Afghan public’s attitudes, habits and traditions. But at the 
same time, he explained, “we have a responsibility to cover the American presence here 
through the American military or the civilians’ words and actions. And our readers have a 
particular interest in those stories because those could be their sons or daughters, or 
friends or colleagues.”  
 News stories about the health of the Afghan government, civil society and 
economy also fall within a security frame because they affect Afghanistan’s overall 
stability, and whether or not the U.S.’s military mission is succeeding. Therefore, Nikki 
explained, she was, “writing about the larger American entanglement in Afghanistan” 
which includes not just warfare, but also the effects of U.S. money and policy on the 
stability of the country. Nathan agreed, “It doesn’t matter how many troops you have. If 
people don’t have jobs, then they are vulnerable to the insurgency” and conflict will 
continue.  The prospects for long-term stability in Afghanistan affect long-term American 
national interests, Nathan and James similarly argued. Should Afghanistan or Pakistan 
become anarchic or fall to extremists again, as it did in the 1990s, then the U.S. could 
become embroiled in a longer, even bloodier conflict. It is in American readers’ interests 




 The Afghan and Pakistani journalists also criticized American journalists’ 
seeming unwillingness to report positive news about their countries. While the majority 
of U.S. journalists interviewed also saw this as a legitimate criticism, many felt that it 
wasn’t their jobs to do so.1129  They pointed out that Afghan and Pakistani journalists are 
more likely to know what is encouraging and hopeful for their societies than Americans 
are. “It’s very hard for us to justify [to editors] some of the good news stories that we 
would tell,” Nikki explained, when she has limited space to report on the region.  
Moreover, good news stories often do not qualify as news. “So you have to ask yourself 
if that is the best use of the space, if you are really showing people something real.”1130 
Usually, she answers no.  
American journalists are used to complaints about their news reporting, too, from 
U.S. government officials who pitch them narratives that positively depict U.S. foreign 
policy efforts and effects. The journalists normally turn down invitations to cover school 
or hospital openings that the U.S. military or the U.S. Agency for International 
Development funds. The journalists agreed that reporting what the U.S. government 
wants would give Americans an exaggerated idea of the U.S. mission’s accomplishments 
in Afghanistan. The narrative that the journalists construct for Americans about the war is 
closer to reality, they agreed, and therefore in the American public’s interest to consume.  
 
American Government & Media Hegemony 
 
For this reason, the journalists vehemently disagreed with most of the Pakistani 




government. They hear the criticism that they are complicit advocates of U.S. foreign 
policy from many Afghan and Pakistani officials, too – especially President Hamid 
Karzai and his palace staff.1131 But U.S. journalists’ relationships with U.S. State 
Department and military officials in country are often cold and contentious.1132 After all, 
James explained, “The really great story is showing how we [the U.S.] fucked up – not 
how the Afghans fucked up. It’s not surprising that the Afghans fucked up. The best 
stories are the ones you don’t expect, and the ones you don’t expect are the ones of total 
malfeasance from American military and officials.” 
The U.S. military regularly shuns U.S. journalists in Afghanistan once it doesn’t 
approve of a news story they have reported. General John Allen, the commanding general 
in Afghanistan at the time, “has no clue how to deal with the press,” Nikki said. While his 
predecessor, General David Petraeus cooperated with journalists in Iraq, he became much 
more cautious in Afghanistan. This was likely because, Nikki speculated, Afghanistan 
was far more complex and elusive for U.S. military officials than Iraq. Military 
spokespeople don’t honestly answer reporters’ questions; indeed, they are openly hostile. 
This is likely, Nikki said, because they are unsure if they are winning the war. Recently, 
Nikki reported a story that U.S. Special Forces actively worked to keep from her, even 
ridiculing her about it . She ultimately published the story without their assistance. “If 
Afghan journalists have any illusions that we have better access to the U.S. military than 
they do, those are illusions. It is not reality,” Nikki said.  
 However, there is one advantage that the American journalists have over Afghans: 




are entertaining a form of military censorship, since officials can control what the 
journalists see. Jason explained: 
I’m pretty cynical about the U.S. military agenda with reporters…their mission is 
really to steer you towards whatever they want. They want you to write about 
success so they go out of their way to shield you from seeing something that 
would depict them as losing the war or doing a bad job. It feels like propaganda 
because they make such an active effort to send you to certain units. They don’t 
want you to see soldiers with bad morale or the units that have lost a lot of people. 
 
Once they travel with American troops, the U.S. journalists see at close range how they 
risk their lives, but the experience is rife with attempts at manipulation. Maya copes with 
this by writing a story at variance with what the military pitched her, and she often turns 
the story the military wanted against them. For instance, on her first trip with U.S. 
soldiers to Ghazni, a volatile province in the east, the press officer wanted to show her 47 
schools that the Taliban had shut down and American troops had subsequently reopened. 
“But I definitely wasn’t going to write what they said,” Maya explained. “I was going to 
take advantage of a four-day trip to Ghazni.” Once she was there, she saw that the 
schools were open, but empty. She spoke with the local education director and discovered 
that the students were terrified to attend schools that the Americans had constructed, 
fearing that the Taliban would kill them. This was not the celebratory news story the 
military had imagined. “It’s pretty impossible to ever meet the U.S. military’s 
expectations because the reality is never as rosy as they project it to be,” Maya said. “But 
the facts always come out, it doesn’t matter.”  
Since American journalists must keep the U.S. military accountable, Tom said, 
the embeds are one of the few ways that they can try to do that. In the most dangerous 
locations, the military does not send a public affairs minder to manage the journalists. 




“No one is telling you what things mean.  You’re seeing it.”1133 Nikki and Nathan agreed 
that the embed system functions when it allows the journalists to interact with soldiers, 
who are often candid, and when the higher ranking officials do not try to “control the 
narrative.”1134 There is so much message discipline within the U.S. military that it can be 
difficult to uncover any truths.1135 Plus, the International Assistance Force (ISAF) 
bureaucracy is large and confusing, with multiple press offices. Identifying the right 
people to speak with and investigating the veracity of their statements can be exhausting. 
Annoyingly, the military blocks journalists’ access to information when they want to 
keep an issue under wraps, then pester the journalists to cover stories they want covered. 
“The U.S. military plays a pretty powerful gate-keeping role in that sense,” Jason said. 
Journalists often are forced to give up on reporting information when military officials do 
not confirm it before their deadlines.1136    
The idea that U.S. journalists are affiliated with or beholden to the U.S. 
government is even more absurd when you consider their relationship with the American 
diplomats.1137 “I don’t think if you ask the U.S. ambassador that he would say the U.S. 
reporters are on his side,” Jason said drily. Officials at the American embassy do not 
want to engage with the press candidly, and have no “institutional commitment to making 
their people talk on the record” like the military does. The State Department is much 
more deliberate about which officials get to speak with journalists and what they get to 
say. To protect the image of its diplomats and programs, the embassy public affairs 
section insists on its right to edit and approve embassy officials’ quotes before journalists 
can publish them. Most interviews between reporters and officials are off the record or on 




“You can only do an on-the-record interview if it’s with the ambassador or at a press 
conference,” Jason explained. And even then, there is no candor. The only honest 
moments you have with American officials is when it is off the record, Tom, Roger and 
Nathan emphasized. 1138 But the American journalists cannot quote them.   
There is a widespread belief among Afghan and Pakistani journalists that U.S. 
officials leak information to the American press corps. It is true that U.S. officials 
disclose information to journalists, but they do not directly give American journalists 
entire news stories as most Afghans and Pakistanis suspect they do. Information sharing 
“is not scripted the way it may seem from the outside, or the way it may seem to Afghans 
and President Karzai,” Jason said. Journalists have to be dedicated enough to investigate 
a small piece of information they may receive from government officials; those officials 
do not guide them on how to follow up on the story, what to say or how to say it. Maya 
insisted that U.S. embassy and military officials stonewall her when she is working on 
investigative news pieces. “When I first got [to Afghanistan], I thought that the U.S. 
government had all the answers and they just didn’t want to tell me,” Maya said. But “it’s 
so hard to see the U.S. make the mistakes that they do and to feel sorry for them, because 
they’re so stupid.” For instance, they often refuse to cooperate on news stories about 
corruption, Maya emphasized, and end up looking clueless in her news reports.  Still, 
while American journalists in the region do not conspire with the U.S. government, they 
are American citizens and thus benefit from its protection. American journalists are 
public figures in Afghanistan and Pakistan because their work is closely scrutinized and 
copied in local media, and they are more at risk than other Americans in the country. Yet 




investigate the countries’ most powerful people.1139  “I think everyone [in the Afghan 
government] knows that it’s a pretty serious line to cross to kill an American journalist,” 
Jason conceded.1140 “I think other power brokers know that too.” The U.S. journalists are 
associated with the American government’s power, and the U.S. military could retaliate 
or Congress could vote to cut aid to Afghanistan if a journalist was harmed or killed. But 
since American journalists are linked to American power in the eyes of Afghans, they are 
also more valuable to the Taliban and other extremist factions who are seeking to hurt the 
U.S. 
Local journalists are especially vulnerable. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, Maya 
said, “It’s like it is in the Middle East: no one could give a fuck about their citizens. 
Citizens are expected to be subservient. Whereas, in the U.S., politicians – not always – 
but there’s a general sense that they have to serve the public.”1141 In many developing 
countries, Nathan emphasized, governments fear journalists and threaten them with harm; 
in the West, governments may see journalists as nuisances but do not threaten them.1142 
While local government officials and power brokers refrain from threatening American 
journalists, they will threaten the Afghan and Pakistani nationals who work for U.S. news 
organizations but do not benefit from the U.S. embassies’ protection.1143.  
 
 
American Ethnocentrism  
 
American journalists do not work to advance the U.S. government’s foreign 
policies, but they do benefit from its power and its policy of protecting American citizens 




responsibility to report for their fellow Americans and in the interest of the United 
States.1144 Afghan and Pakistani journalists see American journalists as putting their 
nationality above their profession, as being “more American than they are journalists.” 
That is “inevitably true,” Nikki admitted. “We are Americans and we do see the world 
through a lens imbued with America.” Jason agreed that it is probably true “in ways you 
don’t even always understand” as sympathy toward fellow Americans can happen so 
naturally, especially when you see first-hand U.S. troops fighting for their country. “They 
are the protagonists in your story and the people they fight are the enemy, and that’s the 
way your story is framed -- as their success or failure against the enemy. So you are 
telling it from their side.”1145 Yet still, Jason said, “We might hope America wins in 
general, but we want to document the reality along the way.” In this way, U.S. journalism 
about the world is supportive of maintaining American power, but wants to monitor and 
report U.S. missteps and not echo the U.S. government’s general narrative about its 
mission, which they will almost always frame as a success.  
Since the U.S. news organizations’ reportage is targeted towards Americans, 
James agreed, it is “American by its very nature” James said. He continued, “The 
Afghans are not my main concern here, my country is.”1146 This is less the case for U.S. 
news foreign coverage in countries where American troops are absent. When he covered 
India, for instance, he wrote about India. When he covered Kenya, he wrote about Kenya. 
But in Afghanistan, “you are writing about America. So we are American about it,” 




A major outlier was Tom, who was emphatic that he does not have “an inherent 
bias toward the United States” and sees Afghanistan more as a general foreigner than as 
an American. He said:  
I don’t feel as if I’m writing as an American but I am writing as someone who is 
not from Afghanistan, I see things as an outsider does. I don’t speak the language 
as much as I would need to have an Afghan perspective. But I don’t feel as if I’m 
writing from the American perspective just because I’m an American. I think that 
would be a real failure.  
 
Yet Tom also noted that his reportage is also American-centric. He also views his job as 
holding his government accountable, which, he said, is something any journalist would 
want to do when they witness their country’s actions overseas. “Sometimes when you see 
something really egregious and you talk to the people who are responsible, it would be 
hard not to make the connection between your tax dollars and your country, and the 
damage you are seeing.” It would be negligent if he just reported on Afghanistan without 
illuminating the injustices the U.S. was creating.  
 Each U.S. journalist interviewed plainly accepted the fact that they could not 
detach their nationality from their job. They have an American worldview that societies 
should be open and just, and they report within that frame. The problem, James 
emphasized, is that the people in the region, with Afghan journalists to a lesser extent, 
“confuse having an American worldview with having a specific Western government 
agenda.”1147 Just because someone is attached to their nationhood does not mean they are 
blindly supportive of their government. It is easy to look at the U.S. as a monolithic entity 
with enormous power, to strip it of its political complexities and see the entire country as 






CHAPTER 11. Dysfunction: American Journalists View of Reporters & Officials in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan.  
 
Ethnocentrism in journalism is not a uniquely American phenomenon. The U.S. 
journalists stressed that Afghan and Pakistani journalists hold the same ethnocentric 
biases they criticize the U.S. journalists for having: Afghan and Pakistani reporters, 
editors and pundits reduce the U.S. to fit their worldviews. “Just as we are Americans, 
they are Afghans and they are Pakistanis,” James said. Afghan and Pakistani journalists 
“complain about their countries being too simplified in our coverage, and they do the 
same with simplifying America.” Roger agreed that Afghans are very nationalistic, as 
they see the world from a place that is at the nexus of Iran, China and Russia -- and along 
the historic Silk Road from China to North Africa, a significant trade route that 
developed the economies of China, India, Persia, Arabia and Europe. It is a land that 
Mongols, Persians, British and Russians wanted to occupy, and the U.S. has settled there 
for more than a decade. This geopolitical importance naturally inclines them to think they 
must be great, he explained.1148  
After decades of war and authoritarianism, Afghans’ also do not understand the 
concepts of objectivity and government accountability, Maya said.  Thus they do not see 
American journalists as being independent of the U.S. government. To explain, she 
offered an anecdote on an interaction she had with her Afghan driver earlier in the day:  
It’s a hot day today, and while driving here, the driver can tell I’m uncomfortable. 
So he puts on the air conditioning. Now the air conditioning has never worked, it 
just spits out lukewarm air. He has no concept of what air conditioning is. But he 
knows that we as Westerners like air conditioning. But he has no concept of air 
conditioning and what it’s supposed to do. And I think the idea of being 




no concept, they don’t really understand what that means. They can’t conceive 
that that would ever actually exist.  
 
Afghans’ worldview is limited by their experience. While there has been no history of 
journalism, there has been a history of heavy government interference with their news 
media. So they assume that the same manipulative dynamic applies to U.S. officials’ 
relationship with U.S. reporters. They assume that where there is nationalism, there is 
subservience to government policies.  
 
American Journalists’ Relationship with Afghan Government Officials and 
Journalists 
 
 The Afghan journalists emphasized that their American peers had greater access 
to Afghan government officials than they themselves did. It is true, that for the first seven 
years of the war, American journalists’ relationship with Afghan officials, especially 
members of President Hamid Karzai’s senior staff at the palace, was fairly open and 
uncomplicated. But that relationship deteriorated considerably after the Obama 
administration assumed power in 2009 and changed U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and 
Pakistan considerably. Along with the increase of U.S. military and civilian personnel, 
the Obama administration became less protective of President Karzai and his family. The 
U.S. embassy seemed to favor other candidates to replace Karzai in the presidential 
election that year, and the U.S. press increased reporting on corruption in the Afghan 
government.  
Still, the American journalists acknowledged that they often have unfettered 




numbers of major officials in Kabul and the other 33 provinces, and they can get quick 
appointments with officials for interviews most of the time.1149 Afghan officials, said 
Nathan, normally invite only Western press for exclusive interviews or roundtable 
discussions. He confirmed that they think less of Afghan journalists. This happens in the 
Arab world, too, Nathan explained: 
When you go to these events and all you see is Western media, you think that they 
are intentionally bypassing their local media because they know the local 
population won’t be the primary consumers of the media they are talking to. They 
want to talk to the West. They want to be seen as talking at the table 
internationally.  
 
The status conferral that comes with being quoted in a Western newspaper is attractive 
for many Afghan officials. The American journalists agreed with their Afghan peers that 
some Afghan officials actively seek that prestige, which they cannot acquire speaking 
with just local reporters. Also, the “idea of ‘social betters’ is very strong in Afghanistan 
(and Pakistan),” James emphasized. Afghan officials rather talk to U.S. reporters, or the 
owners of Afghan media outlets, because they see them as being more important, and 
therefore more relevant.   
 Moreover, the American journalists concurred that Afghan officials do not trust 
Afghan journalists to handle information professionally. This is because much of the 
Afghan news media is political and/or tied to external actors, Nikki, Jason and Maya 
explained. Afghan government officials are naturally suspicious of journalists they see as 
controlled by warlords, certain ethnic groups, Iran, Pakistan or the West. Maya explained 
that this too is a dynamic in the Middle East and a hallmark of any authoritarian society:  
Especially in closed societies like Afghanistan, people are constantly worried 
about who you are connected to. It’s not like Afghanistan is a small nation, there 




tribe you could be affiliated with, what political party you could be affiliated with, 
what ethnicity you are – and that plays into a lot whether or not they trust you. 
 
This is a legitimate concern, Nikki thought, because the Afghan media is politically 
charged and not just influenced by Westerners, but also by Iranians and Pakistanis. Even 
within the media perceived to be more professional, news professionals are of different 
ethnic heritage that they may feel inclined to represent and support. But such suspicions 
about journalists’ underlying agendas were also an excuse, she said, for Afghan officials 
to ignore Afghan journalists.1150   
Afghan officials also gravitate toward American journalists when they want to 
make local and international news. They eagerly chase U.S. reporters in the country and 
lobby them to report information that will cater to their agendas. Afghans believe that the 
New York Times or Washington Post, in particular, strongly affect perceptions within and 
outside the U.S. government. While U.S. elite media influences U.S. government officials, 
Tom and James believed the Afghans have an exaggerated sense of their impact on U.S. 
foreign policy. Tom explained that Afghan officials almost see him more as an advisor to 
the American president than an independent journalist: 
There are folks that when you talk to them about a story you are working on or in 
the process of interviewing people, it is very clear that they are saying things they 
want President Obama to hear. And they think you are the conduit between this 
person in the palace and the White House. That’s a very grandiose way of 
viewing our role here. I’m not sure that’s always the case. 
 
Afghan officials regularly come to American journalists with information because they 
want to send a message to Washington. Nikki explained that they approach her frequently 




their story out” than American officials. Palace officials often ignore Jason, but when 
they want him to write something, they hound him. 
This dynamic was certainly the case after the Washington Post broke news about 
widespread corruption in the Kabul Bank in 2010. The story was starting to fade, James 
explained, but then Afghan officials and businessmen who wanted to try to manipulate 
the bank fallout started to talk openly to American journalists with that purpose in mind. 
One of them was Mahmood Karzai, a brother of the president.. He approached U.S. 
reporters in Kabul, James recalled, and said: “Write this down – the Americans need to 
bail us [the Kabul Bank] out.” His rationale was that the U.S. government had rescued 
America’s major banks and should do the same for the Kabul Bank. The story was almost 
dead, James explained, “but then the corrupt brother of the president called for an 
American bailout of the bank… so that kept the story alive” in the U.S. news media, and 
“was not that savvy.” Later, bank officials told the New York Times that the American 
press “destroyed Kabul bank,” though it was clearly the stakeholders’ mismanagement of 
the bank that ensured its demise.1151  
Often, mid-to-low ranking Afghan officials approach the U.S. foreign 
correspondents with information about high-level officials’ high-level corruption.  In 
James’s words, they “are horrified with how people at the top behave, the nepotism and 
patronage.” They are too poor to leave Afghanistan, so exposing it to try to generate 
change is their only option. Maya agreed. When she speaks with Afghan palace officials, 
they often say to her, “‘We know that the [American] ambassador takes you and whispers 
things into your ear.’ And I want to say, ‘Actually, it’s Afghans who are whispering into 




officials have become valuable sources for U.S. reportage on government corruption – 
reporting that has considerably damaged the journalists’ relationship with President 
Hamid Karzai’s administration.  
 Since early 2009, the Karzai palace has become increasingly disdainful of the U.S. 
news media. In January of that year, soon-to-be Vice President Joe Biden walked out of a 
dinner with President Karzai in Kabul after Karzai refused to acknowledge corruption in 
his government. Later, Karzai believed that the Obama administration was openly 
backing other candidates for president to oust him from office in the September 2009 
election. Much of the U.S. news coverage was indexed to the rocky relationship between 
the two governments, which led Karzai to believe that the U.S. press was working to 
discredit him while advancing the U.S. government’s agenda.1152 This belief intensified 
after the election, when many Western reporters perceived Karzai’s re-election as 
fraudulent.  The New York Times, especially, pursued stories about bribery within 
Karzai’s cabinet and his family, leading to a contentious relationship between the 
American newspaper and the palace.   
The U.S. government has invested more than $29 billion of civilian funds in 
Afghanistan, the bulk of which has gone to the Karzai administration.1153 The American 
journalists therefore investigate the Afghan government because they associate it with the 
successes and failures of U.S. foreign policy. Nikki acknowledged how vexing it must be 
for Afghan government officials to see American journalists dwell on their troubles and 
mistakes. Yet it is part of the journalists’ job to report Karzai’s words and actions, 
because he is “the president of the country that we are essentially occupying and we’re 




President Karzai and we helped perpetuate his term as president,” Nikki explained. “And 
we need to take a look at what we have done. And that’s part of what we are writing 
about.” Her news organization approaches Karzai with cynicism, and perhaps less 
empathy than an Afghan journalist would have. Nikki expanded:  
But…what we’re doing is bringing with us an American framework for how you 
write about government officials. And here that is seen as, if not treasonous, than 
a betrayal on some moral level. After all, the U.S. is an ally of Afghanistan. That 
is the case, and yet here we are criticizing and, whether or not it is true, we don’t 
make them look very good. I think they view that as personal in a way that, at 
least speaking for myself, isn’t true. 
 
The strong legacy of authoritarianism in Afghanistan, and a culture of deference to power, 
is such that officials think that journalists – or any member of the general public – 
questioning them is improper. As mentioned in the chapters about the Afghan journalists, 
President Karzai seemingly reads all American media reports about Afghanistan. He 
reacts strongly to them, especially to those that address his relationship with Western 
diplomats and ISAF leadership. Tom explained that Karzai’s spokesman’s office has 
called him to make clear that the president was unhappy with a news story, even a fairly 
insignificant one that recently ran.1154 “The official who called couldn’t quite articulate 
his concerns, but he was angry that the story ran,” Tom recalled. Rarely, though, does the 
palace ask for corrections – they just want to note their displeasure.   
Jason has been a foreign correspondent for more than a decade, covering 
countries in three continents, yet he’s never been in a country where U.S. news has such 
an impact on local politics. He explained: 
Karzai seems pretty convinced that a lot of the American news stories about him 
are planted and manipulated by the politicians in Washington who want to attack 
him. So when he reads things he sees it as the U.S. diplomats and the 
administration saying one thing to him in person, and then attacking him through 





The Afghan officials’ suspicion and rejection of American journalists often works against  
the Karzai administration’s interests. The U.S. foreign correspondents sometimes want to 
reflect on the country’s progress since 2001, but the palace’s senior staff members rarely 
respond to the most benign interview requests, Maya explained.1155 She recently asked the 
palace spokesman if she could write a story on the progress of Afghan women. “I mean, 
it’s in his interest to tell me that Afghan women are doing incredibly well – and he never 
answered.” She called, texted and e-mailed him to no avail. “It’s stupid on his part, it 
makes him look like an idiot.” 
There are times, Nikki said, when her news organization credits Karzai for the 
good work that he has done, especially with respect to women’s empowerment. Though 
she works actively to hold him accountable, she has a great deal of empathy for the 
position that he is in: “He’s up against a lot…he has a really troubling, corrupt family that 
he cannot completely abandon as an Afghan. And he has a lot of people around him who 
are a terrifying combination of being corrupt and bullies, and they are also armed. And he 
can’t get rid of any of them.” She wants to be more sympathetic in her news reports, but 
still thinks he has not tried hard enough to overcome these barriers. Still, she said, when 
she does positively portray something Karzai has done, “the palace press office wonders 
why we still write things that are bad for him. They do not understand the concept of 
balanced reporting.”1156 
In Afghanistan, like Pakistan, the perception is that the U.S. is a patron for their 
governments. Often, the perception among Afghan and Pakistani officials, and the public, 




Pakistanis want economic and development assistance, but they also want praise and 
encouragement from U.S. government officials. They also want moral support from 
American reporters: Because Afghan and Pakistani officials feel that they are aligning 
themselves with the United States, they are entitled to favorable U.S. news coverage. 
They believe that not just U.S. officials, but the U.S. journalists should be grateful to 
them for their sacrifices to help the United States in its war. Afghan officials often 
complain to U.S. journalists that they do not understand how difficult their jobs are; they 
want reassurance from the American press, because they see them as an extension of the 
American government and nation. Nikki explained: 
It is has not been easy for [Afghan officials] to be an ally of the Americans. It is 
not a popular stand to take in this country. Even though people will say that they 
need the Americans privately, being seen standing next to them is a fraught 
position. And they have been out there doing that. And we’ve never given them 
credit for that… So then when anything or anyone is American in a country where 
honor and image and face is so terribly important comes out and criticizes them, 
they feel really insulted. And that’s why they feel betrayed. They say, ‘We stood 
up for you, we let you come into our country.’ That’s become the narrative: Here 
you are just saying we are blemished in every possible way. 
 
This belief among Afghan officials that American journalists betray them by criticizing 
them means that the officials – and many Afghan journalists, as we have seen – perceive 
U.S. journalists to be an extension of the U.S. government, and/or as representatives of 
the American nation. To them, U.S. journalists work to amplify government rhetoric and 
action; they do not provide a separate, public service. They are all, indiscriminately, 
“America.”  
President Karzai and other officials are also upset because American reporting 
reverberates through the Afghan press, the American journalists agreed.1157 Afghan 




emphasized, but they also woefully mistranslate it at times. Afghan officials can become 
so angry at how they are depicted in U.S. news that they sometimes hold press 
conferences denouncing American journalists and their news organizations. Therefore, 
while they write with American readers in mind, Jason and Tom also try to take into 
consideration local dynamics and think about how Afghan officials will react to their 
reportage.  
Afghan journalists need American news to understand what Washington is 
deciding about Afghanistan, and what Americans are thinking. But Maya emphasized 
that the most important service U.S. news provides is this coverage of the Afghan 
government. The Afghan news channels Pajhwok (the national newswire) and Tolo TV 
(the most popular television station), while professional, “can’t fight the big fights that 
we can.” She agreed with the Afghan journalists that American reportage often provides 
them with a cover, the space they need to expose corruption and malfeasance. 
“Intimidation to journalists here, to local journalists, is nothing new. Which is a shame 
because I think a lot of the Afghans are sick of the corruption and would like to take on 
these stories, but they can’t,” she explained. A majority of the American journalists 
confirmed that, like Afghan officials, Afghan journalists – and media owners – come to 
them or their local staff with information that they feel they couldn’t make public 
themselves.1158 
The American journalists, however, also use Afghan news as source material. To 
understand Afghan society, you need to speak with everyday Afghans, Nathan said, and 
you need to look at Afghan media. The journalists track dozens of Afghan news 




Ariana, and Pajhowk.1159 Tom pointed out that Afghan journalists are the go-to sources 
for breaking news about Taliban and other extremist groups’ attacks; they often use the 
microblogging platform Twitter to broadcast the information. This is a great service to 
U.S. journalists, who are mostly confined to Kabul and cannot witness the attacks first-
hand.  
The Afghan news media does not set the news agenda for the American 
journalists, but local journalists can often provide fragments of information that spark 
new story ideas. For instance, Nikki’s organization watches Tolo frequently and, at some 
point, Tolo had interviewed the Governor of Wardak province, a volatile area less than 
one hundred miles from Kabul. The governor told the news anchor that the transfer of 
control from NATO to the Afghan National Army was too precipitous. Thereupon, she 
decided her news organization should call other provincial governors to see if they were 
also concerned about the military transfer. The warlord stations are also a sound resource 
for U.S. journalists on the warlords’ priorities and actions throughout the country. 
General Abdul Rashid Dostum, for instance, often holds large rallies in northern 
Afghanistan that are broadcast on his television station, Aina. Such assemblies are 
valuable indicators of Afghan public sentiment and the cult of personality around these 
warlords; yet one would only know of their existence on warlord TV.  
While the U.S. journalists look to Afghan journalists for support with breaking 
news and story ideas, they tend to see them as unprofessional and undeveloped. Their 
immaturity is most evident, Nathan said, in the kinds of questions that they ask. The 
questions normally reflect an editorial bias. For instance, one question he heard recently 




problem?”1160 Maya stressed that Afghan journalists often accept certain information as 
truth without investigating or validating it. Nikki agreed that while Afghan journalists 
have improved the past decade, their standard of proof is different from American and 
Western journalists and their news coverage occasionally spreads misinformation.  
The American journalists also think that the majority of Afghan journalists see 
their work simply as a means to a paycheck, not as a public service.1161 There is 
corruption in Afghan journalism as well: Some local reporters extort money from 
politicians and businessmen by claiming that they have evidence of corruption that they 
will expose unless given a bribe.1162  Most Afghan journalists, though, hesitate to confront 
powerful figures because they fear for their lives, or they fear breaking the cultural taboo 
of discrediting their elders. Maya’s Afghan colleagues often raise objections to the 
Americans “ruining reputations” of people by exposing malfeasances. She must spend 
time explaining, repeatedly, why criticism is merited. “It’s in Afghan culture that you 
don’t put people on the spot,” Maya explained. This experience has led her to question if 
Afghan journalists will be willing to hold influential Afghans accountable without regular 
encouragement from the American reporters.  
Yet Jason and Tom agreed that Afghan journalists from Tolo, Channel One and 
Ariana have recently become more aggressive. The head of Moby Media Group, Saad 
Mohseni, who owns Tolo TV, wants to push boundaries they emphasized. At news 
conferences, Tom sees Afghan journalists press officials for information. “They don’t put 
their leaders on pedestals,” he said. “They feel like their leaders ought to be criticized and 
held accountable the way we do when we cover Washington or any state capital.” Tom 




nosed” and “passionate” about their work. “Maybe the American press provided the 
initial spark [for this]. But now they know what they are doing. I can’t see it coming to an 
abrupt halt because the guys who inspired them to do it are gone,” he explained.  
The other American journalists I interviewed aren’t as optimistic about the 
independent, or currently Western-backed, Afghan media’s future.1163 With the exception 
of India, Afghanistan’s neighborhood does not offer examples of a pluralistic, free press 
that is socially responsible and contests authority. The Afghan press’s future simply 
hinges, they concurred, on how the Afghan government treats them: If they crack down 
on freedom of speech and a free press, then it will disappear; if they protect them, they 
will survive.  
The likelihood, however, is that the Afghan government will relinquish press 
freedoms after U.S. troops leave Afghanistan, and U.S. news bureaus close down because 
of the exodus. There will be no more investigative news about the Afghan government or 
the country’s power brokers. “The concept of a free media will go completely out the 
window,” Maya lamented. She, Nathan and Nikki agreed that the so-called independent 
media that benefitted from Western funding are unsustainable. Tolo TV, Afghanistan’s 
most popular station, is “too American” in its current form, Nikki and Nathan concurred, 
and it will probably regress into a more government-friendly station.1164 They expect 
warlord, government or Iran- and Pakistani- funded media to remain. Without the support 
of the U.S. government and U.S. journalists, the successes of the news media the past 








American Journalists’ Relationship with Pakistani Government Officials and 
Journalists 
 
 In neighboring Pakistan, government officials are similarly skeptical of U.S. 
journalists and their relationship with American officials, yet they are also responsive to 
requests from U.S. television or elite news publications. Still, interviews with Pakistani 
officials are rarely straightforward, Nathan emphasized. Often, Pakistani officials smile at 
him during the conversation, as if they are not taking the interview seriously. He 
interpreted this as them trying to “win the battle of the interview” and “outsmart the 
Americans” while pushing “total nonsense.” While they are in Pakistan, American 
journalists regularly hear from agents with the Inter Services International (ISI), the 
intelligence wing of the Pakistani military, who call to complain about their reporting. 
They often issue veiled threats and assign them minders who shadow them.1165 The day 
after Nathan aired a story on the Amadi people, a minority Muslim sect in Pakistan, and 
their lack of religious freedom in the country, he received a call from an agent in the ISI 
“special branch.” The agent reminded Nathan that ISI was the equivalent of the CIA, and 
then told him that they knew he had visited the Amadi village. “But he didn’t really say 
anything direct. He just wanted me to know they were keeping an eye on me.” In 
Pakistan, the ISI always “wanted you to know they are watching you.”1166  
 In other words, James said, the Pakistani government is paranoid about the 
presence of American journalists in the country. Not just the government, but the media 
and the public, he stressed, care far too much what’s written about them in the U.S. press. 




worry too much about American reportage. Pakistan is image-obsessed, he said, whereas 
their rival, India, is much more secure about its place in the world. This insecurity is 
palpable in the Pakistani media because journalists are insistent on destroying people’s 
lives through shaming politicians and others in power, whether it is warranted or not. 
Pakistani journalists, James said, see “destruction [of careers and reputations] as a show 
of success.” Destruction is their version of holding power accountable. “Unless you bring 
someone down, you’re not a good journalist,” James explained. U.S. journalists, he said, 
know that just because they have the power to devastate individuals’ careers and 
institutions, does not mean they should do it unless they have indisputable evidence. But 
this belief does not resonate in Pakistan. He continued:  
The Pakistanis [journalists] have destroyed so many fucking people. It’s really 
bad…The media in the U.S. totally overstates its importance – embarrassingly 
overstates its importance. But as a destructive force, it is incredibly potent. It’s 
capability for destruction is much greater than its capability for doing good. My 
stories can only do so much in regards to having a big policy impact, but they can 
very easily destroy someone’s career. 
 
As a result, “the myth of Watergate runs amok in Pakistan.” Pakistani journalists take 
shortcuts. They accuse people of wrongdoing much more than they investigate 
wrongdoing. This does not make for a responsible, constructive force in society. Like 
many Pakistani journalists whom I interviewed, James agrees that broadcast media can 
contribute more to chaos and confusion than to a functioning liberal society.  
The Pakistani news media is largely immature and agenda-driven, Nathan agreed. 
They often speculate about motive while reporting information, and therefore project 
conspiracy theories that the Pakistani public may misinterpret as fact. To him, the 




there, or editors in the sense that we [American reporters] are used to…They usually pass 
off editorial writing for reporting.” Yet assuming that one’s perceptions are reality is part 
of Pakistan’s culture. He continued: 
There is a perception and a belief that people in Pakistan know more about U.S. 
politics and motives than Americans do. Because they believe that Americans are 
brainwashed by [American] politicians. And they don’t … see how American 
policy is affecting people on the ground. So they believe that Americans are 
getting a rosy view through their news media… they say, ‘We live this. We know 
the truth.’…and I think it’s fine for them to talk about the impact since they are 
living in these spaces. But when they start talking about motives and intentions, 
then that’s where it crosses a line. 
 
The Pakistani journalists tend to embrace falsehoods about American government 
conspiracies, such as the notion that the September 11 attacks were an inside job, Nathan 
explained. Sometimes Pakistanis do appreciate additional information about an issue, but 
it rarely alters their anti-American worldview. “This is what they believe, what they 
heard, what they want to believe. And you’re not going to change that,” Nathan said. 
Nathan agreed with James that Pakistani journalists, and even Afghan ones, have 
a Watergate-like dream of “We’re going to expose this stuff and bring down this 
power.’”1167 Rarely do they think they need to inform voters about larger matters. In both 
countries, “Democracy is a novel concept. Leaders don’t know how to operate in a 
democracy, citizens don’t know how to operate in a democracy, the media doesn’t know 
how to operate in a democracy, and institutions are still in raw form.” At least in the U.S., 
the journalists interviewed agreed, reporters know what their laws and protections are. 






Future of U.S. News Coverage of Afghanistan and  Pakistan  
 
Each American journalist I interviewed stated that their news organization’s 
bureaus would remain in the region as long as U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan, or as 
long as their organizations could afford to keep them there.1168 They likely will stop 
reporting from Afghanistan full time after 2015, one year after the American military’s 
withdrawal. Maya and Nathan stressed that Iraq is largely a dead story to American news 
now that U.S. troops have gone; their respective news bureaus in Baghdad, once the 
largest in the world, are now empty. Roger was certain that after the troops depart, his 
agency “will not have the stomach for this story.” There is even the chance, Nathan said, 
that things will stabilize in Afghanistan so much that there is no longer a news story there 
of relevance to Americans, or the world.  
Yet many of the journalists thought that security will deteriorate, making the U.S. 
news bureaus much more costly and difficult to manage. One option is that the local 
journalists whom U.S. news organizations employ to write news stories will maintain the 
bureaus, Jason said. But the American journalists will only occasionally parachute in and 
not be able to provide much context of a post-American war Afghanistan. There may not 
be another civil war in Afghanistan, Nikki said, but “it will still be ugly. There will be 
people being killed who are innocent, which is what we [the U.S. government and 
military] should have stopped…I believe our job as American journalists is to document 





The American journalists want to continue covering Afghanistan and Pakistan 
after 2014. “There’s a general desire and editorial policy to stay here with as large a 
presence as long as we can,” Nathan said. But the American demand for Afghanistan 
news will decrease, many said, and that will affect their organizations’ resources.1169 The 
American journalists, like the troops, are exhausted from covering a war that has lasted 
more than a decade. Jason noted that they have fallen into a trap of routine news coverage 
that is not particularly illuminating of the country or the war Americans are fighting. He 
said:  
The biggest problem with the coverage here is that it is so rote. It’s been the same 
thing for so long that no one wants to read it and no one wants to write it. It’s like 
‘writing by numbers’ now. Everyone knows how to write a bombing story…if 
you contrast that stuff to the first time there were bombings in Baghdad, people 
tried hard to write in creative ways. And now there’s no appetite for it from the 
editors or the writers…you almost need people who haven’t written this before to 
attempt it. Everyone else is so tired.   
 
The news story of the region as violent and failed – and perhaps no longer worthy of 
American money, time or energy – is currently the norm. The American journalists are 
unlikely to change that before they leave Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their jobs were to 
report for Americans, which they did diligently. The unintended consequences of their 
reportage in Afghanistan and Pakistan are ultimately not their concern. They are 





CHAPTER 12: Clarity in Chaos: Nationalism to Manage Reportage 
 
 
A nation’s news media always illuminates the nation itself. How news 
professionals determine newsworthiness, how they construct narratives and how they 
present them indicate their nation’s priorities, its agreements, divisions, and its role in the 
world. Journalists have astounding power to construct a sense of reality for people, but 
despite the transnational reach of news today, editors, producers and reporters select and 
construct media messages to cater to their targeted audiences.1170  They often aim to 
deliver a worldview that feels comfortable for the audiences, and give them evidence that 
the “pictures in their heads” are accurate.  
The picture of U.S., Afghan and Pakistani relations, no matter your vantage point, is 
hazy. It is infused by three decades of tunnel vision, distortion, mutual dependency and 
resentment. Journalists from each country try to make sense of the chaos of conflict, yet 
whatever clarity they arrive at comes mainly from nationalism.1171 Nationalism is 
equipment that reporters use to make sense of conflict. A lens that puts your country at 
the center can bring war into sharp focus. But it also radically oversimplifies the chaos.  
The principle of objectivity might seem to hold professional journalism together, but 
it is much easier to supply, even simulate, in the examination of domestic issues. When 
reporting about their own governments, journalists can take up a certain familiar distance 
from a political party, and take advantage of that distance to critique officials and 
politicians vying for influence. They can employ a plausible mental grid with which to 
understand, and sometimes clarify, the various positions and conflicts. Yet detaching 




it comes to the question of their country’s role in the world, journalists do not disengage 
themselves from their national identity. In this study, each set of journalists – Afghan, 
American, Pakistani – identifies with their fellow citizens and therefore with their nation.  
In part this is cultural, virtually automatic – a case of emotional identification. In part it is 
strategic – a necessity to make their story comprehensible to their primary readers. But by 
reporting for one audience, they unintentionally package their nations in an efficient form 
for outsiders to consume. The journalists play the role of representatives, or de facto 
diplomats, for their nations.  
This is certainly the case for American journalists who work for elite news 
organizations. Afghan and Pakistani journalists habitually look to them in order to 
understand a country that looms so large in their own affairs.1172 Yet they seek to 
understand the U.S. in its relation to their own nations. They do not want to understand 
America in all of its complexity; they want to know what the American government and 
people think about them. Just as American journalists talk about America in global news, 
Afghan and Pakistani journalists focus on themselves, on their nations, when talking 
about America. National interest is not an exclusively American concept. Ethnocentricity 
in journalism is universal.   
The types of ethnocentricity that each country has, and the degree of it, however, 
differ. American-branded media dominates global news, and therefore American 
ethnocentricity has a special weight and significance. The United States is a global 
hegemon, and American journalists, as citizens, have an abiding loyalty to it. Since those 
journalists dominate the international media market and news flows, they can accentuate 




Since the late 1970s and the New World Information and Communication Order 
movement, developing countries have complained about this one-way flow of 
communication from the West. The United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) confirmed in 1985 that the richest countries in the world with 
the most sway over international politics received the most coverage and also had the 
most influence in international news. This especially applied to the United States.1173 
Leaders in Asian, African and Middle Eastern countries referred to this information 
imbalance as a form of neo-colonialism in which the West was serving as image-makers 
for others.1174 They saw it as a form of suppression: The Western media should be 
supporting these countries’ development, not focusing on their failures.  
This sentiment is very palpable in Afghanistan and Pakistan, although more so in 
Pakistan. Afghans and Pakistanis do not appreciate the recurring picture of them as failed 
states seething with violence and instability. I, and the very Americans journalists who 
write those stories, cannot blame them. This visceral reaction comes from their 
ethnocentricity. Pakistan’s brand of ethnocentricity is embedded in its inception. To keep 
the country together, Pakistani governments since 1947 have reminded their citizens that 
Pakistan was founded to give South Asian Muslims a home, and the state is who they 
are.1175 Today, even government-created highway signs in major cities read, “Pakistan is 
our identity.” When U.S. elite news criticizes Pakistan and focuses on their failures as a 
country, Pakistani journalists feel criticized and judged.  
Afghanistan’s brand was built over time, through the many battles it fought as a 
nation against occupying forces like the British and Soviets. Afghanistan is also home to 




They know Afghanistan’s place in the world and are less insecure about it. The Afghan 
journalists are disappointed that the U.S. news media focuses on the war when it attempts 
to explain Afghanistan to the United States, but they also accept the criticisms of their 
government. They value the space that the U.S. government gives them to be reporters by 
funding them and encouraging the Afghan government to do so; and they value the 
information U.S. reporters give them about the wrongdoings of their country’s most 
powerful people.1176 They want the U.S. news media to support their development, but do 
not mind them documenting their failures along the way as much.  
Even though they should be able to take control of their countries’ stories, 
Afghans and Pakistanis feel too overwhelmed by their situations to do so. Nominally, 
their press systems are free. But the degree of that freedom fluctuates. Objective 
investigation and quality information are especially difficult to come by. The Afghan and 
Pakistani populations are afflicted with chronic conflict and political turmoil. They are 
only fitfully emerging from periods of harsh authoritarian rule where people were 
supposed to be subservient to government. The Afghan and Pakistani governments may 
trumpet a free news media as a sign of their liberalization and progress in international 
society, but the reality is only tolerated to a lesser degree. They regularly look for ways to 
suppress media freedoms.  
Yet Afghan and Pakistani journalists deeply value their roles. They see 
themselves as public guides to democracy and modernity. They want to create order out 





In Pakistan, News Reflects an Anxious, Uncertain Society 
 
In Pakistan, part of modernization includes a broadcast-centric, non-stop news 
media that needs not just to report and analyze news, but to entertain as it informs. Their 
press corps has become young, fast and electronic, making it dangerously viral. A vastly 
uneducated populace, eager for information and entertainment, has quickly gravitated 
toward it. And therein lies the problem. 
The Pakistani journalists covet their opportunity to hold the power accountable that 
they could not for decades. The purpose of Pakistan’s first newspapers, Nawa-e-Waqt and 
Dawn, were to create legitimacy for a Pakistani, Muslim identity separate from British 
India in the 1940s.1177 Once the Pakistani state was established though, the Pakistani 
government worked relentlessly to control them.1178 For decades, journalists slowly 
learned how to balance being defiant while paying homage to the government to 
survive.1179 But then, in 2002, when President Pervez Musharraf liberalized electronic 
media, a young crop of journalists (the average age is 23) became more vociferous. They 
want to avenge the wrongs of the government in the way that earlier generations could 
not. They work actively to destroy power in its current form. As a result, they find public 
acceptance and, in it, power for themselves. But the most popular broadcast news 
organizations today reflect a society that feels vulnerable to their military and extremist 
groups.  
The criticisms leveled by Pakistani journalists in this study illustrate that 
vulnerability. A majority of those interviewed considered themselves moderate. They 




conflict and political intrigue and whose emphasis has become perversely addictive. 
Television stations often compete for the most gruesome, invasive news coverage of 
tragic events. The electronic news media has largely become desensitized to violence and 
relentlessly tramples on human rights to get a story.  
Consider the recent death of Owais Baig, a 23-year-old man. In late November 
2012, he went to an interview at the Karachi Electricity Supply Company on the eighth 
floor of the State Life Insurance building. While he sat waiting for the interview, a fire 
engulfed the building. He did not know how to save himself other than through the 
window. He hung from the eighth floor window as a crowd of spectators swelled outside. 
Among them were cameraman from ARY and AAJ, two popular television networks.1180 
Yet no one helped. Baig fell to his death, with the cameramen documenting his descent.  
The media wanted him to fall, Maheen Usmani wrote in a column for the elite 
English-language newspaper Dawn on Nov. 30, 2012. As Baig’s grip slipped, it was 
likely that “the cameraman was already licking his lips in anticipation of accolades from 
not only his Bureau Chief, but also from the Director News. No matter who won the 
media battle for cheap sensationalism and gutter press, he was destined to lose.”1181 ARY 
and AAJ chronicled his death, with ARY bragging that they were “the first” to bring the 
event to the Pakistani public.1182  Local news media defended their “right” to show the 
grisly footage. “What right,” Usmani asked, “does the media have to critique politicians 
when their behavior was no less criminal?”1183 
Such criticism of the press by the press suggests some hope that the Pakistani 
news media will not forever be defined by sensationalist coverage. Some moderate, more 




The Express Tribune later wrote a piece, “We are sorry, Owais Baig,” in which he said 
that the majority of media has become desensitized to death. “To broadcast the clips of a 
man dangling from a burning building until he falls to his death shows the level of 
empathy and social awareness that our media lacks….Let us force our media houses 
to publicly apologize for this particular error so that they recognize their professional 
code of conduct and never indulge in such indecency again.”1184  By the moderate 
journalists’ own admission, however, there are few of the contrite. They continue to be 
overpowered by their colleagues and by media owners who are narrowly focused on high 
ratings.    
Americans look to the U.S. news media for explanations and guidance on 
terrorism and violence and for a feeling of unity with the rest of the nation through 
sharing information.1185 The Pakistani public looks to their press for the same. However, 
news professionals regularly, daily, assume there is intentionality behind the actions of 
the civilian government, their military, the Americans, the Indians and extremist groups, 
including the Taliban, that infest them. Conspiracy theory is pervasive in Pakistani 
culture, a legacy from a closed society that created habits of suspicion and resentment. 
“While Pakistanis are willing to blame some of their troubles on themselves, feelings of 
responsibility are lessened by the alleged sinister behavior of others,” Marvin Weinbaum, 
a professor of political science at the University of Illinois and former Pakistan analyst at 
the U.S. Department of State, wrote in 1996. He continued, “It is far more comforting to 
contend that their impotence comes from the reality that they have been singled out for 
manipulation and exploitation, and regularly let down by their friends.” 1186 One of those 




Pakistan and elsewhere.  
To Pakistan, the United States has not been a loyal friend. In the 1990s, the U.S. 
suspended its embassy in Kabul and, upon discovery that Pakistan was pursuing nuclear 
weapons again, cut-off its aid -- leaving Pakistan to single-handedly deal with the post-
Cold War chaos in Afghanistan. Since the post-9/11 war began in 2001, the U.S. has also 
contributed to volatility along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border as extremists fled U.S. 
troops in Afghanistan for the semi-autonomous tribal areas. The U.S. has launched 
multiple drone strikes into Pakistani territory to kill suspected militants. But Pakistan’s 
corrupt politicians, military leaders and extremists have inflicted more damage on the 
state’s government, economy and overall psyche. Pakistan’s news media will take on 
America and Pakistan’s corrupt politicians but rarely the county’s military or homegrown 
extremists. Saleem Safi, a talk show host on the overwhelmingly popular Geo network, 
explained that there are surefire rules for high ratings in Pakistan’s broadcast media. One 
is to “start verbally abusing America. If you abuse the Taliban, al-Qaeda or the Pakistani 
establishment, you face threats to your life — people say you are a non-Muslim. If you 
are talking against America, you become a hero.” 1187 This fixation on the U.S. is an 
obsession with victimhood, which is always an evasion of responsibility, an invitation to 
bad faith. Yet as long as sensationalism attracts viewers and conspiracy theories comfort 
them, this is unlikely to change.  
Or is it? Pakistan’s news reflects an anxious society, but without a clear 
agreement on its direction or how to pursue positive change. The moderate journalistic 
minority sees the fundamental problems in their press and society for what they are, but 




forces can control journalism is overblown. Michael Schudson wrote in Sociology of 
News, “the desire for profit makes a news operation vulnerable to influence by advertisers, 
but the more profitable a news outlet is, the more it is able to withstand such 
pressure.”1188 News professionals can protect themselves from market-driven censorship 
by educating the audience on in-depth reporting, investigation and analysis that looks at 
all of their society’s problems.1189 For now, the electronic Pakistani news media has 
chosen to embrace populism, and let mass sentiment drive their news coverage. It is up to 
Pakistani journalists with moderate views who work for news organizations that put a 
premium on sensationalism to assert their value and lead.  
They will, however, have to be exceedingly careful: 51 Pakistani journalists have 
been killed since 1994, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. Fifty-five 
percent of them have been intentionally murdered and in 96 percent of those cases, no 
one has been convicted. Sixty-one percent of the deaths have been related to Pakistani 
politics.1190 It is the most dangerous place to be a journalist today.   
 
In Afghanistan, News Reflects an Uncertain yet Hopeful Society  
 
A sense of national vulnerability and a penchant for conspiracy tales are also 
evident in the Afghan news media system, yet the Afghan journalists who work for 
independent news organizations are proud of their progress. They are largely hopeful that 
they can contribute to a robust, democratic society for the long-term. They are most 
critical of the lack of professionalism in Afghan news, but their free news system is just 




The Afghan news media feels pressure from many directions: the government, 
warlords, Iranians, Pakistanis and the West – mainly Americans. The government-
sponsored news media continues its century-long tradition of uncritical reportage about 
official policies and actions; warlord television promotes the political agendas of men 
who destroyed the country in the early 1990s; and the Iranian and Pakistani sponsored 
press wants to bend the Afghan public in favor of their visions for the region. The 
Western-backed news media, the most popular in the country, also reflects an agenda for 
a liberal society with a free press. But within that free press, the journalists I spoke with 
are much more reluctant than their Pakistani peers to hold any power accountable. The 
journalists want to be responsible stewards of an open society, but they fear for their lives 
and livelihoods. After three decades of war, one cannot blame them.  
The Afghan news media does not independently pursue the major malfeasances of 
their government, warlords and overall society. They come from a place of severe 
weakness. Decades of authoritarianism have habituated them to following government 
dictates. They take for granted conflict, corruption, poverty, warlordism and inefficiency. 
This dysfunction is remarkable and fascinating to outsiders, like American journalists. 
But to the Afghans it is routine. They are just beginning to learn to recognize that they 
can challenge the people and institutions responsible for wreaking such havoc in the 
country, and the American journalists who are based in Kabul have been their tutors.  
There are some Afghan journalists who desperately want to inject hope and 
positivity into an otherwise bleak environment through the media. This includes the 
coverage of the Afghan National Cricket Team by radio stations such as Salam Watandar 




debut of Afghan Premier League Football. All of this gives Afghans a sort of competition 
they can cheer. News as entertainment in Afghanistan also aims to be more educational 
than its equivalent in Pakistan: Television and radio programs attempt to teach Afghan 
citizens about the importance of health, education and the vital role women play in their 
society and economy. Conspiracy, security and political intrigue show up in Afghan 
independent news and on talk shows, but they are not the focal points. In warlord, Iran or 
Pakistan-sponsored media, however, they are. 
In Afghanistan, the news media reflects a culture that is also anxious for change in 
security, human rights and its economy, but is reticent to push for it too quickly as the 
powerful forces that ran the country for decades still linger. While the United States and 
the West help keep those forces at bay, 10 Afghan journalists have been killed the past 
decade. Five of these cases have been confirmed to be murder, half of which were caused 
by paramilitary or political groups. Sixty-seven percent of the cases have not resulted in 
conviction.1191 This is a fraction of journalists’ deaths in neighboring Pakistan, but it still 
helps to explain the high-degree of self-censorship among Afghan journalists.  
Afghan journalists are attentive to signs of progress and self-consciously aim to 
improve the welfare of their long-impoverished citizens. But it is not clear that their 
attempts are sustainable or effective. For instance, the American government funds many 
of the news and entertainment programs on TV stations like Tolo that encourage Afghans 
to send their children to school, respect women’s rights and support their Afghan 
National Army and police forces. The U.S. and other Western governments also urge the 
Afghan government to protect free speech. Journalists who work for U.S. news 




also serve as conduits for information that the Afghans themselves do not feel safe 
reporting. Without a steady U.S. presence in the country to support a free and functional 
press, the Afghan news media will more easily be overpowered by warlords, Iran and an 
Afghan government that is eager to make journalists their spokespeople. Like the 
Pakistani journalists, the Afghan journalists will have to try to continue to lead, as long as 
security conditions and a democratic government allows them to.   
 
In America, News Reflects Power 
 
In Afghanistan and Pakistan, two countries whose publics have been controlled by 
outsiders for decades, the general assumption is that the United States controls their fate. 
To them, America is all-powerful, brutally efficient and constantly conspiring. And there 
is enough evidence to prove this: The decade long presence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, 
the infiltration of drones into Pakistani tribal areas, and the breach of Pakistani 
sovereignty in killing Osama bin Laden in May 2011 all show the insistence of the U.S. 
on treating their countries as battleground space to expand its power. Afghan and 
Pakistani journalists react viscerally to American news about their countries, and 
understandably so: American political, economic and security apparatuses directly affect 
Afghans and Pakistanis’ lives. It has done so for decades.  
The U.S. news media amplifies that power. A nation’s soft power, by Joseph 
Nye’s definition, is, “its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the 
values that underlie them.”1192 The U.S. news media encompasses the value of free 




international affairs, and it certainly does not succeed in legitimizing U.S. policies. To the 
contrary, it helps foreign citizens see more starkly how different they are from America. 
American news professionals have considerable reach and authority in the world, 
and the mental image, the picture they have helped construct for Americans about 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, is frightening. They have constructed a narrow, violent reality 
of the two countries that Afghans and Pakistanis do not accept as accurate or adequate. In 
their eyes, American news judges their countries harshly yet fails to apply the same 
standard of judgment toward America itself. 
 The Afghan and Pakistani journalists are correct: U.S. journalists do focus on U.S. 
national interests and frame the world through lenses of conflict, disaster and crisis. As 
Herbert Gans emphasized in Deciding What’s News, a focus on conflict and violence is 
an ”enduring news value,” a significant or even decisive factor in determining the 
newsworthiness of events.1193 Another value at work in American journalism is the 
assumption that the U.S. is the most important and valued nation in the world order.1194 
The framework in which Americans understand our involvement in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan is overwhelmingly the question of security rooted in the al-Qaeda attacks on 
America on September 11, 2001 and the ensuing warfare with the Taliban and its 
supporters. American journalists who report from Afghanistan and Pakistan try to give 
their American readers context about the countries, but a disproportionate amount of 
focus is on Afghanistan not as a nation, but as an arena for U.S. troops. As individuals, 
U.S. foreign correspondents have gained empathy for the plight of the people and the 




America’s role in them. The U.S. journalists’ responsibility, after all, is to report and 
analyze issues and events for the American people – not Afghans or Pakistanis.  
Despite this focus on the American nation, the journalists who report for U.S. 
news organizations from Kabul and Islamabad insist that they hold U.S. government 
officials accountable. This is undeniably true. The American news media has told a story 
of this war that is frustrating, exhausting, and endlessly complicated. Some of the most 
sobering stories have been about the limits of American power in the region. For instance, 
in the past two years, the Wall Street Journal’s Maria Abi-Habib’s investigative reporting 
exposed the horrific neglect of the Dawood Military Hospital under the control of U.S. 
Lieutenant General William Caldwell, which led to a congressional hearing;1195  the 
Washington Post’s Kevin Sieff’s work has focused on the legacy of war that the U.S. will 
leave behind in Afghanistan, including a field of landmines that Afghan children play in 
with no warning ; 1196  and the New York Times’ Alissa Rubin and Matt Rosenberg cover 
the deaths of Afghan civilians at the hands of U.S. forces. The Afghans and Pakistanis 
still, though, largely do not see the humility in American news. They see a reflection of 
power.  
 
The Media Boomerang Effect 
 
American journalists report for Americans, yet they are also major purveyors of 
information for anyone invested in this conflict. Once reported, information from U.S. 
news organizations becomes a global force. The international news net is interwoven, 




media boomerang effect: Whatever text is written, whatever pictures are taken, whatever 
words are said about a foreign land for a U.S. audience promptly travels back to the 
government officials, journalists and citizens of the nation American journalists are 
talking about.  
Until “we know what others think they know,” Walter Lippmann said in 1922, 
“we cannot truly understand their acts.” Consuming American news about them is a ritual 
for Afghan and Pakistani journalists and government elites, it’s an addiction to 
understanding their place in America’s world. They see the New York Times as the 
agenda-setter for American policy, and arguably the most important news organization in 
the world, with the Washington Post coming in second.1197 As Tsan-Kuo Chang said, “all 
countries [are] not created equal to be news” and global publics definitely sense that 
when they look at U.S. and western journalism.1198 But Afghans and Pakistanis have seen 
themselves relatively frequently in American news the past deacde, especially since the 
commencement of President Obama’s first term in 2009.  
In one way, Pakistani journalists are proud that American elite news finds 
Pakistan newsworthy. It confers legitimacy on Pakistan’s importance in the world. The 
Pakistani people’s greatest resentment toward America is when it “abandoned” them in 
the 1990s as it pursued nuclear weapons. The Pakistani journalists want U.S. news when 
it confirms their worldview because elite U.S. journalism gives their reportage credibility. 
When it does not, the majority of journalists and pundits rail about it being complicit with 
the U.S. government. In this way, the journalists display cognitive dissonance: They hold 
two incompatible ideas about the nature of the American press, and the value of 




typical self-contradictions of the weak and dependent. The Afghan journalists are also 
weak and dependent, but have a more constructive relationship with their American 
counterparts. The openly admit that they depend on them too much. They fear the day 
when U.S. news will stop talking about them again, as it will confirm that Afghanistan no 
longer matters to America’s story.   
 
The Diplomatic Dimension of American News 
 
Patricia Karl wrote in her 1982 analysis of U.S. mass-mediated coverage of the 
Iran hostage crisis: “The media are increasingly a part of the process (if not the entire 
process) in the communications between governments and publics about international 
politics.”1199 Governments can share information through traditional diplomatic channels, 
but a nation’s news systems can reach both governments and citizens, playing an 
unofficial diplomatic role. Since U.S. journalists’ work is regularly consumed by 
American and foreign government officials, it can help shape their opinions and therefore 
become part of the dynamics that affect the conduct of international relations.  
American journalists can play a diplomatic role in the sense that they help 
Americans, who elect leaders who can shape the world, to understand the world. They 
also become stand-ins, surrogates, conveying to non-Americans a plausible replica of 
their nation’s politics and views. They signal to Afghans and Pakistanis how the U.S. 
government sees the region and what it wants to happen there.  
Many commentators have argued that the diplomatic dimension of journalism is 
that reporters can write news stories that foster understanding; that they play an unofficial, 




international relations.1200  In 1964, for instance, John Hohenberg, a professor at 
Columbia University and the former administrator of the Pulitzer Prize, wrote that 
foreign correspondents could create “understanding between peoples by bringing them 
more meaningful news of each other.”1201  Yet this view doesn’t take into account 
American news’ asymmetric power and does not stand in today’s context. 
A large majority of Afghans and Pakistanis assume that journalists are advocates for 
the U.S. government’s foreign policies. This is not entirely true. American journalists let 
the U.S. government set the news agenda on foreign matters; they project foreign issues 
and events through an American worldview frame; and they write mainly for American 
audiences. They are in Afghanistan and Pakistan because the U.S. government is there, 
and they will likely leave with U.S. troops sometime in 2014. Rarely, does the U.S. news 
media challenge the norm of U.S. power in the world, but they want to keep the 
government accountable so that it maintains that power as a force for good and can keep 
America safe. They do not, however, work in tandem with U.S. officials.  
But that doesn’t really matter. When it comes to diplomacy and global public opinion, 
perception is more important than reality. And the effect of U.S. news on diplomacy 
inside Afghanistan and Pakistan has been damaging. In Afghanistan, the stories 
American journalists choose to pursue and how they frame them has contributed to the 
tension between the administrations of Hamid Karzai and Barack Obama. The U.S. press 
has not mediated understanding between the two leaders. Rather, Karzai sees U.S. 
journalists as co-conspirators with U.S. government officials, with the American press as 
a means to publicly register complaints against him and the Afghan nation. 




development role for Afghan journalists; they have become their instructors on how to be 
professional reporters. Pakistani politicians and their media, in the meantime, are well 
served by being anti-American and they use U.S. news selectively to validate them for 
being so. The fact that there is only 9 percent public approval of the U.S. drives much of 
U.S.-Pakistani relations, which motivates Pakistani politicians to campaign on anti-
American platforms – and media owners to encourage ant-Americanism for high ratings. 
The constant U.S. news refrain that Pakistan is a violent, epicenter for terrorism and an 
economic basket case can harden anti-American views. 
Fundamentally, what frustrates Afghan and Pakistani reporters about American news 
is what frustrates them about America. The Afghan and Pakistani journalists believe U.S. 
news should consider their perspective more, be more empathetic, stop serving itself. 
That will not happen. America’s most elite news organizations can report and explain the 
contours of American power and its impact abroad, but they see the world through an 
American-centric, security lens. As a result, it does not bridge understanding or broker 
goodwill between the U.S. and the two countries. Just because American news is 
transnational does not mean American reporters abandon their national identity. 
Nationalism is how we organize the world and make sense of conflict. We cannot easily 
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American – that information is getting out there fairly and accurately.” Often, this is interpreted, he said, as 
being defensive of the United States.  
 
1133 Tom. Interview by author. Tom said that covering the military, too, as an institution is fascinating: “To 
be able to write what is a very local story about a few Americans that also happens to be a global story 
because those Americans are in a far off place that is of geopolitical – that’s very neat. There are few other 
places in the world where you can report on that kind of intersection. A kid from a small town and the 
province that hangs in the balance – for those things to intersect are really interesting, and important.” 
 
1134 Nikki. Interview by author. The military, Nikki said, doesn’t know how to work with the Western elite 
media: “They have this huge press operation and they don’t know how to use us. And one way they could 
do it is to tell stories of things that aren’t going well to their leadership back in Washington. Whether if it’s 
that they need more time or backing for one thing or another, they should use the press to get their message. 
The press should be in their arsenal,” Nikki said. “We’re doing our job which is to report what we see, and 
they are doing their job which is to get people to hear what is difficult.” 
 
1135 Nathan. Interview by author 
 
1136Tom. Interview by author. If Afghans and Pakistanis do see the U.S. media as being sycophantic or 
stuck on security frames, it is often the journalists who parachute into the country for short reports, Tom 
emphasized. The U.S. military makes it easy for American journalists to travel to Afghanistan for succinct 
time periods, and then has great control over the narrative they write. The stories those parachute 
journalists produce are weak, Tom said, and are definitely American centric because they interact only with 
Americans and no Afghans. “But if you look at the journalists who are based here, I think our coverage is 
fair,” Tom said. They know the military officials – and the region – well enough to criticize the military 
strategy and policy separate from covering the troops whose lives are at stake.  
 
1137 Nathan. Interview by author. Access to U.S. government officials in Kabul is more difficult than it is in 
Washington, Nathan agreed. In Washington, you have access to a variety of legislators or White House, 
Pentagon or State Department officials. But in Islamabad and Kabul, there are far more physical and 
bureaucratic barriers in place for journalists to interface and develop relationships with them, he said. 
 
1138 James. Interview by author. One of the stories that began with off the record comments was the Kabul 
Bank story, which Washington Post broke in February 2010. One of the journalists who worked on the 
story told me it began with U.S. officials telling him that a lot of money was leaving Kabul to buy homes in 
Dubai. A Post journalist went to Dubai to speak with the housing authority and the Afghan community 
there to investigate where exactly the money was coming from. They brought that information to the U.S. 
embassy for commentary, but a Wikileaks cable later showed that the embassy seemed to be surprised by 
the extent of information the Post had gathered. 
 
1139 Nikki. Interview by author. Nikki said, “But what Afghan journalists don’t realize is that protection will 
diminish as U.S. aid and the presence of the U.S. military diminishes. So it is true that Afghans will have to 
do it themselves because we won’t be able to do it either, or we’ll be able to do much less.” Afghan power 
brokers and government officials often threaten the local staffs of the U.S. news bureaus; it’s frightening to 
think what could happen to them if they did not work for an American news organization, Nikki said. “In 
the end, though, we do have the protection of the U.S. government and that helps us a great deal. And it’s 
something that Afghan reporters don’t have. They are much more vulnerable.”  
 
1140 Jason. Interview by author; Given recent episodes of American journalists who had been taken hostage 
– New York Times’ David Rohde and Steve Ferrel, for instance, Jason said,  “It is nice to know how much 
effort [the U.S. government] puts into getting you out.” 
 
1141 Maya. Interview by author. Recently, the Afghan Minister of Defense had threatened her over a story 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that she reported it to seek fame. She did not know about the statement until the U.S. embassy called her to 
tell her, “And they really stood up for me, because I’m an American… I don’t think I expected it, but after 
they did it I wasn’t surprised,” Maya said. But the American embassies will also stand up against injustice, 
Maya thought, “I think they would do the same for any Afghan journalist who was thrust into the 
limelight…Unfortunately, it take a lot of attention to be protected by the U.S. government but when there’s 
a sense of injustice that’s in your face like that and really pervasive, people tend to react,” Maya said. 
 
1142 Nathan. Interview by author. Nathan was not sure if the U.S. government would support him if he 
angered the Afghan government, but should something happen to him, it would likely get much media 
attention. “Good, bad or otherwise, Western journalists are going to cover what happens to other Western 
journalists in an environment like this. So you just know how much of a black eye it would be if the 
government detains you, beats you, etc,” he said. There’s a high probability that Afghan and Pakistani 
officials could pick up, intimidate or harass Afghan and Pakistani journalists, or insurgents can take them. 
They are often legitimately afraid to report stories of corruption or malfeasance, or on the inner network of 
the insurgencies for that reason.  
 
1143 Tom. Interview by author; Nikki. Interview by author. 
 
1144 Roger. Interview by author. Despite this, American journalists do not come to the region to protect U.S. 
interests, Roger emphatically said. 
 
1145 Jason. Interview by author. The Taliban could also invoke sympathy if they allowed American 
journalists to embed with them in the same way the Mujahdeen allowed Americans to in their fight against 
the Soviets. “Then, the Americans had access to the rebels and saw the story through their heroic efforts to 
fight the evil Soviets. I think it the Taliban had a smarter media strategy they would let us in and embed 
with then, then I think they would get much more sympathetic coverage – much like the mujahedeen did – 
if they took in journalists. I think they missed an opportunity to portray themselves as human beings with a 
legitimate struggle. A lot of people would be more sympathetic to their cause if they explained it a different 
way, that they just wanted to get foreign troops out of their country,” Jason said. 
 
1146 James. Interview by author. James was aware that in 2009, 46 percent of the U.S. news coverage on 
Afghanistan was indexed to the ‘Af-Pak’ policy debate in Washington. But he attributes this to the fact that 
many foreign correspondents came from covering the war in Iraq and realized quickly that Afghanistan and 
Iraq were vastly different countries, and wars. “The two countries are both Muslim, but that’s where the 
similarities end. It would be like saying, ‘Well, I covered a war in England, so I could definitely cover a 
war in Bulgaria.’ So you don’t totally get Afghanistan – but the one thing you do know is Washington, you 
get that. So it was easier to write about that for awhile in 2009.” 
 
1147 James. Interview by author. 
 
CHAPTER 11. DYSFUNCTION: AMERICAN JOURNALISTS VIEW OF REPORTERS & OFFICIALS IN 
AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN.  
 
1148 Roger. Interview by author. 
 
1149 Tom. Interview by author; Jason. Interview by author. 
 
1150 Nikki. Interview by author. The presidential palace and cabinet officials may use U.S. media or 
European media to send signals to Western governments, but that’s not the case in parliament. With 
ministers, you can be received immediately – or you have to wait months. Once Afghan officials are named 
in corruption stories in U.S. media, they tend to shun the U.S. media all together. It’s strange, Nikki said, 
that they take so personally what an American newspaper writes about them but “We can’t change what’s 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1151 James. Interview by author. 
 
1152 See: “Afghanistan—State of the News Media in 2009.” Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism. 2010.  
http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2010/year_overview.php  
	  
1153 Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations,” 
Congressional Research Service, March 29, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf 
	  
1154 Tom. Interview by author. So does Karzai’s cabinet. A top defense official complained to Tom that he 
was misquoted and threatened to arrest the local journalist if there was not an official apology. Tom had a 
recording of the quote so the situation defused, but it showed to him how seriously the Afghan government 
took American news stories.  
 
1155 Maya. Interview by author. Maya is convinced that whatever relationship she created with Afghan 
officials is because she is a woman, and they were more willing to speak with her because they did not find 
her threatening. “I really do think they think that women are stupider than men. So that helps sometimes 
because people don’t expect much of you. I think they’ve learned that’s not the case, since,” she said.  
 
1156 Nikki. Interview by author.  
	  
1157 Nikki. Interview by author; Jason. Interview by author. The idea that elite American news organizations 
are the agenda setter for local news was the same in other countries where there is a strong U.S. presence, 
like Iraq, Nikki and Jason said. 
 
1158 James. Interview by author; Jason. Interview by author. 
 
1159 Nikki. Interview by author; Maya. Interview by author. 
 
1160 Nathan. Interview by author. 
 
1161 Maya. Interview by author; James. Interview by author; Jason. Interview by author. 
 
1162 A friend of Maya’s who is the CEO of a large company was recently approached by a TV reporter who 
told him he had evidence that the CEO was corrupt. “And I believe my friend to be honest and not corrupt, 
although I could be fooled by him. But he was strong enough to say I’m not going to give you $500 to not 
run this story. You do find journalists who put people in a tough spot to extract money,” Maya said. 
 
1163 Jason. Interview by author; Maya. Interview by author; Nikki. Interview by author; Nathan. Interview 
by author; Roger. Interview by author. 
 
1164 Nikki. Interview by author; Nathan. Interview by author. 
 
1165 James. Interview by author; Nathan. Interview by author. 
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1168 James. Interview by author; Jason. Interview by author; Nikki. Interview by author; Maya. Interview by 
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The argument of this dissertation is that elite Afghan and Pakistani journalists 
routinely use American news for source material to report on and create meaning of 
events in their countries, and the entire South Asia region. They do this because the 
United States is perceived to be a hegemon that is particularly central to the health of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan’s economy and security, in addition to the various constraints 
placed on them to report quality news. U.S. journalists, especially those who represent 
elite publications, are therefore powerful but overlooked players in the international 
conflict.  They not only influence U.S. policymakers and the American public, but are 
taken to represent the views of the United States in a compact form that Afghan and 
Pakistani journalists can recycle and relay to their audiences. U.S. journalists’ 
representation of both Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s realities, and the U.S. government’s 
policy towards both countries, make them unofficial diplomats for anyone seeking to 
understand U.S. thought about, and action within, the South Asia region.   
Since I was studying how journalists used the work of their American peers, I 
concluded that the best approach was to speak with Afghan and Pakistani journalists 




This qualitative study seeks to explain Afghan and Pakistani journalists’ philosophies 
through the analysis of interviews.1201 In-depth interviews are an intensive method that is 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
allows for observation of non-verbal responses, and can be influenced by the dynamic 
between the interviewer and the interviewee.1201 I might have used ethnography, 
participant-observation, or a quantitative analysis of Afghan or Pakistani news products. 
But possible biases and interpretations can be subtle in print or broadcast transcripts, and 
these are not always available. In-depth qualitative interviews, however, allow journalists 
to explore, in their own words, their approaches to their own work and their use of U.S. 
news narratives about their countries. Robert Lane, in his book, Political Ideology, noted 
that in-depth interviewing provides the opportunity for discursiveness, rambling, 
anecdote, argument, moral comment and rationalization.  It provides the opportunity for 
extensive probing, testing and reflecting, and thus insight into  connotative meanings.1201 
This method allows the journalists to reflect at length on their habits and philosophies 
toward journalism, and how they justify and make meaning of the current conflict for 
national audiences.1201  
Scholarship on Afghan and Pakistani journalists is rare. 1201 Non-governmental 
organization and think tank reports lack in-depth interviews. Such interviews enabled me 
to develop a detailed description of journalistic life in the capitals of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, to integrate multiple perspectives, describe the journalists’ thinking processes, 
learn their interpretations – and give inside accounts of journalistic experiences.1201 
Afghan and Pakistani journalists, who are creating habits and relaying interpretations 
almost daily, are in position to observe themselves, their peers, government officials, and 
the public they reach – as well as American journalism.  
I was able to gain access to their experiences and views through interviews that 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
understood their situations, and the conceptual frameworks they used to make sense of 
their role as journalists, their relationships with their governments and their relationship 
with American news.1201 I kept to a structured interview schedule, but also allowed 
respondents to deviate. I worked to steer the conversations toward topics relevant to my 
study, but my subjects at times provided unexpected insight or color that enriched it.1201 
Whenever possible, I dug to understand where these understandings came from. Many of 




In 2003, I began traveling to Afghanistan and Pakistan for jobs in media and public 
affairs. My capacity in both countries as a State Department official and a staff member 
with the non-governmental organization, The Asia Foundation, enabled me to create 
relationships that were helpful to me with my research. Those relationships helped me 
begin my fieldwork in 2010 in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the U.S. with relative ease.  
In May and June 2010, I was able to interview 15 Afghan journalists in Kabul. 
Between March 2010 and April 2011, I encountered 27 Pakistani journalists not just in 
Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad, but also in Washington, DC; New York City; and Lahore. 
In the summer of 2012, I returned to Kabul to interview 15 more Afghan journalists and 
reach comparable parity with the Pakistani journalists. Once those interviews were 
completed, I interviewed seven American reporters who regularly cover Afghanistan and 
Pakistan on whether or not they thought Afghan and Pakistani journalists’ perceptions of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Creating a meaningful sample, however, meant targeting American, Afghan and 
Pakistani journalists who represented the most popular news outlets in their countries and 
could be assumed to wield most influence with local publics. These were “elite” 
journalists, those who have “an impact with intellectuals and opinion leaders,” are 
respected within their communities, and have “the biggest impact on the serious thinking 
of a nation.”1201 Each participant signed a Columbia University institutional review board 
(IRB) form that promised confidentiality;1201 therefore, this dissertation withholds 
information that could lead the reader to identify the respondent. Pseudonyms were 
chosen for all respondents. Only their gender, the language in which they report, and the 
medium they use to deliver news is used to draw comparisons. While IRB protocols 
limits me from describing the journalists and the institutions they represent, they are well-
known figures to news consumers in their respective societies. 
Finding elite journalists to speak with meant using the technique of purposive 
sampling, which aims to strategically collect participants that have direct relevance to the 
research questions and have specific characteristics or qualities that will enhance the 
study.1201  Purposive sampling helped me target journalists who represented both print 
and broadcast outlets in both countries; who reported in the English, Urdu or Pashto 
languages in Pakistan; and Dari or Pashto-languages in Afghanistan.1201 Because I was 
also conducting research in a space in which I had previously worked professionally, I 
was also partaking in convenience sampling, or and snowball sampling. In other words, I 
was approaching former colleagues and acquaintances first, and then contacting the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
knew and the people they referred me to, I found the most robust samples of elite 
journalists in both countries.1201 
My samples of elite Afghan and Pakistani journalists show considerable variance 
in how they approach journalism, how they perceive American journalists’ work, and 
how they use American journalism to build their own narratives about current reality. 
Each group of journalists is grappling with their own journalistic and national cultures, 
and with a seemingly ever-proliferating electronic media landscape. Afghan journalists 
especially have seen staggering growth within electronic media, putting new demands on 
a nascent press corps with little experience. In neighboring Pakistan, a dramatic 
expansion of news media has also taken place since 2002, but Pakistanis have a more 
consistent history of civil society and strong tradition of print media. 
 
Interview Schedule & Analysis 
  
My interview schedule included 15 questions, initially tested during a small pilot 
study in spring 2010 with 10 Pakistani journalists based in Washington, DC. The 
questions were then re-assessed for my fieldwork in Kabul, Islamabad and Lahore in the 
summers of 2010 and 2012.  
The first half of the schedule was designed to let the journalists give their impressions 
of the media spaces their worked within – how far they had come since the U.S. war in 
Afghanistan began in 2001, and where their news media may be going; their general 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
their role in the conflict. It also included questions that encouraged them to comment on 
press-state relations in their country. These questions included:  
• What is your job in journalism? 
• What type of news do you normally cover? 
• How has media in your country developed the past decade? 
• What is the difference between print and broadcast media? 
• Do you think that media has an influence on your government? 
• Do you think media has an influence on public opinion? 
• Do you think that the public trusts the media? 
• Is there a TV channel or newspaper that is the most influential? 
• Do you think there is much distinction between what is news and what is 
opinion in media here? 
• Do you foresee a positive future about the direction of the news media in your 
country?   
The second half of the schedule was intended to discover specifically how the 
respondents used U.S. news about their country (and the greater South Asia region), what 
they thought of it, and how – if at all – they relayed it to their respective audiences. These 
questions included:   
• How much American news do you follow? 
• Which American newspapers, channels, or websites do you follow regularly? 
(Why? How often do you check them?) 
• Do you use American news articles as sources for your own reporting? 
• How often do you cite American news stories in your own stories?; Please 
describe your thoughts about American news about your country 
• Do you read American editorials/opinions about your country? If so, what do 
you think about them? 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• Do you think the American press is an official representation of the U.S. 
government? 
• In your opinion, what is the most repeated storyline that Americans read about 
your country? 
• If you were to use three words to describe American press attitudes towards 
your country, what would they be? 
 
My questions for the American journalists were different in scope, but I also wanted to 
uncover their habits, biases and grounding philosophies toward journalism.  They 
included:  
• How long have you been covering Afghanistan and/or Pakistan? 
• Are you reliant on U.S. officials for information – here or in Washington? 
• Do you feel as if you have the backing of the U.S. government should you be 
threatened or at risk here? 
• Do you depend on Afghan and/or Pakistani officials for information? 
• What audience do you think you are writing for?  
• Do you think about the transnational audience, or how your stories may be 
received within the countries you are writing about? 
• Do you think you are covering Afghanistan or Pakistan? Or America’s war 
and foreign policy impact in the countries?  
• What do you say to criticism that U.S. news focuses too much on Washington 
decision-making and security? 
• Who do you follow in the local media? 
• Do you track how your work may be received within Afghanistan or Pakistan? 
• What do you think about the Afghan or Pakistani media’s level of 
professionalism?   
• Do you think it is a fair criticism that you have an inherent bias toward 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
Transcribing, sorting, sifting and integrating the material into a wider analysis took 
months. Each of the 64 respondents provided a great deal of information and it required 
significant time to interpret, summarize and integrate their different viewpoints.1201 Once 
the interviews were transcribed, I coded them into the meta-categories of common 
themes, deviations and journalists’ backgrounds. These largely mirrored the interview 
schedule: How the journalists saw their media environments, and how they used and 
perceived American news. I then re-examined the data and coded it into more detailed 
sub-categories. Mapping these journalists’ thoughts allowed for both coherence and 
inconsistency, but it put them in a “wider web of beliefs” that exist within elite 
journalism communities.1201  
 
Research Limitations  
 
 There are good reasons for a lack of sociological scholarship on Afghanistan in 
general, although it certainly has increased in the past decade. Due to years of war that 
ravaged the country, Afghan intellectuals fled; and then Taliban control of the country 
dictated that education focus on religion. In Pakistan, there is certainly more academic 
work.  Dozens of universities and think tanks produce regular commentary and analysis 
by Pakistanis about Pakistan, often in English. But for westerners trying to advance 
research on the countries, there are multiple barriers to doing so. Language, security 
precautions and the difficulty of travel to remote locations make social inquiry inherently 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
I focused on elite journalists not just because they are influential but because they 
could speak English. While I speak intermediate-level Farsi, of which Dari is a dialect, I 
do not speak Pashto or Urdu, which made conversing in English necessary. The 
journalists’ level of education made them appreciate the contribution they were making to 
scholarship and willing to speak at length about their experiences and opinions. These 
English-speaking, elite journalists would often report in two languages and, because they 
could speak English, they were most affected by western media development programs 
and regularly used U.S. journalism as source material for their reportage.  
I would be remiss, however, if I did not acknowledge the limitations of my own 
identity as a researcher in these countries as well as the biases journalists may have had 
toward me because of my nationality, gender and past professional history as an 
American government official. While I believe that I captured their unfiltered, candid 
opinions on the issues I asked out during the interview, it is not entirely unlikely that they 
expected my research to have administrative value for the U.S. government. Despite 
signing a form that clearly communicated their protection of privacy, it is not entirely 
unlikely that – despite every effort to protect their identity – they did not believe I would 
adhere to it.  
The concept of “parachute journalism” is discussed in parts of the dissertation. The 
idea is that journalists spend limited time in a country to get the legitimacy they need to 
publish or broadcast a story that they have more or less pre-determined in their home 
country. It is a constant criticism of western foreign correspondents—their, or their news 
agency’s, for home-country views over reporting undertaken abroad. Given the costs of 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
news, parachute journalism is normal. Parachuting in and out of countries for news 
stories lends itself to episodic journalism.  Instead of a developing “film” of a country, 
we get “snapshots” of specific evens and issues. Because these are normally matters of 
disaster or war, the image of the country are distorted.  The western audience encounters 
a country as a field of chaos and craziness.  
I would also be remiss if I didn’t acknowledge that, to a certain extent, my own 
research was a fort of parachute journalism. For the sake of this research project, my time 
in Afghanistan amounted to approximately three months; in Pakistan, it was just six 
weeks. Collectively, however, I have spent 1.5 years in the countries over the course of 
nine years, which gives me some long-term perspective on the places and the ability to 
filter out the most salient issues worthy of exploration.   
 
 
 
 
 
